Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Townsend
| Decision Date | 25 March 1936 |
| Docket Number | 25490 |
| Citation | 200 N.E. 772,130 Ohio St. 554 |
| Parties | The Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Townsend. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Negligence - Grade-crossing collision of train with automobile - Violation of municipal ordinances proximate cause of driver's injuries - More than three persons riding in automobile front seat - Passengers obstructed driver's view and interfered with control of driving mechanism.
Two city ordinances were in force, one making it unlawful for an operator of a vehicle to drive it when there was on the front seat "such number of persons as to obstruct the view of the operator to the front or sides or to interfere with the operator's control of the driving mechanism of the vehicle"; and another ordinance making it "unlawful for more than three persons to ride in the front seat of an automobile." The evidence adduced by the plaintiff disclosed that, while driving within the city limits over a four-track railroad crossing, he, the operator of the car, by loading its single seat with five person other than himself produced a situation which not only interfered with his view of an approaching train, but also interfered with his control of the driving mechanism of his car. Under the facts thus disclosed, reasonable minds could arrive at no other conclusion than that plaintiff's violation of the two city ordinances was a proximate cause of his injury received in a collision with the approaching train.
The parties will be alluded to as they stood in the trial court where Carl B. Townsend was plaintiff and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was defendant.
In the Common Pleas Court the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from a collision of a train of the defendant with plaintiff's automobile at a grade crossing in the city of Canton. The chief specifications of negligence relied on and pleaded in plaintiff's petition were that the defendant was negligent in not sounding the whistle or ringing the bell as the train approached the crossing, and that the agents of the defendant were negligent in operating the train at a greater speed than twenty miles an hour in violation of a city ordinance.
Denying the allegations of negligence contained in the petition, the defendant, in its answer, pleaded that the plaintiff was operating a coupe carrying five people on his right and that that condition obstructed and interfered with his view of the approaching train from that direction. Defendant also alleged that at the time of the collision two city ordinances were in effect: (1) Making it "unlawful for the operator of any vehicle to drive the same when such vehicle is so loaded or when there are in the front seat of such vehicle such number of persons as to obstruct the view of the operator to the front or sides or to interfere with the operator's control of the driving mechanism of the vehicle," and (2) making it "unlawful for more than three persons to ride in the front seat of an automobile." The answer alleged that the collision was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in operating his automobile so loaded as to obstruct his view and to interfere with his control of the driving mechanism, and in operating the automobile with more than three persons riding on the front seat, all of which was contrary to the ordinances of the city of Canton.
The cause was tried to a court and jury. During its progress the defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and renewed its motion at the close of the entire evidence. The latter motion was sustained by the trial court, which directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court for directing a verdict in favor of the defendant. Thereafter certification of the cause was allowed by this court.
Messrs Burt, Kinnison, Carson & Shadrach, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs Amerman & Mills, for defendant in error.
The sole question presented is whether the trial court erred in directing the verdict. It did so for the reason that, in its opinion, plaintiff's evidence disclosed that he was guilty of violating the city ordinances and that such violation proximately caused his injury.
In the consideration of this case we shall chiefly allude to the evidence of the plaintiff. Plaintiff was the owner of a single-seated Dodge coupe, a six-year old model, which he had purchased some three months before the accident. After midnight on May 12, 1929, in taking his guests home, he loaded the five of them in this single-seated car. So loaded the occupants, including himself, numbered three adults and three small children, approximately three, five and seven years of age. The father, seated next to the plaintiff's right, held one child in his lap; the mother,...
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