Pelletier v. Lewistonf Auburn Water Pollution Control Authority
| Decision Date | 29 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | CV-14-336 |
| Parties | MICHAEL PELLETIER, Plaintiff v. LEWISTON AUBURN WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AUTHORITY, CLAYTON M. RICHARDSON, and IRENE ASSELIN, Defendants |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff Michael Pelletier is an employee of defendant Lewiston Auburn Water Pollution Control Authority. He alleges that he was never told he could join the Maine Public Employees Retirement System ("MPERS") plan and that defendants intentionally concealed from him the fact that he could become a member since he began working in 1999. Mr Pelletier brings seven counts: fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud (count I); breach of contract (count II); due process violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (count III); administrative review under M.R. Civ. P. SOB (count IV) wages earned claim under 26 M.R.S. § 626-A (count V); quantum meruit (count VI); and equitable estoppel (count VII). Defendants have moved to dismiss all counts. For the following reasons, the motion is granted in part and denied in part
The following facts are alleged in the complaint and taken as true for deciding defendants' motion to dismiss. Mr Pelletier began working for the Lewiston/Auburn Water Pollution Control Authority ("the Authority") in April 1999. (Compl. ¶1.) The Authority is a non-profit entity tasked with treating and disposing of wastewater from Lewiston and Auburn. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Defendant Clayton Richardson has been Superintendent of the Authority since before Mr. Pelletier was hired. (Compl. ¶ 3.) Defendant Irene Asselin was an employee with the Authority from before Mr. Pelletier was hired until 2007. (Compl. ¶4.)
As a "Participating Local District, " the Authority maintained a retirement plan under a contract with MPERS to provide coverage for eligible employees who elected to become members under the plan.[1] (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8.) As more employees joined the plan, the Authority's "employer share" of the costs of the plan increased. (Compl ¶ 8.) Employees are also required to contribute an "employee share" under the program, which is deducted by the Authority from members' paychecks. (Compl. ¶ 7.) Mr. Pelletier was eligible to become a member of the MPERS plan. (Compl. ¶ 7.)
The Authority did not inform Mr. Pelletier that the plan existed or that he was entitled to enroll. (Compl. ¶ 13.) As a result, the Authority has never contributed its employer's share, and Mr. Pelletier's employee's share has never been deducted from his paychecks. (Compl. ¶ 13.)
The Authority began considering whether to opt out of MPERS as early as March 22, 1996 when the Board of the Authority stated that they should consider not offering membership in the plan. (Compl. ¶ 19(a).) That April, the Board reiterated that it may be wise to encourage new employees not to join MPERS. (Compl. ¶19(b).) The following year in April 1997, the Board announced that the Authority should make an effort to "move away" from the MPERS plan and gave Mr. Richardson discretion in accomplishing that task. (Compl. ¶ 19(c).) Before Mr. Pelletier was hired in April 1999, Ms. Asselin told Mr. Pelletier in an interview that membership in MPERS was not available to him. (Compl. ¶19(d).) Ms. Asselin and Mr. Richardson made similar statements to a prospective employee in June 1999 and maintained that position for all new hires. (Compl. ¶ 19(e)-(f).)
In 2008, the Authority hired a new employee and did not offer membership in MPERS to that employee. (Compl. ¶ 19(g).) The employee protested and was eventually offered membership but was told by Candace Taylor, another employee at the Authority, that "no one is supposed to get that anymore" and that the employee "will be the last one." (Compl. ¶ 19(h).) Thereafter the Authority continued to deny new hires the opportunity to join MPERS. (Compl. ¶19(k)-(l).)
On May 25, 2010, Mr. Pelletier submitted an MPERS membership form stating that he wanted to enroll. (Compl. ¶19(i).) Mr. Pelletier believes that an employee of the Authority altered his application to reflect that Mr. Pelletier was only seeking enrollment in the life insurance part of MPERS and not the retirement plan. (Compl. ¶19(i).)
On August 6, 2012, MPERS informed the Authority that the Authority may not have been consistently offering MPERS membership to eligible employees. (Compl. ¶19(m).) MPERS instructed the Authority that if it no longer wished to offer MPERS membership to employees, it must withdraw from participation. (Compl. ¶19(m).)
Mr. Pelletier alleges that he discovered the Authority's fraudulent conduct in September 2012. (Compl. ¶ 26.) On October 4, 2012, Mr. Richardson told Mr. Pelletier that he should have been allowed to become a member of MPERS in the past but nevertheless refused to allow Mr. Pelletier to enroll on that day. (Compl. ¶ 19(n).) Mr. Richardson falsely told MPERS that Mr. Pelletier had been offered the opportunity to join the retirement plan when he was hired. (Compl. ¶ 19(o).) On December 31, 2013, an investigation by MPERS found that the Authority did not advise Mr. Pelletier that he could join MPERS at the time he was hired. (Compl. ¶ 19(r).)
Mr. Pelletier submitted an application to join the MPERS retirement plan on October 4, 2012. (Compl. ¶ 19(s).) He has since submitted two more applications, one on June 30, 2014 and one on July 10, 2014. (Compl. ¶ 19(s).) Mr. Richardson has refused to process the applications. (Compl. ¶19(s).) Mr. Pelletier filed his complaint on July 29, 2014.
On review of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts the facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint as admitted. Saunders v. Tisher, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830. The court "examine[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." Doe v. Graham, 2009 ME 88, ¶ 2, 977 A.2d 391 (quoting Saunders, 2006 ME 94, ¶ 8, 902 A.2d 830). "For a court to properly dismiss a claim for failure to state a cause of action, it must appear 'beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that might be proven in support of the claim.'" Dragomir v. Spring Harbor Hosp., 2009 ME 51, ¶15, 970 A.2d 310 (quoting Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 885 (Me. 1995)).
In their motion to dismiss, defendants make three primary arguments: (1) plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, (2) defendants are immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act, and (3) plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted for each individual count of the complaint.[2] The court will first address defendants' statute of limitations and Maine Tort Claims Act arguments. The court will then address each individual count in the complaint to determine whether plaintiff has stated a claim.
Defendants first argue that the applicable statutes of limitations bar Mr. Pelletier's claims. Maine's general statute of limitations for civil claims is six years.[3] 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2014). In cases of fraud, the statute of limitations begins to run "when the potential plaintiff discovers that she has a cause of action or when she should have discovered it in the exercise of due diligence and ordinary prudence." Efstathiou v. Aspinquid, Inc., 2008 ME 145, ¶ 17, 956 A.2d 110 (emphasis in original).
Mr. Pelletier filed his complaint on July 29, 2014. Defendants argue that Mr. Pelletier should have discovered that he was eligible to enroll in MPERS before July 29, 2008 and therefore all of his claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Mr. Pelletier has alleged that employees of the Authority, including Mr. Richardson and Ms. Asselin, explicitly lied to him about whether he could join the retirement plan. He alleges that they told prospective employees and told others at the Authority that new hires were not eligible to enroll from the time he was hired up to the present. According to the complaint, Mr. Pelletier did not discover the Authority's alleged fraud until September 2012. Given these allegations and the absence of evidence that Mr. Pelletier should have known that he could enroll in MPERS at any other specific time, the court cannot conclude at this stage that Mr. Pelletier's claims are barred by the statute of limitations.[4]
Defendants next argue that count I of Mr. Pelletier's complaint must be dismissed under the Maine Tort Claims Act because Mr Pelletier was required to provide notice to the Authority, the government entity, within 180 days of the discovery of the cause of action. 14 M.R.S. § 8107 (2014). Defendants are correct about the notice requirement, however, the Maine Tort Claims Act only applies to actions for damages. See 14 M.R.S. § 8103 (). Mr. Pelletier argues that, despite his demand for compensatory damages in his complaint, he may only be entitled to equitable relief under count I. (Pl.'s Opp. Mem. at 15.) Mr. Pelletier goes on to argue that the cause of action may not have even accrued yet because he will not suffer an actual injury until he retires.[5] See Day v. Town of Baileyville, WASHCV-2012-9, at 17 (Me. Super. Ct, Wash. Cnty., Apr. 25, 2014) (). Mr. Pelletier does not dispute defendants' argument that he has failed to file a timely notice under the Maine Tort Claims Act. Thus, Mr. Pelletier is not entitled to recover money damages. The court will consider whether the complaint states a claim...
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