Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers' Ass'n
| Decision Date | 21 March 1995 |
| Parties | , 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2877 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Appellee, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE TROOPERS' ASSOCIATION, Trooper James Betancourt, Appellant. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Appellant, v. PENNSYLVANIA STATE TROOPERS' ASSOCIATION, Trooper Scott Gibson, Appellee. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, Appellee, v. The FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Gary Lightman, for S. Gibson in Nos. 55, 57.
Gary M. Lightman, for J. Betancourt, in Nos. 56, 57.
Anthony C. Busillo, II, Stephen C. Richman, for amicus--Philadelphia Lodge No. 5, F.O.P.
Thomas W. Jennings, Thomas H. Kohn, for amicus--Pa. Prof. Fire Fighters Ass'n.
Gary M. Lightman, for F.O.P. in Nos. 55, 56.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS, CAPPY, CASTILLE and MONTEMURO, JJ.
These three appeals were consolidated for review as they all raise a single identical issue: whether the Commonwealth Court applied the correct scope of review when it reviewed these Act 111 1 grievance arbitration 2 awards.
For the reasons discussed below, we find that the Commonwealth Court applied the incorrect scope of review. We therefore reverse the Commonwealth Court's orders in the Betancourt and DiRaimo cases and reinstate the arbitrators' awards, and affirm the Commonwealth Court's disposition of the Gibson case.
Trooper James Betancourt was charged with Unbecoming Conduct for exposing his penis while on duty at troop headquarters during a jovial conversation with other state troopers. For this incident, Trooper Betancourt was placed on restricted duty and a court martial was scheduled. The court martial was held, and Trooper Betancourt received a thirty day suspension without pay. Trooper Betancourt later appealed this discipline through the contractual grievance procedure.
The arbitrator determined that Trooper Betancourt's conduct did not squarely fit the definition of "Unbecoming Conduct," and that in any event Trooper Betancourt was adequately punished by performing janitorial work for the two months he was on restricted duty. The arbitrator awarded Trooper Betancourt lost wages and ordered that his record be expunged. The Pennsylvania State Police ("State Police") appealed to the Commonwealth Court. In its appeal, the State Police urged the Commonwealth Court to revisit the issue as to what is the proper scope of review for an appeal of an Act 111 grievance arbitration award.
In its opinion, the Commonwealth Court recognized that the scope of review applicable to Act 111 interest arbitration awards was in the nature of narrow certiorari. Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers' Association (Betancourt), 159 Pa.Commw. 489, 633 A.2d 1278 (1993). The narrow certiorari scope of review limits a reviewing court to questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator's powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. 3 , 4 The Commonwealth Court went on to state that the scope of review employed by courts to review Act 111 grievance arbitration awards should not be narrow certiorari, but rather should be the essence test scope of review as embodied in the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). 5 The essence test grants a far broader scope of review to the courts than does the narrow certiorari scope of review. The essence test permits a court to vacate an arbitrator's award if the court finds that arbitrator's award did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement; in other words, the essence test allows a court to question whether the arbitrator's award represents a reasonable interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. County of Centre v. Musser, 519 Pa. 380, 548 A.2d 1194 (1988).
The Commonwealth Court rested its conclusion as to the appropriate scope of review upon its understanding that the UAA, and not Act 111, authorizes grievance arbitration for police and fire personnel. Thus, the Commonwealth Court concluded, as the UAA established grievance arbitration, its scope of review applied.
The Commonwealth Court then determined that the arbitrator's decision was not drawn from the essence of the collective bargaining agreement, and reversed the arbitrator's award.
Trooper Scott Gibson was progressively disciplined, and ultimately discharged, for violating State Police regulations. The violations were connected with his failure to pay his debts, his issuance of bad checks, and his failure to file reports properly. Trooper Gibson filed a grievance over his dismissal.
The arbitrator found that Trooper Gibson's offenses did not constitute extremely egregious behavior. Additionally, the arbitrator considered the discipline administered to be so late that the motivational aspect of discipline was lacking. The arbitrator directed the State Police to reinstate Trooper Gibson immediately without backpay but with full seniority. The State Police appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
Citing its own recent Betancourt opinion as support, the Commonwealth Court applied the essence test. The court sustained the arbitrator's award, declaring that it had drawn its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.
While returning from a police training session, Trooper Joseph DiRaimo placed $10 worth of gasoline in the state vehicle he was driving and $5 worth of gasoline in the personal vehicle his wife was driving; both purchases were placed on a Commonwealth credit card. Trooper DiRaimo did not repay the $5. When Trooper DiRaimo's act was discovered, he was charged with the summary offense of making unauthorized use of a credit card. 6 Trooper DiRaimo pled guilty to this charge.
Court martial proceedings were instituted. Trooper DiRaimo pled guilty, and he was dismissed. Trooper DiRaimo then requested grievance arbitration.
The arbitrator sustained the grievance, and reduced the discipline to a fifteen-day suspension without pay. The arbitrator reasoned that Trooper DiRaimo did not act like one who had the selfish nature of a thief and thus should not be discharged.
The Commonwealth Court, again citing Betancourt, applied the essence test. The court held that the arbitrator had failed to conform to the essence of the collective bargaining agreement when he reduced the discipline to a fifteen-day suspension without pay. The Commonwealth Court vacated the arbitrator's award and reinstated the order dismissing Trooper DiRaimo. 7
In these appeals, we are presented with the question of what is the proper scope of review for an Act 111 grievance arbitration. 8 The Commonwealth Court in Betancourt stated that the UAA's essence test is the proper scope of review; the State Police now urges this Court to adopt the Commonwealth Court's conclusion.
The conclusion of the majority of the Commonwealth Court in Betancourt is based on the assertion that the courts of this Commonwealth have declared that Act 111 does not allow grievance arbitration, and that the only authorization for grievance arbitration for police and fire personnel comes from the UAA. Therefore, the Commonwealth Court concluded, since it is the UAA that validates grievance arbitration, its essence test scope of review applies. The Commonwealth Court was in error.
First, the Commonwealth Court's perception that the courts of this Commonwealth have specifically held that Act 111 does not authorize grievance arbitration rests on Allegheny County Firefighters, Local 1038 v. Allegheny County, 7 Pa.Commw. 81, 299 A.2d 60 (1973). Its reliance on this case is misplaced. Ten years after Allegheny County Firefighters, this Court plainly declared in Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newton Township, 504 Pa. 71, 78-79, 470 A.2d 470, 474 (1983) that it was Act 111 that authorized grievance arbitration; there was no mention of the UAA in Chirico. 9
Second, the Commonwealth Court in Betancourt was also incorrect in stating that this Court established the UAA as the progenitor of Act 111 grievance arbitration in Chirico and Township of Moon v. Police Officers of Township of Moon, 508 Pa. 495, 498 A.2d 1305 (1985). Neither case provides justification for the court's views. Chirico could not support the proposition that "[u]ntil the enactment of the Uniform Arbitration Act in 1980, a governmental body was without authority to enter into a grievance arbitration procedure[.]" Betancourt, 159 Pa.Commw. at 503, n. 13, 633 A.2d at 1285, n. 13. Chirico declared that a grievance must be arbitrated in accordance with Act 111. Chirico, 504 Pa. at 78-79, 470 A.2d at 474. As noted above, the UAA was not mentioned in Chirico. Township of Moon also provides no support for the Commonwealth Court's proposition. In Township of Moon, we focused on the issue of whether it was permissible for an Act 111 grievance arbitration panel to decline to follow some of the procedures set forth for interest arbitration in Section 4 of Act 111, and instead follow some of the procedures set forth in the UAA. 10 We determined that a grievance arbitration panel need not conform in all particulars to the procedures set forth in Section 4. We reasoned that while the procedures within Section 4 are specifically applicable to interest arbitration, there is no such specific direction that they should apply to grievance arbitration. Furthermore, we noted that grievance arbitration procedures could deviate from Section 4 on such particulars as the number of arbitrators to be on the panel as "there is nothing unique about a tripartite arbitration panel [which is mandated by Section 4] that would make it more suitable for grievance arbitration than other forms of binding arbitration...." Township of Moon, 508 Pa. at 509, 498 A.2d at 1312. Thus, we...
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