Pennington v. Coxe
| Decision Date | 01 February 1804 |
| Parties | PENNINGTON v. COXE |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
IN the circuit court of the United States for the Pennsylvania district an action was instituted and a feigned issue formed to try the question whether sugar which had been refined and was in the manufactory previous to the 1st of July 1802, was, when sent out for sale, liable to duty under the provisions of the act of congress passed June 5th, 1794, entitled an 'act laying certain duties upon snuff and refined sugars.'
The judgment of the circuit court was in favour of the plaintiff below, and the defendant in that court brought this writ of error.
The second section enacts, that from and after the 30th of September 1794, 'there be levied, collected, and paid upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States, a duty of two cents per pound.'
The third section directs, 'that the duties aforesaid shall be levied, collected and accounted for,' by certain officers therein described.
The fifth section directs, that every refiner of sugar shall make true and exact entry and report in writing, at the office of inspection, of every house or building where such business shall be carried on, and every pan or boiler, together with the capacity of each; and shall also give bond in the sum of five thousand dollars, with condition that he will enter in a book or paper, to be kept for that purpose, all sugar which he shall refine, and the quantities from day to day sent out of the building where the same shall have been refined; and shall on the 1st day of January, April, July and October, in each year, render a just and true account of all the refined sugar which he shall have sent out from the time of the last account rendered, producing and showing therewith the original book or paper whereon the entries from day to day to be made as aforesaid have been made; 'and he shall, at the time of rendering each account, pay or secure the duties which by this act ought to be paid upon the refined sugar in the said account mentioned.'
By the seventh section, it is enacted, that every refiner of sugar shall, yearly, being thereunto required by an officer of inspection, make oath, that the accounts which have been by him rendered of the quantities of refined sugar by him sent out of the building, have been just and true.
By the tenth section, it is enacted, 'that all snuff and refined sugar which shall have been manufactured or made within the United States, in manner aforesaid, after the said 30th day of September next, whereof the duties aforesaid have not been duly paid or secured, according to the true intent and meaning of this act, shall upon default being made in the paying or securing of the said duties, be forfeited, and shall and may be seized as forfeited by any officer of the inspection or of the customs.'
By the eleventh section, the refiner has the option to pay upon rendering his account, 'the duties which shall thereby appear to be due and payable,' with a deduction of six per cent. for prompt payment, or to give bond payable in nine months.
By the eleventh section a drawback of the duties, 'hereby laid upon sugar refined within the United States,' is allowed upon exportation to a foreign port.
But by the sixteenth section, such allowance is not to be made, unless the exporter shall make oath that the duties have been paid or secured.
The twentieth section declares it shall be lawful to export refined sugar directly from the manufactory free from duty.
The first section of the repealing act of April 6th 1802, enacts, 'that from and after the 30th day of June next the internal duties on stills and domestic distilled spirits, on refined sugars, licenses to retailers, sales at auction, carriages for the conveyance of persons, and stamped vellum, parchment and paper, shall be discontinued, and all acts and parts of acts relative thereto, shall, from and after the said 30th day of June next, be repealed:
'Provided, that for the recovery and receipt of such duties as shall have accrued, and on the day aforesaid remain outstanding, and for the payment of drawbacks, or allowances on the exfortation of any of the said spirits, or sugars legally entitled thereto, and for the recovery and distribution of fines, penalties and forfeitures, and the remission thereof, which shall have been incurred before and on the said day, the provisions of the aforesaid acts shall remain in full force and virtue.'
[Argument of Counsel from pages 36-51 intentionally omitted]
In this case a single point is presented to the court. The plaintiff in error was a refiner of sugar, in the city of Philadelphia, and had a large quantity of refined sugars in his refinery, on the 1st of July 1802.
In April 1802, congress passed an act to repeal the internal taxes. The first section of the repealing law enacts 'that from and after the 30th day of June next, the internal duties,' &c.
To recover the duty on sugars refined before the 30th of June, and sent out afterwards, this action was brought. The single question is, whether the duty had then accrued, and was on that day outstanding? This is admitted on both sides; and the repealing law is to be construed as if it had passed on the 30th of June, to take effect immediately, and the proviso had been expressed in words of the present tense, thus, 'provided, that for the recovery and receipt of such duties as have now accrued, and now remain outstanding, the provisions of the aforesaid act shall remain in full force and virtue.'
Had the duty accrued, and was it outstanding in contemplation of the legislature, on sugars refined, but not sent out of the building in which the operation was performed?
The solution of this question depends on the construction of the act by which the duty was imposed.
This act passed in June 1794, and is entitled 'an act laying certain duties on snuff and refined sugars.' The first section imposes a duty on snuff which shall be manufactured after the 30th of September then next ensuing, and the second section is in these words: 'and be it further enacted, that from and after the said 30th day of September next, there be levied, col-
lected and paid upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States a duty of two cents per pound.'
The fourth section of the act contains provisions respecting the duty on snuff, and the fifth section, after making several regulations requiring the refiner of sugars to report the building and utensils to be employed in the manufacture, and to give bond with condition that he shall keep books in which he shall enter daily the sugars refined, as well as those sent out, proceeds to enact, 'that he shall, on the 1st day of January, April, July, and October in each year, render a just and true account of all the refined sugar which he or she shall have sent out, or caused or procured to be sent out, from the first time of his or her entry and report aforesaid, until the day which shall first ensue, of the days above mentioned, for the rendering of such account, and thenceforth successively, from the time when such account ought to have been, and up to which it shall have been last rendered, until the next day thereafter, of the days above mentioned, for the rendering of such account, producing and showing therewith the original book or paper, whereon the entries, from day to day, to be made as aforesaid, have been made: and he or she shall, at the time of rendering each account, pay or secure the duties which by this act ought to be paid upon the refined sugar in the said account mentioned.'
Other sections of this act have been relied on by the counsel on both sides, and the phraseology of the law, in other acts said to be in pari materia, has been brought into view. They have not been unnoticed by the court in forming the opinion now to be delivered; but as the case depends principally on the just construction of the sections which have been quoted, those sections only are stated for the present.
That a law is the best expositor of itself, that every part of an act is to be taken into view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the legislature, and that the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of general expressions used in another part of the same act, are among those plain rules laid down by common sense for the exposition of statutes
which have been uniformly acknowledged. If by the application of these rules it shall appear, that the duty on refined sugars did 'accrue, and was outstanding' before the article was sent out of the building, then the refiner is unquestionably liable to pay it, notwithstanding the repeal of the law by which it was imposed.
To support the proposition, that the duty did accrue, the words of the second section of the act for imposing it, have been relied on. These words are, 'that from and after the 30th day of September next, there be levied, collected and paid upon all sugar which shall be refined within the United States, a duty of two cents per pound.' These words, it is said, contain an express charge upon all the sugars to be refined within the United States.
It is admitted by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, that such would be the operation of the section, if unexplained and not restrained by other parts of the law.
In order to determine the influence which other sections must necessarily have on this, it is proper to ascertain with precision the import of the words which have been stated.
'There shall be levied, collected and paid,' &c. Each of these words implies a charge upon the article, and if either of them had been used singly, no doubt could have been entertained that the article would have been burthened with the tax. They present to the mind distinct ideas, and when used together seem to designate distinct actions required by the law.
It would not,...
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