Pelton v. Smith

• Decision Date: 29 September 1908
• Citation: 97 P. 460,50 Wash. 459
• Parties: PELTON v. SMITH.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

97 P. 460

50 Wash. 459

PELTON v. SMITH.

Supreme Court of Washington

September 29, 1908

Appeal from Superior Court, Asotin County; C. F. Miller, Judge.

Action by Grace Deatherage Pelton against Susie M. Smith administratrix of A. J. Smith, deceased. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Daniel Needham and Sturdevant & Bailey, for appellant.

Geo. W Tannahill, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

The appellant is the administratrix of the estate of Dr. A. J Smith, deceased. The respondent presented a claim against the estate for $3,000 and interest, averring that sum to be due for services performed for Dr. Smith in his lifetime, at his special instance and request, as nurse, bookkeeper, and housekeeper, between the dates of February 25, 1898, and February 25, 1903. The claim was rejected by the administratrix, and this suit was instituted to establish the same as a proved claim against his estate. In her answer the administratrix denied the performance of the services alleged, and for a first affirmative defense averred that the respondent, at the time the alleged services were performed, was a member of the family of Dr. Smith, who stood in loco parentis to her, and that any services she may have rendered him were rendered in that relation, without any agreement on his part to pay for them, and without expectation on the part of either of them that such services should be paid for. For a second defense she pleaded an accord and satisfaction between Dr. Smith and respondent, entered into after the performance of the services ceased, in which the respondent accepted certain personal property and certain money in lieu of any claim she might have against Dr. Smith. The action was tried out on these issues to a jury, and resulted in a verdict and judgment against the appellant, establishing the claim as a proved claim against Dr. Smith's estate.

The evidence tended to show that the respondent first entered Dr. Smith's family in 1893 when she was 13 years old; that she performed such services around the household as a daughter of a family in ordinary circumstances usually performs, and attended school during the school year, finally graduating from the local high school in the year 1898. Shortly after this she left the doctor's home and returned to that of her father. Dr. Smith conducted a hospital in connection with his medical practice, and the respondent had shown proficiency as a hospital nurse. He was desirous of having her continue to reside with him, and to that end approached her father and made a proposition to him concerning his daughter's future as an inducement to have her return. The respondent had then reached the age of majority, and the father, without indicating an acceptance of the terms offered, referred the doctor to the respondent. Shortly thereafter he approached the respondent, with the result that she again entered into his service, and continued therein as his housekeeper, bookkeeper, and nurse, until some time in 1903, when she married with the doctor's consent and left his home for a home of her own. Dr. Smith died a few months thereafter. The claim presented against his estate was for services rendered during the time she resided in his household after re-entering it in 1898.

That the services were faithfully performed and of the value claimed for them the record abundantly shows. Indeed, at times the respondent's duties were most arduous, leaving no respite other than a few hours for sleep out of the 24, and consisting of the most servile drudgery. So fully was this part of the case proven that but little effort was made to combat it; the defense directing its effort to show that the services were rendered while the doctor and the respondent sustained the relation of parent and child, without promise of remuneration on the one side or expectation of receiving it on the other, and to the second defense, namely, that such pecuniary differences as did exist between them were mutually settled during the doctor's lifetime.

The evidence as to the agreement between the doctor and the respondent, made at the time she entered his household the second time, is from necessity indirect and circumstantial. It seems not to have been overheard by any third person, and the respondent could not testify concerning it, because of the statute. Its nature, however, is clearly indicated by the indirect and circumstantial evidence. The father testifies that at the time the doctor spoke to him, seeking to induce the daughter to return, he proposed to complete her education along particular lines, to make her the beneficiary of a certain life insurance policy he held and a general heir of his estate, and also to board and clothe her according to her station in life. It was shown that after the respondent's return to his household he did send her away to school for a year while she perfected herself in stenography and bookkeeping, that he supplied her with...