Peniston v. Hydraulic Press Brick Co.

• Decision Date: 01 June 1911
• Parties: PENISTON et al. v. HYDRAULIC PRESS BRICK CO. et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

138 S.W. 532

234 Mo. 698

PENISTON et al. v. HYDRAULIC PRESS BRICK CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

June 1, 1911.

1. QUIETING TITLE (§ 30)—JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION—PARTIES AND INTERESTS INVOLVED.

Rev. St. 1899, § 650, as amended by Laws 1909, p. 343, now Rev. St. 1909, § 2535, which gives the right to institute an action to quiet title "against any person or persons having or claiming to have title, estate or interest in such property," and authorizing the court to adjudge "by its judgment or decree, the title, estate or interest of the parties severally in and to such real property," must be construed with section 651 (section 2536), which, in effect, directs that the proceedings shall conform in all respects to the Code of Civil Procedure, so that for the rules regulating joinder of parties and causes of action and the rules of equity recourse must be had to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. PLEADING (§ 349) — JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS—ADMISSIONS IN PLEADINGS.

Rev. St. 1899, § 602, provides that, if a petition does not show on its face a misjoinder of causes of action, objection may be taken by answer, otherwise by demurrer. In a suit to quiet title brought under section 650 against 475 defendants, the petition alleged that plaintiffs owned the land in fee, and that defendants "claimed some title, interest or estate, adverse to the estate of the plaintiff therein," and each defendant filed a separate answer describing a lot which he claimed to own in severalty as against plaintiff and as against his codefendants, and disclaimed any interest in the lots claimed by his codefendants or in any other portion of the original tract, and plaintiff's reply denied the new matter except the averments as to claim of ownership of the separate lots and the disclaimers. Held, that defendants were entitled to judgment on the pleadings, as plaintiffs' admissions in their replies rendered the petition multifarious.

3. JURY (§ 13)—RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY— LEGAL OR EQUITABLE.

Under Const. art. 2, § 28, which provides that the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate, and Rev. St. 1899, § 650, as amended by Laws 1909, p. 343, now Rev. St. 1909, § 2535, relating to suits to quiet title and to determine interest in land, a case under section 650 is in law or equity according to circumstances, the question of practice under that section remaining open to be determined by the pleadings and facts of each case, and thereunder all issues triable by a jury prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1875 are still so triable, and cases in which the title hinges alone on facts bringing the case within either the 10 or 30 year statute of limitations, and in which no equities are pleaded, are cases at law.

4. COURTS (§ 90)—RULES OF DECISION—PREVIOUS DECISION AS PRECEDENT.

A decision by the Supreme Court must control the disposition of a subsequent similar case in that court, unless the former case has been overruled.

5. EQUITY (§ 147)—MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS— MULTIFARIOUSNESS.

A party appealing to equity to avoid a multiplicity of suits must obey the rules of pleading and avoid the vice of multifariousness.

6. QUIETING TITLE (§ 5)— JURISDICTION — MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS—PROPERTY RIGHTS.

Where, in a suit to quiet title, a large number of defendants are joined, each of whom, claiming a separate and distinct parcel in the tract described in the petition, answers that he claims the particular lot specifically described by him, and that he owns it in severalty, and that none of the others claim any interest therein, and that he claims no other interest in the whole tract nor any interest in lots claimed by his codefendants, and so stands on his own title and pleads the statute of limitations, there is no common interest or common relation or common question pertaining to the subject-matter which is decisive of the controversy, and hence it does not fall within the reason of equity jurisdiction as to the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits.

7. ESTOPPEL (§ 68)—POSITION IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.

On appeal by the plaintiff in an action to quiet title joining a large number of defendants, each of whom pleaded title to a specific part of the land in controversy, and disclaimed as to all other parts, and averred that as to him the action was severable and demanded a separate trial, a part of the defendants united in a motion to advance the cause, and alleged that plaintiffs claimed through one party and defendants through another, and that the sole question of fact was as to the survivorship between these two parties. Held, that the motion to advance had served its office, and the case stood for disposition as if the motion to advance had never been made, and that its averments did not estop defendants from insisting that there was no common question decisive of the whole controversy which would bring the case within the equity rule of avoiding multiplicity of suits.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; W. B. Homer, Judge.

Action by Robert S. Peniston and others against the Hydraulic Press Brick Company and others. Judgment on the pleadings for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

H. W. Femmer, for appellants, Lubke & Lubke, Eliot, Chaplin, Blayney & Bedal, Theo. C. Eggers, Harmon J. Bliss, Alexander Rahm, Edw. C. Kehr, Rassieur, Schnurmacher & Rassieur, E. W. Pattison, Nagel & Kirby, Stewart, Bryan, Christie & Williams, Harold R. Small, and A. & J. F. Lee, for respondents.

LAMM, J.

Plaintiffs sue in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis in 1906. Defendants are the Hydraulic Press Brick Company, a corporation, and 474 other corporations and individuals. The object of the suit is to try the title and determine the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, respectively, in and to 306 acres of land west of King's Highway in the city of St. Louis. See section 650, R. S. 1899, now section 2535, R. S. 1909. Defendants answered separately. Plaintiffs replied, and thereafter defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. That motion was sustained on the 10th day of February, 1910, and (from a final judgment then rendered) plaintiffs appealed.

In October, 1910, 150 of the defendants filed their motion in banc to advance the cause. The showing made thereby was (among other things) that some of the corporate defendants were using the tracts claimed by them severally for business purposes; that some portion of the land was unimproved, but that for the most part the land was claimed and occupied by individual defendants, who resided thereon in their homes; that from 1,600 to 2,000 people resided there, who were either defendants or members of their families; further, in substance, that the claim of defendants was an ancient and stale one, viz., the same held in judgment by this court in Peniston v. Schlude, 171 Mo. 132, 71 S. W. 146 (wherein dramatic features appealing to the student of early annals are exploited); that the law question raised by the motion for judgment on the pleadings was settled in Chaput v. Bock, 224 Mo. 73, 123 S. W. 16; that plaintiffs' old and shadowy claim was being held in terrorem for the purpose of tribute and speculation over the heads of the residents of St. Louis claiming lots and parcels of land within the described tract, thereby casting a cloud on their titles and preventing alienation and renewals of mortgages; that delay fostered and fed the evil; and that the number of persons interested made the case fall within that class where public and general interest was involved. Taking that view of it, we sustained the motion to advance, and set the cause down for hearing in Division 1 at its April term, 1911.

The question is: Was the motion for judgment on the pleadings well ruled? That question seeks the pleadings, the substance of which follows: The petition describes the land as a single tract by metes and bounds, courses, and distances referring to old landmarks and monuments in St. Louis. Enough appears from the petition to show indirectly that the survey and description of the land relates to the boundaries of an old farm, now a part of the city, and laid out into streets, alleys, lots, and blocks. It takes seven solid printed pages to list the names of the formidable aggregation of churches, schools, companies, trustees, and other individual defendants, and the suit is self-evidently brought against the entire home-owning population in that part of the city. The petition charges that plaintiffs own the land in fee simple, and that defendants "claim some title, interest, or estate adverse to the estate of the plaintiffs therein."

The case runs, here, on the theory that the separate answer of Amos R. Taylor (mutatis mutandis) will do as a sample of all the others. Attending to his, it denied the allegations of the petition, and then sets up title, ownership, and possession in himself to lot 4, block 9 of Fairmount subdivision, a part of the locus in quo. It avers that he claims no title to, interest in, or possession of any other land described in the petition and disclaims any; that he has no claim or interest in common with any defendant or with any other person whatsoever in said land, and claims said lot 4 against all persons. Averring that this action, as to him, is severable and that his defense is distinct from that of his codefendants, he demands a separate trial as to the issues between plaintiffs and him. He also pleads as defenses the 10-year and the 30-year statute of limitations. Each of the other answers raised the same issues. To each of the answers a reply came in the same as to Taylor's, which latter was to the effect that the land had been subdivided into many lots and blocks, but that such subdivision was without authority, knowledge, or consent of plaintiffs. The reply admits that no one of the defendants claimed an interest in all of the property described in the petition, admits that Mr. Taylor makes claim...