Pennington v. Snow, 1101

• Decision Date: 02 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 1101,1101
• Citation: 471 P.2d 370
• Parties: Florence PENNINGTON, Appellant, v. Lawrence SNOW and Michael Anthony Rimmer, Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 370

471 P.2d 370

Florence PENNINGTON, Appellant, v. Lawrence SNOW and Michael Anthony Rimmer, Appellees.

No. 1101.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July 2, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 1970.

James K. Tallman, Anchorage, for appellant.

Robert C. Erwin, Hughes, Thorsness, Lowe, Gantz & Clark, Anchorage, for appellees.

Before BONEY, C. J., DIMOND, RABINOWITZ, and CONNOR, JJ., and MOODY, Superior Court Judge.

OPINION

BONEY, Chief Justice.

The appellant, Florence T. Pennington, and her husband, Earl Pennington, were injured on June 27, 1965, when their car was struck from the rear by a car driven by appellee Michael Anthony Rimmer. As a result of the mishap, two suits were filed in the courts of Alaska, and two trials were subsequently held. In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether the conclusions reached at the first of the two trials should have a binding effect upon the outcome of the second trial by virtue of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

On November 14, 1966, Earl Pennington filed with the district court, Third Judical District, a complaint against International Service Insurance Company, hereinafter called International. The complaint alleged that Earl Pennington was insured by the defendant company and that under the terms of the insurance policy International was obligated to make medical payments of up to $2,000 for each person involved in an accident in Pennington's car. The complaint further alleged that both Earl Pennington and his wife had incurred injuries in an accident while the policy was in force, and that both were entitled to recover the full amount of $2,000 from the defendant. According to the complaint, the defendant company had paid only $900 of the wife's medical expenses and $600 of the husband's, and was therefore liable for an additional amount of $2,500.

Trial was held before the district court ¹ beginning June 22, 1967. As part of his case at that trial, Earl Pennington sought to establish that as a result of the accident his wife had suffered injuries to her abdomen and urino-genital system, causing inflammation and bleeding; that this inflammation led to the spontaneous abortion of a six-month old fetus in December 1965; and that as a result of this injury, Mrs. Pennington was ultimately forced to undergo surgery. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, ruling in favor of International and against Earl Pennington. The relevant portions of the district court's findings are as follows:

The evidence presented shows that the last menstrual period of Mrs. Florence Pennington as related to the treating and consulting physicians occurred on July 21, 1965; sometime between July 21, 1965 and August 4, 1965 Mrs. Florence Pennington became pregnant and the pregnancy occurred subsequent to the automobile accident of June 27, 1965; a small female fetus resulted from the spontaneous abortion on December 27, 1965, the fetus was in the developmental stage of approximately five months from the period of conception, and said spontaneous abortion or miscarriage was not causally connected or related to the accident of June 27, 1965.

The evidence presented by the plaintiff for medical expenses incurred within one year after the date of the accident was insufficient both as to the amount claimed and the dates incurred to support or justify a finding of additional claims for damages under the insurance policy provisions covering medical expenses.

The district court concluded as a matter of law that International had fulfilled its obligations under the terms of the insurance policy, and that Earl Pennington was not entitled to recover any additional amounts for medical expenses.

Another suit resulted from the accident of June 27, 1965. This second suit was filed in superior court by Earl Pennington, Florence T. Pennington and Earl Pennington as special administrator for the Estate of Mary Ann Pennington, and named as defendants Lawrence Snow and Michael A. Rimmer. Although this suit was brought on March 29, 1966, several months before the filing of the suit against International, it was still in its pretrial stages when the district court delivered its ruling in Earl Pennington's suit against International.

The complaint filed in the superior court was divided into three counts. The first count set forth details of the June 27 accident. It further alleged that the car which collided with the Pennington vehicle was driven by defendant Michael A. Rimmer; that Michael A. Rimmer was acting as the agent or employee of defendant Lawrence Snow, the registered owner of the vehicle; that Michael A. Rimmer had been negligent in his driving of the vehicle; and that as a result of the negligence, Earl Pennington suffered damages in the amount of $50,000.

The second count of the complaint incorporated the allegations of the first, and in addition thereto alleged that Florence T. Pennington was a passenger in her husband's car when it was struck by the defendant's vehicle, and that as a result of the collision she suffered certain injuries to her neck, back and spine. It was further alleged in count II of the complaint that Florence T. Pennington had been pregnant at the time of the accident and that she had 'suffered injuries to her abdomen and in her urino-genital system resulting in bleeding and a subsequent premature birth of a child being carried by this plaintiff at the time of the injuries.' Florence Pennington alleged that, as a fresult of the injuries suffered in the accident, she was entitled to recover general and special damages in the amount of $75,000.

The third count of the complaint incorporated the allegations of the first and second counts, and further alleged that on December 27, 1965, Florence T. Pennington gave birth to a premature child, Mary Ann Pennington, who expired due to her premature and weakened condition shortly after being born. It was also alleged that the premature and weakened condition of the child was the result of the June 27 accident and that Earl Pennington, as special administrator of the Estate of Mary Ann Pennington, was entitled to damages of $50,000.

While the issues raised in this complaint were awaiting trial in the superior court, the district court issued its ruling in the case involving Earl Pennington and International. On the basis of the district court's ruling, the appellees, Lawrence Snow and Michael A. Rimmer, raised a claim of res judicata and made a motion in the pending superior court case for partial summary judgment. ² The appellees' motion was granted, and on April 18, 1968, the superior court issued a judgment granting the appellees summary judgment, on count III of the complaint.

On July 8, 1968, the appellees again moved for partial summary judgment, contending as before that the appellants were estopped by the district court ruling from relitigating certain issues raised in counts I and II of the complaint in the action before the superior court. The superior court again ruled in favor of the appellees, granting summary judgment on the portion of count I in which Earl Pennington sought to recover damages for expenses he incurred in providing funeral services for his daughter, Mary Ann, and on the section of count II in which Florence T. Pennington sought to recover damages for alleged injuries to her urino-genital system and the subsequent premature birth of her child. As before, the superior court's ruling was based on the conclusion that res judicata, or collateral estoppel, precluded Earl and Florence Pennington from relitigating issues previously adjudicated by the district court.

On October 2, 1968, a jury trial was commenced in superior court on the remaining issues of the complaint filed by Earl and Florence Pennington against the appellees. The trial culminated in verdicts favorable to both Earl and Florence Penington, holding appellees Lawrence Snow and Michael A. Rimmer jointly and severally liable. The superior court entered a final 'Memorandum Decision' in accordance with the verdict on December 19, 1968. From this judgment, Florence T. Pennington has appealed.

The principal point of error which the appellant raises centers upon the superior court's ruling on the appellees' motions for summary judgment, and questions the court's application of the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the circumstances of the instant case. Since Florence Pennington has alone appealed, we need to consider the ruling of the lower court only insofar as it precluded the appellant from litigating the allegations made in count II of the complaint.

The effect of the doctrine of res judicata in civil proceedings was discussed by this Court in State v. Baker, 393 P.2d 893, 896-901 (Alaska 1964). There we pointed out:

(Res judicata) bars a second suit between the same parties on the same subject matter resolving the same issues between the parties in the same capacity or quality. It is founded upon the principle that parties are not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and that when a right or fact has been judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. (Citations omitted.)

393 P.2d at 896-897. In Baker we also noted that, while the doctrine of res judicata is applicable only to suits involving identical causes of action, where a second action is upon a different cause, collateral estoppel will act to preclude from litigation any issues actually adjudicated in the previous action involving the same parties or their privies. ³ Here, since the suit brought by Earl Pennington in district court was upon a cause of action different from that involved in the superior court action, ⁴ the ruling of the district court could at most...