Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 21525
| Decision Date | 12 September 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 21525,21525 |
| Citation | 160 Colo. 462,418 P.2d 50 |
| Parties | The PENN MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v. Lois P. GIBSON, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Dawson, Nagel, Sherman & Howard, Michael A. Williams, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Wm. Rann Newcomb, Denver, for defendant in error.
This is a case of first impression in Colorado. The dispute arises out of a claim prosecuted by Lois P. Gibson, the defendant in error, under a double indemnity clause in a life insurance policy. We shall refer to Mrs. Gibson as the beneficiary or plaintiff; to the plaintiff in error as the Company or the defendant; and to the deceased, Edward A. Gibson, by name, as the insured or as the deceased.
The record discloses that on November 15, 1961, Edward A. Gibson insured his life in the face amount of $10,000 with the Company, a Pennsylvania Corporation authorized to do business in Colorado. Attached to the policy was a supplemental agreement which provided for an additional $10,000 benefit in the event of the insured's accidental death. The pertinent policy wording involved is:
'* * * the Double Indemnity Benefit shall not be payable if death results directly or indirectly from * * * (4) the commission by the Insured of an assault or felony; * * *.'
It appears that on June 3, 1963, the insured was involved in an automobile accident west of Denver at the intersection of 20th and Kipling in Jefferson County, Colorado. The evidence reveals that Gibson, while driving his Ford station wagon at a speed of approximately 60 miles per hour, struck the rear end of a pick-up truck which had stopped at the intersection for a traffic light. The cumulative result was as follows: four automobiles sustained damage; one Charles Houck, the driver of another vehicle suffered personal injuries; and the insured died as a result of the collision. An analysis made during an autopsy performed on Gibson revealed that his blood contained .354 per cent ethyl alcohol by weight which was more than sufficient under our statute to presume that he was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident. See 1960 Perm.Supp., C.R.S., Section 13--4--30(1)(c).
The Company paid the beneficiary of the policy, the widow of the deceased, the face amount of the policy; it, however, refused payment of the additional $10,000 under the double indemnity agreement. As a result this action was instituted.
Trial was had to a jury of six. At the close of the Company's case, the plaintiff moved for a directed verdict which was granted by the trial court. Judgment was thereafter rendered in the amount of $10,000 plus interest from October 22, 1963. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied and the Company now seeks relief by way of writ of error.
The basic question presented for our determination is whether the facts as presented bar the recovery under the double indemnity agreement because of the exclusionary provision above quoted.
The Company contends that they do because the deceased was allegedly committing a felony when he was killed, i.e., he was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and injured another person in violation of C.R.S. '53, 40--2--11. The plaintiff's position, both here and in the trial court, is two-pronged, viz.: (1) that the act of the deceased did not constitute a felony within the meaning of the double indemnity agreement; and (2) that, in any event, the felony committed by the insured did not cause his death.
The trial court directed the verdict, however, on the ground that the only felony contemplated by the agreement was one in which an insured set out with 'the intent and purpose of committing a felony.' It thereafter concluded that since the particular felony involved did not meet this criterion, the exclusionary provision could not take effect. For reasons hereinafter set forth, we do not agree with the basis of the trial court's holding; however, since we believe that the trial court's action based on plaintiff's contention was correct, we must affirm.
We note that on the date of the...
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...between the insured's injuries and a felony violation of law. Indeed, as expressed by the Colorado Supreme Court in Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gibson, 12 in order to relieve the insurer of liability in such situations, the insured must have been actually engaged in a felony at the ti......
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...of the FAA regulation and the insured's death. As authority for this causation argument, she relies on Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Gibson, 160 Colo. 462, 418 P.2d 50 (1966). In Penn Mutual, plaintiff sought double indemnity benefits for the death of her husband who was driving while i......
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ARTICLE 3
...or injury to another person does the statute specifically provide that an offense has been committed. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 160 Colo. 462, 418 P.2d 50 (1966). Vehicular assault while driving under the influence is a strict liability crime, and jury was properly instructed on ob......
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ARTICLE 3 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
...or injury to another person does the statute specifically provide that an offense has been committed. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Gibson, 160 Colo. 462, 418 P.2d 50 (1966). Vehicular assault while driving under the influence is a strict liability crime, and jury was properly instructed on ob......