Pennysavers Oil Co. v. State
| Decision Date | 30 March 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 13584,13584 |
| Parties | PENNYSAVERS OIL COMPANY of Texas, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
J. R. Sorrell, Tom M. Pogue, Richard B. Stone, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Franklin L. Smith, County Atty., C. Edwin Prichard, Jr., Asst. County Atty., Corpus Christi, for appellee.
This suit was instituted by the State of Texas against Pennysavers Oil Company of Texas, seeking to condemn a small portion of land (0.157 acres), together with defendant's access rights to an 'access controlled highway' or Freeway to be constructed. U. S. Highway No. 77, also known as Texas State Highway No. 9, was, prior to 1958, a conventional, twoway designated highway, leading from Corpus Christi to San Antonio, and running through the Town of Calallen, Nueces County, Texas.
Pennysavers Oil Company was the owner of 3.66 acres of land, lying just west of Highway 77 in Calallen, on which was located a filling station which it operated. The parcel of land to be condemned was not near the filling station, and its taking in no way interfered with the operation of the filling station or its access to the old conventional highway. The price of this parcel of land was agreed upon, which was satisfactory in every way to both parties, and its condemnation is in no way involved in this appeal. The entire controversy here concerns the right of Pennysavers Company to recover for its alleged loss of access to this new access controlled highway.
The jury found, in effect, that appellant's right of access to the new access controlled highway was of no value and allowed nothing for its taking. Judgment was accordingly rendered, and Pennysavers Oil Company of Texas has prosecuted this appeal.
The record shows that prior to the construction of the Freeway appellant's filling station was a very prosperous business, but after its construction the filling station became a losing proposition and it was finally closed. This, however, does not establish the fact that the State and County must pay for the loss.
Before the construction of the Freeway, appellant enjoyed full and complete access from its property to Highway 77, but now has only limited access to the Freeway, still known as Highway 77. The paved highway in front of appellant's station is still there and appellant has full access to it, but instead of its being a main highway, leading from the City of Corpus Christi to the City of San Antonio, it is now only a frontage road furnishing access to the Freeway. The road is now 32 feet wide, and in front of appellant's station is one and 3/16 feet higher than it formerly was, but this is not the basis of appellant's complaint. Appellant's real complaint is that originally people traveling on Highway 77 had free access to its filling station, and people driving either north or south could drive with ease into its station to buy gas, oil and other articles, while, due to the circuitous route which they must now take in order to drive into the station and get back on the Freeway, such people have ceased to trade at its station and its filling station business has been ruined.
In building the Freeway the State and County acquired land on the east side of old Highway 77, opposite from appellant's station, and the Freeway traffic lanes now lie east of the old conventional highway, and still further east is another frontage or land service road that furnishes limited access to residents on the east side of the Freeway traffic lanes. In other words, the one-time conventional two-lane highway that passed in front of appellant's filling station is now a four-lane Freeway, with a frontage or land service road lying on each side of the Freeway lanes. These frontage roads furnish an indirect, limited, and sometimes circuitous access to and from the Freeway.
This brings us to the question of whether appellant was in the first place entitled to complete access to the Freeway. Art. 6674w et seq., Vernon's...
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