Pendergrass v. State
| Decision Date | 09 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 36043,36043 |
| Citation | 245 Ga. 626,266 S.E.2d 225 |
| Parties | PENDERGRASS v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Jerry Boykin, Thomas M. Jackson, Macon, for appellant.
H. R. Thompson, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Malone, Asst. Dist. Atty., Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Mary Beth Westmoreland, Staff Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant was convicted of the murder of Camilla Jones, and she was sentenced to life imprisonment. We affirm.
Evidence introduced by the state showed that the appellant's daughter and the victim had been involved in an altercation on the day of the murder. Elvyn Peebles, who was the appellant's boyfriend, testified that he heard gunshots coming from the victim's house that night. He saw the appellant coming out of the back door, and he went inside the house and found the victim lying on the floor, dead. Peebles testified that he could not calm the appellant down or get her to tell him what had happened. Peebles further testified that he wrapped the victim's body in a spread and took it to an area where it was later found.
Peebles was initially arrested for the murder. However, he told the police that the appellant had committed the murder, and he agreed to testify against her. The bullet recovered from the victim's body was shown to have been fired from a gun owned by the appellant. The appellant was subsequently indicted for the murder. Initially, the appellant told the police that she had fired the pistol on her back porch on the night the victim was shot. The appellant later gave a written statement to the police in which she maintained that Peebles had come to her house and told her that he shot the victim, and she saw him take the body and put it in the trunk of his car. However, the appellant later gave another written statement to the police in which she denied knowing anything about the murder, but she admitted seeing Peebles on the night of the murder and she said he was acting funny.
The foregoing statements made by the appellant were admitted in evidence after the trial court conducted a Jackson v. Denno hearing outside of the jury's presence and determined that the appellant made the statements freely and voluntarily after being advised of her Miranda rights. The trial court charged the jury that alleged statements by the defendant had been admitted in evidence and before considering these alleged statements, they had to determine (1) whether the appellant was warned of her constitutional rights and clearly understood and knowingly gave up those rights, and (2) whether the statements were freely and voluntarily given. The trial court further charged the jury that they should consider with great caution evidence of any admission or incriminatory statement.
1. In the first and fourth enumerations of error, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting these statements made by her, and in charging the jury concerning them, because they constitute neither confessions, admissions, nor incriminatory statements. We disagree. In our opinion, the jury was fully authorized to conclude that these statements made by the appellant were incriminatory admissions.
"An admission, as applied to criminal cases, is the avowal or acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, and only tending to prove the offense charged, but not amounting to a confession of guilt." Riley v. State, 1 Ga.App. 651, 654, 57 S.E. 1031, 1032 (1907). An acknowledgment by the defendant that he was present at or near the scene of the crime, while not a confession, can be found by the jury to be incriminatory in light of other facts. Kidd v. State, 101 Ga. 528(3), 28 S.E. 990 (1897); Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600(7) (1879). One circumstance which the jury could have properly taken into consideration in determining that the...
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State v. Stepney
...may have an inculpatory effect.' Fletcher v. State, 90 Ga. 468(3) (17 SE 100) (1892)." (Citations omitted.) Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626, 627, 266 S.E.2d 225 (1980). "The statements made out of court by a party-opponent are universally deemed admissible when offered against him"; 4 Wig......
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Waters v. State
...in this case rejected. Further, contrary to the majority's contention, Waters did not admit that she was guilty. See Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626, 627, 266 S.E.2d 225; Robinson v. State, 232 Ga. 123, 126, 205 S.E.2d 210. The evidence showed that Waters' car was parked on the side of th......
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Thomas v. State
...any statements to be inculpatory. This was not error. Birks v. State, 237 Ga. 861, 863, 230 S.E.2d 294 (1976); Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626, 627(1), 266 S.E.2d 225 (1980). The jury could consider the statement as a guilty denial, and it could reject the explanation of the denial as not......
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Cromartie v. State
...test. See OCGA § 40-5-67.1(b)(2) (defendant's refusal to submit to test may be admitted as evidence at trial); Pendergrass v. State, 245 Ga. 626, 627(1), 266 S.E.2d 225 (1980) (jury properly considered defendant's admission tending to prove the crime charged); Sieveking v. State, 220 Ga.App......