Penobscot Nation v. Mills
| Decision Date | 16 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket no. 1:12-cv-254-GZS |
| Citation | 151 F.Supp.3d 181 |
| Parties | Penobscot Nation et al., Plaintiffs, v. Janet T. Mills, Attorney General for the State of Maine, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Kaighn Smith, Jr., Adrianne E. Fouts, George Royle, V, James T. Kilbreth, Michael L. Buescher, Drummond Woodsum, Portland, ME, for Plaintiffs.
Gerald Reid, Maine Attorney General's Office, Paul Stern, Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, ME, for Defendants.
ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment: (1) the State Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Dismissal for Failure to Join Indispensable Parties (ECF No. 117), (2) the United States' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 120) and (3) the Motion for Summary Judgment by Plaintiff Penobscot Nation (ECF No. 121/128-1). As explained herein,1 the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART each Motion.
Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2)
. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “material fact” is one that has “the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Nereida–Gonzalez v. Tirado–Delgado , 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505
) (additional citation omitted).
The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)
. In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Santoni v. Potter , 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004).
Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc. , 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999)
(citation and internal punctuation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “Mere allegations, or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient.” Barros–Villahermosa v. United States , 642 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rivera–Marcano v. Normeat Royal Dane Quality A/S , 998 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1993) ); see also Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp. , 639 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2011) . “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” In re Spigel , 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting In re Ralar Distribs., Inc. , 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.1993) ).
Even when filed simultaneously, “[c]ross-motions for summary judgment require the district court to consider each motion separately, drawing all inferences in favor of each nonmoving party in turn. AJC Int'l, Inc. v. Triple–S Propiedad , 790 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.2015)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). In short, the above-described “standard is not affected by the presence of cross-motions for summary judgment.” Alliance of Auto. Mfrs. v. Gwadosky , 430 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir.2005) (citation omitted). “[T]he court must mull each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn.” Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc. , 328 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2003) (citation omitted).
The Court notes that Local Rule 56
provides a detailed process by which the parties are to place before the Court the “material facts ... as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b). Local Rule 56 calls for “separate, short, and concise” statements that may be readily admitted, denied or qualified by the opposing side. D. Me. Loc. R. 56(b) &(c). Additionally, the rule requires each statement to be followed by a “record citation ... to a specific page or paragraph of identified record material supporting the assertion.” D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). Id. ; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) ().
In this Order, the Court has endeavored to construct the facts in accordance with the letter and spirit of Local Rule 56
. Doing so has required the Court to review 479 separately numbered paragraphs, many of which were compound, complex, and supported with citation to voluminous records.2 Additionally, many of the numbered paragraphs were immaterial and/or obviously disputed in the context of this litigation.3 In short, in multiple instances, each of the movants has failed to comply with the letter and spirit of Local Rule 56, making construction of the undisputed material facts unnecessarily difficult. However, the parties have maintained—even after the briefing was complete—that this matter is amenable to resolution on the record submitted. (See 10/14/15 Transcript (ECF No. 156) at 5.) The Court concurs in that assessment.4
On August 20, 2012, Plaintiff Penobscot Nation, which is a federally recognized American Indian tribe in Maine, filed this action seeking to resolve ongoing disputes between the tribe and the State of Maine regarding a section of the Penobscot River. This Court allowed the United States to intervene as a plaintiff on its own behalf and as a trustee for the Penobscot Nation. (See generally United States' Complaint (ECF No. 58).) The named State Defendants in this matter are: Janet T. Mills, the current Attorney General for the State of Maine; Chandler Woodcock, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (“DIFW”); and Joel T. Wilkinson, Colonel of the Maine Warden Service. Additionally, the United States' Complaint directly names the State of Maine as a State Defendant.6
The Penobscot Nation asserts that it was prompted to file this case in response to the August 8, 2012 Opinion issued by then-Maine Attorney General William J. Schneider regarding “the respective regulatory jurisdiction of the ... Penobscot Nation and the State of Maine relating to hunting and fishing on the main stem of the Penobscot River.” (8/8/12 Ltr. from Atty. Gen. Schneider to Comm. Woodcock & Col. Wilkinson (ECF No. 8-2).) In relevant part, this Opinion concluded:
[T]he Penobscot Nation has authority to regulate hunting and fishing on those islands [in the main stem] included in its Reservation from Indian Island in Old Town, northward to the confluence of the East and West branches in Medway. Like private landowners, the Penobscot Nation may also restrict access to their lands, here islands, as it sees fit. However, the River itself is not part of the Penobscot Nation's Reservation, and therefore is not subject to its regulatory authority or proprietary control. The Penobscot River is held in trust by the State for all Maine citizens, and State law, including statutes and regulations governing hunting, are fully applicable there. 30 M.R.S. § 6204
. Accordingly, members of the public engaged in hunting, fishing or other recreational activities on the waters of the Penobscot River are subject to Maine law as they would be elsewhere in the State, and are not subject to any additional restrictions from the Penobscot Nation.
To avoid friction on the Penobscot River, it is important that state and tribal officials, as well as members of the Penobscot Nation and the general public, have a clear understanding of the regulatory jurisdictions of the Penobscot Nation and the State of Maine. Both the State and the Penobscot Nation must encourage citizens to respond civilly to uniformed tribal and state game wardens performing their official duties. All citizens must heed and comply with ordinances promulgated by the Penobscot Nation governing the islands it owns, as well as State laws and regulations covering the River.
Id. The Penobscot Nation and the United States (together, “Plaintiffs”) maintain that this 2012 Attorney General Opinion reflects a misinterpretation of the law governing the boundaries of their reservation and their rights to engage in sustenance fishing.7 Thus, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment clarifying both those boundaries and tribal fishing rights within the Penobscot River. In responding to Plaintiffs' multi-part requests for declaratory relief, State Defendants have asserted their own claim for declaratory relief regarding these same issues. (See State Defs. Amended Answer (ECF No. 59) at 11-14 & State Defs. Mot. for Summ. J. (ECF No. 117) at 1, 30-31 n. 36.)
For purposes of this litigation, the parties agree that the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Penobscot Nation v. Mills
...("MICSA") ], 25 U.S.C. § 1722(i), includes the islands of the Main Stem, but not the waters of the Main Stem," Penobscot Nation v. Mills , 151 F.Supp.3d 181, 222 (D. Me. 2015) ; and (2) "[T]he sustenance fishing rights provided in ... 30 M.R.S.A. § 6207(4) allows the Penobscot Nation to tak......
-
Penobscot Nation v. Frey
...of the riverbed underneath it but holding that the Nation has sustenance fishing rights in the Main Stem. See Penobscot Nation v. Mills, 151 F. Supp. 3d 181, 222-23 (D. Me. 2015). A divided panel of this court affirmed the district court's holding as to the definition of Reservation and vac......
- Henderson v. Office of the Dir. of Nat'l Intelligence