Penn Hills Sch. Dist. v. Saunders, Civ. A. No. 18-00118
| Decision Date | 18 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 18-00118 |
| Parties | PENN HILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs, v. SAUNDERS et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
The present case, arising out of a state court tax collection proceeding, was removed to this court under 28 U.S.C § 1443. (ECF No. 1-1.) Pending before the court is a motion to remand by the Penn Hills School District and the Municipality of Penn Hills (collectively "plaintiffs"). (ECF No. 6.) Because the writ of scire facias (the "writ")1 filed by plaintiffs does not provide a basis for this court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction, the case will be remanded to state court.
On February 13, 2017, plaintiffs filed for the writ in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas to collect delinquent taxes levied against the property located at 10214 FrankstownRoad, Penn Hills, PA 15235 (the "property"). (State Docket No. 1.) Greater Northern Capital Investment Group ("Greater Northern") was the record owner of the property and named as the only defendant in the writ. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs subsequently discovered that Rayco Saunders ("Saunders") had filed a quiet title action challenging Greater Northern's ownership of the property.3 (Id. ¶ 6, State Docket No. 3.) Accordingly, by a court order dated July 31, 2017, plaintiffs added Saunders as a defendant and an amended writ was issued on August 3, 2017. (State Docket Nos. 4, 5.)
Saunders found out about the litigation before being served with the writ. (ECF Nos. 1-1 ¶ 10, 6 ¶ 9.) On September 6, 2017, proceeding pro se, he filed an affidavit of defense, asserting various defenses and counterclaims, along with a motion to dismiss. (State Docket Nos. 6, 7.) His motion to dismiss was denied on October 26, 2017. (State Docket No. 9.) On October 30, 2017, Saunders filed a motion for reconsideration, followed by a November 17, 2017 motion requesting certification for an interlocutory appeal. (State Docket Nos. 10, 12.) Both motions remain pending.
While Saunders was actively litigating the matter, plaintiffs had been unsuccessful in their attempts to personally serve him with the writ. On December 11, 2017, they filed a motion for alternative service which was granted on that same date. (State Docket Nos. 14, 15.) Accordingly, the writ was re-issued on December 13, 2017, and plaintiffs effectuated service upon Saunders by posting the re-issued writ on the property on January 2, 2018. (State Docket No. 16, ECF Nos. 1-1 ¶ 17, 6 ¶ 11.) Believing that a new action had been initiated against him, Saunders filed another affidavit of defense and second motion to dismiss on January 12, 2018. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 16, State Docket Nos. 18, 19.) On January 24, 2018, the state court rendered Saunders' second motion todismiss moot because of his pending motions—for reconsideration and interlocutory appeal—and, if not moot, denied it in the alternative. (State Docket No. 21.)
On January 26, 2018, Saunders removed the case to this court by submitting a motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis and filing a removal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. (ECF Nos. 1, 1-1.) He is proceeding pro se and was granted in forma pauperis status on February 26, 2018. (ECF No. 5.) On that same date, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court with an accompanying brief in support. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) On March 12, 2018, Saunders filed a brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion. (ECF No. 11.) Accordingly, the matter is ripe for consideration.
Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009)). A court shall remand a removed case "if at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Saunders filed his removal petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1443. (ECF No. 1-1 pp. 1, 6.) In their motion to remand, however, plaintiffs focus solely on the court's removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 26.) Saunders, in his opposition brief, also appears to have abandonedhis removal claim under §1443. (ECF No. 11.) Accordingly, the court will first discuss the propriety of removal under § 1441, followed by a § 1443 analysis.
Section 1441—the general removal statute—provides:
[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Under § 1447(c), however, removed "[c]ases may be remanded ... for (1) lack of district court subject matter jurisdiction or (2) a defect in the removal procedure." PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993).
District courts have federal question jurisdiction5 over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Jurisdiction under § 1331 is analyzed under "the 'well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (citing Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-113 (1936)). Therefore, "a defendant may not remove a case to federal court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case "arises under" federal law. Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). "[A] case can 'aris[e] under' federal law in two ways." Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013). First, "a case arises under federal law when federal law creates the cause of action asserted." Id. Second, the Supreme Court has "identified a 'special and small category' of" state-law claims "in whicharising under jurisdiction still lies." Id. at 258 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006)).
Plaintiffs, in their motion to remand, assert that the underlying state court proceeding is an "in rem action against the [p]roperty and only seeks relief under Pennsylvania law." (ECF No. 6 ¶ 26.) They correctly argue that, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, the court does not have federal question jurisdiction because the complaint—i.e., the writ to collect delinquent taxes on the property—is based entirely on state law.6 In his opposition brief, Saunders appears to contend that the court has federal question jurisdiction because plaintiffs' claim is pre-empted by federal law—specifically the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 11 pp. 3-7.) This argument, however, necessarily fails because Metro. Life Ins. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). Accordingly, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.7
Section 1446, which governs the procedures applicable to effectuate removal, provides that "[w]hen a civil action is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal of the action." 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has interpreted § 1446 to "require[] unanimity among the defendants." Balazik v. Cnty. of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Martin,178 U.S. 245 (1900); Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, the "[f]ailure of all defendants to join [in a removal petition] is a 'defect in removal procedure' within the meaning of § 1447(c)[.]" Id.
Plaintiffs contend that the removal is procedurally defective because co-defendant Greater Northern did not join in Saunders' removal petition. (ECF No. 6 ¶ 21.) In response, Saunders seems to be arguing that Greater Northern's failure to join in the removal petition is immaterial because the writ incorrectly identified Greater Northern as the owner of the property. (ECF No. 11 p. 2.) Saunders also claims that, in state court, he "consented on record, to remove" Greater Northern from the present case. (Id.) The writ attached with Saunders' removal petition, however, clearly identifies Greater Northern as a co-defendant in this case. (ECF No. 1-4 p. 1.) Therefore, Greater Northern's failure to join in Saunders' removal petition is a procedural defect necessitating remand under § 1447(c).
As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiffs' two arguments—i.e., the well-pleaded complaint rule and the failure of a co-defendant to join in the removal petition—which necessitateremand under §1441(a), are untenable under §1443. Plaintiffs' first argument misses the mark because § 1443 is "a narrow exception to the rule that a state court action may be removed to a federal district court only if federal jurisdiction is evident on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint[.]" Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d Cir. 1997). Their second argument is unpersuasive because there is conflicting case law on the issue of whether all defendants must join in a removal petition under § 1443. See Brown v. Florida, 208 F....
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