Penate v. Kaczmarek
| Decision Date | 17 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:17-30119-KAR |
| Parties | ROLANDO PENATE, Plaintiff, v. ANNE KACZMAREK, JOSEPH BALLOU, ROBERT IRWIN, RANDY THOMAS, and SONJA FARAK, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COLLATERALLY ESTOP DEFENDANT ANNE KACZMAREK FROM CONTESTING FACTUAL FINDINGS OF SPECIAL HEARING OFFICER, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFNDANT ANNE KACZMAREK, AND ANNE KACZMAREK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING (DKT. NOS. 298, 307, AND 313)
Rolando Penate (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Anne Kaczmarek (“Defendant”) and others after having spent over five years in Massachusetts state prison based on his criminal conviction for drug distribution, a conviction which was ultimately dismissed with prejudice as a result of evidence that Sonja Farak, a drug laboratory chemist, was stealing and using lab samples to feed a drug addiction at the time she was testing and certifying the samples in Plaintiff's case.[1] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by suppressing evidence of the extent of Farak's misconduct. Presently before the court is Plaintiff's motion to collaterally estop Defendant from contesting the factual findings of a Special Hearing Officer of the Board of Bar Overseers in a “Hearing Report” issued on July 9, 2021, in connection with attorney disciplinary proceedings against Defendant (Dkt. No. 298), Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment against Defendant on Count III of his complaint alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkt No. 307), and Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff on Count III of his complaint (Dkt. No. 313).[2] The parties have consented to this court's jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73 (Dkt. No. 92). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion for collateral estoppel (Dkt No. 298) is DENIED, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 307) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 313) is DENIED.
Pursuant to federal common law rules of preclusion, “when a state agency ‘acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,' United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966), federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the State's courts.” Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 789 (1986) (reaching its holding relative to the plaintiff's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has “held that the ‘judicial doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, provides that “[w]hen an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, . the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”'” Brunson v. Wall, 541 N.E.2d 338, 340 (Mass. 1989) (quotingMartin v. Ring, 514 N.E.2d 663, 664 (Mass. 1987)). Thus, “[o]rdinarily to preclude relitigation of an issue there must exist “identity of cause of action and issues, the same parties, and judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.'” Id. (quoting Almeida v. Travelers Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Mass. 1981)). Mutuality of parties is not always required, however. Id. The offensive use of collateral estoppel, which occurs when a plaintiff seeks to prevent a defendant from litigating issues that the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action against another party, “‘does not require mutuality of parties, so long as there is an identity of issues, a finding adverse to the party against whom it is being asserted, and a judgment by a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.'” Bellermann v. Fitchburg Gas & Elec. Light Co., 18 N.E.3d 1050, 1065 (Mass. 2014) (quoting Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 990 N.E.2d 997, 1039 (Mass. 2013)). “Additionally, ‘the determination of the issue for which preclusion is sought must have been essential to the underlying judgment.'” Id. (quotingMatter of Brauer, 890 N.E.2d 847, 857 (Mass. 2008)). See also DeGiacomo v. City of Quincy, 63 N.E.3d 365, 369 (Mass. 2016) (quoting Kobrin v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 832 N.E.2d 628, 634 (Mass. 2005)) (“A party is precluded from relitigating an issue where ‘(1) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication; (2) the party against whom preclusion is asserted was a party (or in privity with a party) to the prior adjudication; and (3) the issue in the prior adjudication was identical to the issue in the current adjudication,' was essential to the earlier judgment, and was actually litigated in the prior action.”). “Offensive issue preclusion may apply to the findings of an administrative agency ‘so long as the tribunal rendering judgment ha[d] the legal authority to adjudicate the dispute.'” Bellerman, 18 N.E.3d at 1065 (quoting Alba v. Raytheon Co., 809 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Mass. 2004)). “The burden of demonstrating that an issue is precluded ‘is always on the person raising the bar.'” Mullins v. Corcoran, 172 N.E.3d 759, 767 (Mass. 2021) (quoting Fireside Motors, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 479 N.E.2d 1386, 1390 (Mass. 1985)). “A judge has wide discretion in deciding whether the doctrine should apply in a particular case.” Bellermann, 18 N.E.3d at 1065 (citing Matter of Brauer, 890 N.E.2d at 857).
If a plaintiff establishes the initial requirements of preclusion, “the ‘central inquiry' becomes whether the defendant had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action.'” Bellermann, 18 N.E.3d at 1065 (quoting Pierce v. Morrison Mahoney LLP, 897 N.E.2d 562, 572 (Mass. 2008)). “Ultimately, ‘[f]airness is the “decisive consideration” in determining whether to apply offensive issue preclusion.'” Pierce, 897 N.E.2d at 572 (quoting Matter of Goldstone, 839 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Mass. 2005)). The fairness determination involves asking whether: “‘(1) the party in whose favor the estoppel would operate could have joined the original action, (2) the party against whom it would operate had an adequate incentive to defend the original action vigorously, (3) “the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor of the defendant, ” and (4) “the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.”'” Bellermann, 18 N.E.3d at 1066 (quoting Matter of Brauer, 890 N.E.2d at 859). “The party facing preclusion bears the burden of proof on the question of fairness.” Id. at 1066-67 (citing Bailey v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 505 N.E.2d 908, 911 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)). A trial court judge has “‘wide discretion in determining whether' applying offensive collateral estoppel ‘would be fair to the defendant.'” Pierce, 897 N.E.2d at 731 (quoting Bar Counsel v. Bd. of Bar Overseers, 647 N.E.2d 1182, 1185 (Mass. 1995)). “Reasonable doubts are resolved against an asserted preclusion.” Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 546 F.Supp. 1251, 1271 (D.P.R.) aff'd in part, reversed in part on other grounds sub nom In Re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982). See also Milton Bradley Co. v. Diamantis, Civ. A. No. 85-0099-F, 1986 WL 11268, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 9, 1986) (citing Bouchard, Inc. v. United States, 583 F.Supp. 477, 482 (D. Mass. 1984)).
On June 28, 2019, Bar Counsel filed a Petition for Discipline against Defendant and two other former Assistant Attorneys General alleging numerous acts of misconduct related to the Attorney General's prosecution of Farak and referencing violations of a number of Rules of Professional Responsibility, including: Rule 1.1, Competence; Rule 1.2(a), Scope of Representation; Rule 1.3, Diligence; Rule 3.3(a), Candor Toward the Tribunal; Rule 3.4, Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel; Rule 3.8, Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor; Rule 4.1, Truthfulness in Statements to Others; Rule 5.1, Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers; Rule 5.3, Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants; and Rule 8.4, Misconduct (Dkt. No. 299-21 at 1). The Board of Bar Overseers appointed a Special Hearing Officer (“SHO”), who held a disciplinary hearing by videoconference over twenty-three days during the Fall of 2020 (Dkt. No. 299-21 at 4). During the hearing, the SHO admitted 305 exhibits and heard testimony from fifteen witnesses (Dkt. No. 299-21 at 4). Thereafter, on July 9, 2021, the SHO issued a 92-page Hearing Report containing his findings of fact and conclusions of law (Dkt. 299-21). Defendant waived any objections to the SHO's findings by not filing a brief on appeal setting forth her objections.
Pursuant to the Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers, the Board must now review the case, at which time it may adopt the findings of the SHO or revise any findings which it determines to be erroneous, “paying due respect for the role of the special hearing officer as the sole judge of credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing.” SJC Rule 4:01, § 8(5)(a). If the Board determines that formal proceedings should be concluded by suspension or disbarment, or if it determines formal proceedings should be concluded by dismissal, admonition, or public reprimand and a demand is made, it must file an Information with the Clerk of the Supreme...
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