Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
| Decision Date | 06 January 1995 |
| Citation | 654 A.2d 96 |
| Parties | 97 Ed. Law Rep. 870 PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent, and Harry and Annemarie Gwynne, Aspira of Pennsylvania, Intervenors. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Michael Hardiman, Asst. Chief Counsel, for petitioner.
William H. Brown, III, for respondent.
Michael Churchill and Patricia A. Lowe, for intervenors.
The School District of Philadelphia filed a partial appeal of the Court's November 28, 1994 order to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The order required the School District to take steps to eliminate the racial disparities in academic achievement and educational opportunities among students attending Philadelphia public schools. The School District has applied to this Court for a partial stay of that order. The instant opinion disposes of the School District's application and together with prior opinions 1 contain the reasons for the Court's remedial order.
The School District seeks a stay of paragraphs 5, 13, 14, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32 and 39 of the November 28, 1994 order, which include remedial measures aimed at eliminating the discrimination found to exist in the public schools.
The School District requests a stay of the requirements to provide full-day kindergarten to all eligible Black and Hispanic students by September 1995 and all eligible students by September 1996; eliminate prolonged disruption in learning at the beginning of each school year, reduce school leveling and provide textbooks and other necessary supplies and equipment at each school; assign qualified substitutes in racially isolated schools and develop incentives to attract a greater percentage of experienced teachers in those schools; reduce the high absenteeism rates and reinstate truant officers to combat absenteeism; restructure operations to foster decision making at the school level; develop an equity assurance office, professional development center and recruitment and educational counselling services for students; retain the regional structure to provide supervision and control over school-based management efforts; and maintain and repair racially isolated schools. The School District's jurisdictional statement indicates that it also appeals the Court's requirement for reduced class size.
An applicant for a stay of proceedings bears the burden to establish the elements necessary for the grant of a stay. The applicant must make a substantial case on the merits of the appeal, demonstrate that without the requested relief the applicant will suffer substantial injury, a stay will not substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings, and a stay will not adversely affect the public interest. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission v. Process Gas Consumers Group, 502 Pa. 545, 467 A.2d 805 (1983). These criteria require the Court to balance the interests of all parties and the public where applicable and demand that an applicant show a legally sustainable probability of success in its appeal. Where the reviewing court determines that the standards for a stay have not been satisfied by the applicant, the request for stay shall be denied. Id.
The School District has not appealed the Court's findings of racial disparities in academic achievement and educational opportunities or that the School District maintains a de facto segregated public school system. Instead, the School District appealed the very essence of the Court's order to remedy the racial disparities found to exist and to bring about equality in education. The School District has elected to continue this 24-year litigation at the expense of children caught in the grips of a system where segregation and racial disparity is pervasive and overwhelming. Because the School District has failed to satisfy even one of the elements for the grant of a stay, its application is denied.
State courts are not precluded from remedying de facto segregation under state law. Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, Act of October 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 962(a); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 233 A.2d 290 (1967); Uniontown Area School Dist. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 455 Pa. 52, 313 A.2d 156 (1973); Bd. of Educ. of Englewood Cliffs v. Bd. of Educ. of Englewood, 257 N.J.Super. 413, 608 A.2d 914 (1992), aff'd, 132 N.J. 327, 625 A.2d 483, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 991, 114 S.Ct. 547, 126 L.Ed.2d 449 (1993). In Chester School Dist., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court imposed the duty on school districts to provide equal educational opportunity to all students and to initiate remedial programs to overcome the effects of discrimination.
In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of courts to order educational programs and improvements to remedy the effects of segregation and stated that where school authorities fail to satisfy their affirmative obligations, judicial authority may be invoked. 2 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971), the Supreme Court stated that in equity actions, the relief must fit the violations found and the purpose of a remedial decree in school desegregation cases is to correct the violations and to eradicate their effects.
The Court clearly possesses equitable powers and authority to order the School District to remedy the unequal treatment of students and to take necessary steps to eliminate conditions found to exist. See HRC VI. The suggestion that the Court has no authority to order a remedy, or that the Court's order co-opts the School District's authority or micro-manages its affairs, reflects the latest in a series of spins calculated to obscure the fundamental issue before the Court and the public: the decades-long recalcitrance of the School District to fully educate the children attending racially isolated schools. Where the School District has refused to satisfy its affirmative obligation to these children, judicial authority must be invoked.
The Court conferred substantial latitude and responsibility upon the School District to develop the specifics of an acceptable plan to be submitted by February 15, 1995 and imposed no educational remedies not supported by the record. The Court framed an order incorporating feasible recommendations contained in the educational plan submitted to the Court on September 15, 1994, expert testimony presented throughout the proceedings, and testimony of the Superintendent who originally agreed to particular educational remedies now under attack. The Court further incorporated ordinary functions of the school board required by the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 1-101--27-2702 ().
Educational experts, including those offered by the School District, universally agree that providing increased resources and enhanced focus and intervention in early childhood development and learning produces substantial outcomes in terms of student achievement and academic success. The consequences of prolonging the institution of full-day kindergarten, particularly to students in the racially isolated schools, are immeasurable and a stay of the order will substantially harm their interests. The record further amply demonstrated that students in racially isolated schools, and others, lose substantial periods of learning and suffer the consequences of disruption occurring at the beginning of each school year due to the District's failure to provide adequate teaching personnel and class rostering.
The School District's failure to provide resources in racially isolated schools on an equal basis, trained and properly certificated substitutes, greater percentages of experienced teachers, smaller class sizes, and other vital supports for those schools to effectively function negate any contention that the School District has made out a substantial case on the merits of its appeal. The remaining items appealed by the School District, if implemented in conjunction with those mentioned above, would substantially equalize educational opportunities and create a system where all children are at a minimum given a chance to obtain a quality education.
Other School District claims concern the Court's limitations on organizational restructuring related to the transfer of fiscal control and management over School District funds to local school councils, transfer of the power to hire and fire personnel, and elimination of the regional offices.
The Superintendent's proposal to transfer school funds and personnel authority to local school councils presents the potential for massive fiscal control and accountability issues, corruption, fraud and patronage. Moreover, the transfer of fiscal control and management to local school councils has not been endorsed in this record by any of the parties to the action, nor by teachers and administrators. In fact, the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers expressly stated in its response to the educational plan that the School District should carry its responsibility to provide educational standards, and allotments and resources to meet those standards so that teachers and parents may concentrate on methods and curriculum. 3 The School District has failed to demonstrate a basis for this proposal or a nexus between the transfer of fiscal and personnel control and the improvement of academic achievement.
Presently, the Superintendent and school board members can be held accountable by law in their fiduciary capacity for the expenditures of taxpayer funds to operate the schools. 24 P.S. § 6-608. 4...
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