Peninsula Properties Co. v. Santa Cruz County

• Citation: 235 P.2d 635,106 Cal.App.2d 669
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 28 September 1951
• Parties: PENINSULA PROPERTIES CO., Limited, et al. v. SANTA CRUZ COUNTY et al. Civ. 14938.

Page 635

235 P.2d 635

106 Cal.App.2d 669

PENINSULA PROPERTIES CO., Limited, et al. v. SANTA CRUZ COUNTY et al.

Civ. 14938.

District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

Sept. 28, 1951.

Hearing Denied Nov. 26, 1951.

Carlyle Miller, Aptos, for petitioner.

June D. Borina, Dist. Atty., Santa Cruz County, Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., E. G. Benard, Deputy, Wyckoff, Gardner, Parker & Boyle, Watsonville, and Lucas, Wyckoff & Miller, Santa Cruz, for respondents.

PETERS, Presiding Justice.

There are pending before this court a petition for a writ of supersedeas filed by the plaintiffs, and motions by defendants to dismiss certain appeals taken by plaintiffs. The key question presented is whether a judgment upholding certain tax deeds to the state and entered by the trial court on January 9, 1951, is or is not an appealable judgment. This turns upon whether that judgment is an interlocutory judgment, or a final judgment within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The controversy involves some 1100 parcels of land in Santa Cruz County. The plaintiffs have paid none of the special assessments levied against the lots since 1935, and have paid no county taxes since about 1940. In the year 1940 practically all of the parcels were deeded to the state for non-payment of the special assessments. Thus, since 1940, the state has had absolute title to the lots, which title was subject to defeasance if the former owner exercised his privilege of redemption in the manner provided by statute. People v. Maxfield, 30 Cal.2d 485, 183 P.2d 897.

Ever since 1935 the plaintiffs have disputed the validity of the special assessments. In 1946 they commenced an action, primarily aimed at testing the validity of these assessments, and the sales and tax deeds based thereon. The complaint is entitled 'Complaint to Determine Validity of Tax Sales and Tax Deeds, and for Declaratory Relief,' and states five causes of action.

The first cause of action, and the main one here involved, was brought pursuant to Chap. 5.7 of Part 6 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, and challenges the validity of the tax deeds issued to the state. In addition to the county and state, various public taxing agencies and revenue districts were joined as defendants pursuant to the provisions of section 3623 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

The second, third and fourth causes of action sought to determine the validity of certain tax deeds issued to third party purchasers at tax sales. The third cause of action was dismissed prior to trial.

The fifth cause of action was for declaratory relief, the plaintiffs praying for a judgment declaring their rights and duties and the rights and duties of the public bodies and officials involved in reference to:

A. A certain contract between Peninsula Properties Company, one H. Loomis, and the county of Santa Cruz;

B. The existence of liens upon many of the parcels here involved arising out of the levy in 1930 of special assessments thereon under the County Improvement Act of 1921, Stats.1921, p. 1658, Chap. 872, and in the manner provided by the Improvement Bond Act of 1915, Stats.1915, p. 1441, Chap. 733;

C. The validity of the sales to the state and the tax deeds issued to it by reason of the failure of plaintiff to pay the installments on the special assessments;

D. An accounting of the redemption fund created by the county treasurer for the payment of the bonds.

Answers and cross-complaints of the various defendants were filed in which the state sought to quiet its titles based on the tax deeds, and the individual defendants sought to quiet their titles to the parcels conveyed to them. In addition, the state, by cross-complaint and pursuant to the provisions of sections 3651 and 3652 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, sought to recover rents, issues and profits allegedly taken by plaintiffs from some of the properties since they were deeded to the state.

The trial was had partly in 1948 and partly in 1950. The trial judge then rendered a memorandum opinion in which he stated that he was of the opinion that all of the tax proceedings involved were regular and valid; that all of the causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations; that any defects in the delinquency proceedings were cured by certain tax validation statutes; and that the state, on its cross-complaint, was entitled to a judgment against plaintiffs for $32,621.22 for rents received by plaintiffs from the tax-deeded lands. Defendants were directed to prepare findings in accordance with this opinion. The opinion is dated September 13, 1950. Findings of fact, conclusions of law and the judgment were signed on January 2, 1951, and the judgment was filed January 9, 1951. The judgment is entitled: 'Interlocutory Judgment on the First Count of the Complaint Pursuant to section 3627 Revenue and Taxation Code and Final Judgment on Cross-Complaints and Second, Fourth and Fifth Counts of the Complaint.'

On January 5, 1951, plaintiffs secured from the trial court, ex parte, an order staying execution of these judgments for ten days after the determination of any motion for a new trial that might be filed. The main purpose of this stay was to try to extend the period in which plaintiffs could redeem, because the judgment, in disposing of the first cause of action, provided, as required by section 3627 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, that plaintiffs had ninety days from the date of the entry of the judgment to redeem, and that, if they did not redeem within that period, the right of redemption was forever lost. This ninety-day period would expire on April 9, 1951.

On February 8, 1951, plaintiffs served a notice of intention to move for a new trial. On March 13, 1951, the plaintiffs, again ex parte, secured from the trial court an amended order purporting to stay execution which specifically provided that the period of redemption should not terminate until thirty days after the determination of the motion for a new trial. The defendants thereupon filed a notice of motion for an order vacating this amended order staying execution.

On March 30, 1951, plaintiffs filed exceptions to the findings, a motion to vacate the judgment, a motion for an order directing the manner of redemption, a motion for an order directing segregation on partial redemption of property, and notice of motion for the appointment of a referee. A hearing was had on these various matters and all of them, including the motion for a new trial, were denied on April 6, 1951.

On April 7, 1951, the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from the judgment of January 9, 1951, and from the order denying the motion for a new trial, from the order refusing to vacate the judgment, from the order denying plaintiffs' motion for an order directing the manner of redemption, and from the order denying plaintiffs' motion for an order directing segregation on partial redemption of property.

On this same day--April 7, 1951--the county auditor informed plaintiffs that the period of redemption would expire on April 9, 1951, and that he had been advised that the amended order staying execution beyond that date was void, and for that reason would be disregarded.

On April 9, 1951, plaintiffs filed this petition for a writ of supersedeas, requesting this court to suspend generally the enforcement of the judgment during the hearing of the pending appeals, and specifically to extend their period of redemption pending the hearing of said appeals. This court, after an informal hearing with all counsel, issued an order to show cause why such a writ should not issue, an order preserving the status quo, and an order staying all proceedings in the action (with the exception of the money judgment granted the state) until the final determination of the order to show cause.

On May 7, 1951, defendants filed a notice of motion to dismiss the appeals of plaintiffs from the interlocutory decree upon the first cause of action, and from the orders denying the four motions above enumerated. It is the theory of these motions that the four orders and the interlocutory decree are not appealable. It will be noted that defendants do not seek to dismiss the appeals from that portion of the judgment disposing of the second, fourth or fifth causes of action, nor do they seek to dismiss the appeal from the money judgment secured by the state on its cross-complaint.

The proceedings on the writ of supersedeas and the motions to dismiss have been consolidated for consideration.

The basic question involved is whether the so-called 'interlocutory' judgment on the first cause of action is an appealable judgment. Plaintiffs urge that, regardless of its designation, the judgment is, in fact, a final judgment and therefore appealable. The judgment provides the following:

1. That plaintiffs take nothing by their action;

2. That each one of the tax deeds is valid in all respects; that the delinquent taxes and assessments upon the basis of which the deeds were executed are valid in all respects; and that the various funds of the county of Santa Cruz out of which advances were made to the 2-B Bond Redemption Fund are entitled to be first reimbursed out of any surplus that may remain in that fund;

3. That the title to the described properties is quieted in the State of California; that 'within minety (90) days from the date of this Interlocutory Judgment, if the right or privilege of redemption has not been previously terminated, redemption may be made with the usual penalties and costs provided by law; but if redemption is not so made within said ninety (90) day period, then all further right or privilege of redemption shall stop, cease and terminate as to all of said real property, whereupon a final judgment shall be entered which shall recite whether or not said real property has been redeemed within said ninety (90) day period, and as to any of said real property not so...