Pellissier v. Reed

• Citation: 134 P. 813,75 Wash. 201
• Parties: PELLISSIER v. REED, Warden of Washington State Penitentiary.
• Decision Date: 30 August 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

134 P. 813

75 Wash. 201

PELLISSIER v. REED, Warden of Washington State Penitentiary.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 30, 1913

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, Walla Walla County; Thos. H Brents, Judge.

Habeas corpus proceedings by Frank Pellissier, by Josephine Castleman, his mother, against C. S. Reed, as warden of the Washington State Penitentiary. From an order denying the writ, the petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Herbert C. Bryson, of Walla Walla, for appellant.

W. V Tanner and John M. Wilson, both of Olympia, for respondent.

CHADWICK J.

Appellant was charged in the superior court of Columbia county with the crime of grand larceny, and was on the 2d day of October 1909, upon his plea of guilty, sentenced to the Washington State Reformatory; the court having found him to be over the age of 16 years.

On the 16th day of August, 1910, the board of managers of the reformatory ordered appellant and 12 others to be transferred to the state penitentiary. Appellant remained in the penitentiary until April 13, 1912, when he was released upon a conditional parole. He was thereafter charged with the crime of burglary in the second degree in the superior court of Franklin county. Upon his plea of guilty he was again sentenced to the reformatory. Pending the execution of this sentence, he was seized under a warrant issued by the superintendent of the penitentiary as one who had violated his parole, and is now held by respondent in virtue of the original order of the board of managers of the reformatory.

Soon after his reincarceration, appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. The original sentence pronounced by the superior court of Columbia county was, as the law seems to contemplate, without qualification or reference to the future conduct of the prisoner. The real and determinative question is whether the board of managers of the reformatory could by its order transfer appellant to the penitentiary. It is contended that the act of the board is illegal and void, in that it involved the exercise of a judicial function. The statute under which authority was exercised is as follows: 'Whenever, in their judgment, the welfare of any prisoner or prisoners confined in any penal institution shall require that any prisoner be removed from one institution to another, the board having control of such institution shall have authority to order such removal.' Section 2278, Rem. & Bal. Code.

In passing, it may be said that appellant relies on section 8585, Rem. & Bal. Code, wherein no discretion to sentence persons between the ages of 16 and 30 years to the penitentiary is given to the court, and other sections of the act of 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 385); but this act is clearly superseded, in so far as it conflicts, by chapter 249 of the act of 1909; particular reference being had to those sections now enumerated as sections 2277, 2278, Rem. & Bal. Code. Only one case that it distinctly in point has been cited. In re Dumford, 7 Kan. App. 89, 53 P. 92. The law of Kansas, under which Dumford was sentenced, is the same as our own. The court exercised the discretion vested in it by statute, and sentenced the prisoner to the penitentiary. He was thereafter removed by order of the board of managers to the state reformatory, and upon his petition for a writ the court held that the order of the board was void, in that it had exercised a judicial function, a power which the Legislature had no authority to grant it, and that the removal operated as a deprivation of a constitutional right, in that no person could be confined in the penitentiary execpt after indictment returned or information filed and a sentence upon a judgment rendered in a court of competent jurisdiction. We will not elaborate upon this case; reference to it will show that in its facts and the statutes and constitutional provisions involved it is on all fours with the instant case.

After mature consideration, the question being an open one in this state, we feel constrained to hold against the authority of the Kansas court. It is our judgment that appellant has not been deprived of any constitutional right neither did the board of managers exercise any of the functions of our courts of record. What are the constitutional rights of a person charged with crime? He shall not be deprived of his liberty without due process of law; he shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; excessive bail shall not be required; he shall have the right to a trial by jury, a right to defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of...