Pennsylvania Human Relations Com'n v. School Dist. of Philadelphia

• Decision Date: 04 June 1993
• Citation: 167 Pa.Cmwlth. 1,651 A.2d 177
• Parties: , 96 Ed. Law Rep. 564 PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent and Harry and Annemarie Gwynne, ASPIRA of Pennsylvania, et al., Intervenors.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Page 177

651 A.2d 177

167 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 96 Ed. Law Rep. 564

PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Respondent and Harry and Annemarie Gwynne, ASPIRA of Pennsylvania, et al Intervenors.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Decided June 4, 1993.

Publication Ordered Nov. 28, 1994.

Elisabeth S. Shuster, Chief Counsel, and Michael Hardiman, Asst. Chief Counsel, for petitioner.

William H. Brown, III, and Christina Rainville, for respondent.

Michael Churchill, Richard Z. Freemann, Jr., and Daniel W. Cantu-Hertzler, for intervenors.

SMITH, Judge.

Without exhaustively reciting the decades-long procedural history of the Philadelphia public school desegregation case culminating in the current appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, ¹ this Opinion will address this Court's April 14, 1993 order which granted motions for directed verdict on the issue of mandatory busing for school desegregation purposes and denied motions to join, in these proceedings, as indispensable and necessary parties the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Governor of Pennsylvania, the Department of Education, and certain contiguous suburban school districts (Upper Darby, Interboro, Haverford, Lower Merion, Abington Cheltenham, Colonial, Springfield, Lower Moreland, Bensalem and Neshaminy.)

I.

On March 17, 1993, this Court commenced hearings on the issue of the compliance of Respondent, the School District of Philadelphia, with an April 15, 1982 order of this Court directing the District to:

modify its 1976 Voluntary Desegregation Plan to correct racial imbalance, as measured by the [Petitioner's] Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's new (1979) definition of a segregated school, suggesting that in so doing serious consideration be given to the following:

(1) the pairing of elementary schools ...; and

(2) the reassignment of pupils affected by school closings in a fashion which will promote desegregation rather than perpetuate segregation.

Such modifications shall be submitted to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission on or before July 1, 1982.

Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School District of Philadelphia, 66 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 154, 180-81, 443 A.2d 1343, 1355 (1982). The hearings themselves evolved as follows.

On June 30, 1982, the District submitted a plan entitled "Proposal for Modification." The plan contained no mandatory desegregation measures. Rejecting the proposed modification, the Commission, the entity statutorily charged with alleviating school segregation, ² returned to this Court for enforcement. Prior to any additional judicial intervention, however, the District submitted yet another plan referred to as the 1983 Modified Desegregation Plan which encompassed three components: educational improvement plan, desegregation expansion strategy, and reduction of racially isolated schools.

Despite Commission reservations as to the purely voluntary nature of the "modified plan," as it became known, and in an effort to avoid continued litigation, the Commission and the District executed a Memorandum of Understanding on October 24, 1983 pursuant to which the modified plan would be implemented for a three-year period. If, after three years, either party was not satisfied that the plan had achieved, in the words of the Memorandum, "maximum feasible desegregation," the matter would be referred to a Settlement Team appointed by the parties to independently evaluate progress toward achieving maximum feasible desegregation and report its findings to the Court and the parties.

For three years the District implemented the modified plan and submitted annual reports to the Commission. In June 1988, the Commission concluded that maximum feasible desegregation had not been achieved under the modified plan. On June 27, 1988, the Commission and the District entered into a joint stipulation acknowledging their inability to agree on the issue of accomplishing maximum feasible desegregation and invoking the creation of a Settlement Team.

In November, 1992, the Settlement Team completed its formal findings included among which was a recommendation for the pairing of several schools which would require mandatory reassignment per busing. Following completion of the Settlement Team Report, this Court entertained oral argument during which the District indicated its disagreement with the Report. The District responded that it had complied with this Court's April 15, 1982 order to the extent feasible. ³ This Court scheduled hearings and permitted interested parties to request intervention. Prior to commencement of the first evidentiary hearing on March 18, 1993, this Court entertained and granted intervention to the parties indicated below.

Intervention was granted to three sets of intervenors. They are: first, Olney-Oak Lane-Feltonville Parents for Better Schools, the Lowell Home and School Association and the Finletter Home and School Association which collectively represent families in the District who challenge the mandatory busing of students particularly as it regards school overcrowding implications; second, the Coalition of Concerned Citizens for Quality Education which represents parents and students opposed to mandatory busing measures as a method of desegregation; and third, ASPIRA of Pennsylvania, Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia, Fellowship Commission, Parents Union for Public Schools, Philadelphia Association of School Administrators, and the Philadelphia Home and School Council which in tandem represent parents, students and school administrators seeking to insure equal opportunities for quality education.

At the close of the fourth hearing held on April 8, 1993, the Commission rested its case whereupon both the District and Intervenor Coalition of Concerned Citizens for Quality Education moved for a directed verdict on the basis of, inter alia, the Commission's having failed to demonstrate that mandatory desegregation measures were feasible. This Court treated the motions as though for compulsory nonsuit in partially granting them by order dated April 14, 1993. ⁴ It is from this decision that the Commission has appealed. (In the interest of judicial economy, this Court certified its interlocutory order for immediate appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b).)

II.

A motion for directed verdict is properly posed at the close of all the evidence. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 226. This Court, however, will treat the motions as if they were for compulsory nonsuit. See Pa.R.C.P. No. 126. The legal standard for determining either is essentially the same and is one which is so familiar as to be formularistic.

A motion for a compulsory nonsuit allows a defendant to test the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 390 A.2d 736 (1978). A judgment of nonsuit can be entered only in clear cases, and a plaintiff must be given the benefit of all evidence favorable to him, together with all reasonable inferences of fact arising therefrom, and any conflict in the evidence must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.

. . . . .

Rule 230.1 establishes several distinct elements to be met before a nonsuit may be granted. One is that the plaintiff's case on liability must be closed. Another is that nonsuit must be requested before any evidence on behalf of the defendant has been introduced. A third is that the plaintiff must have failed to establish a right to relief.

Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 149 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 163, 167-68, 612 A.2d 630, 632-33 (1992). See also Rizzo v. Michener, 401 Pa.Superior Ct. 47, 584 A.2d 973 (1990), appeal denied, 528 Pa. 613, 596 A.2d 159 (1991). Compare Thompson v. Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. Preservation Society, 417 Pa.Superior Ct. 216, 222, 612 A.2d 450, 453 (1992), appeal denied, 533 Pa. 635, 621 A.2d 581 (1993) ("In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and must accept as true all evidence which supports that party's contention and must reject all adverse testimony.")

This Court has stated that it is the burden of the Commission to introduce "substantial evidence" in support of its position that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963, has been violated. See J. Howard Brandt, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 15 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 123, 324 A.2d 840 (1974). " 'Substantial evidence' means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 130, 324 A.2d at 843.

How heavy a burden, and by whom it is borne, is one never specifically articulated in the context of enforcement proceedings in school desegregation cases in this Commonwealth. The history of this litigation is not, however, without its instruction. In the first Opinion emanating from this Court, Judge Wilkinson wrote of a "record completely barren of testimony concerning ... whether there is any need for a change in the employment practices of the district." 6 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 290, 294 A.2d at 414. In like vein, this Court alluded to the burden of proof when it later wrote: "[T]he narrow issue presently before us is that of whether the Commission's determination that there has been insufficient progress toward the desegregation of Philadelphia's public schools as the result of efforts pursuant to the 1976 Voluntary Plan is adequately supported by the evidence of record." 66 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. at 174-75, 443 A.2d at 1352 (emphasis added). Thus it is the Commission which logically and legally bears the burden of adducing evidence in support of its determinations as to the efficacy of a plan devised by the District and as to the curative measures needed.

III.

Instantly the Commission bore the burden of demonstrating that the District had failed to achieve maximum feasible...