Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton, B-170

• Decision Date: 05 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. B-170,B-170
• Citation: 119 So.2d 296
• Parties: PENSACOLA TRANSIT CO., Inc., Appellant, v. William C. DENTON, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 296

119 So.2d 296

PENSACOLA TRANSIT CO., Inc., Appellant, v. William C. DENTON, Appellee.

No. B-170.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

April 5, 1960.

F. Churchill Mellen, Pensacola, for appellant.

Hertz, Shelley & Crowell, Pensacola, for appellee.

CARROLL, DONALD, Judge.

The defendant has appealed from an adverse judgment entered by the Court of Record of Escambia County in favor of the plaintiff-appellee in the amount of $18,500. An order of the couert denying the defendant's motion for a new trial is also sought to be reviewed.

At the close of the defendant's case in the trial the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff on the issue of the defendant's liability. The case was later submitted to the jury on the sole issue of damages, with the result that the jury brought in a verdict assessing the plaintiff's damages at $18,500.

The first two points on appeal question the correctness of the court's direction of the verdict for the defendant on the issue of liability.

This was an action for damages resulting to the plaintiff and his automobile when a bus belonging to the defendant crashed into the rear of his automobile a few moments after the plaintiff had stopped his car for a red traffic light at an intersection in Warrington, Escambia County.

At the trial the plaintiff testified that he did not see the bus approaching before the crash. The only eyewitness to the collision itself was the defendant's bus driver. His exact testimony concerning the events immediately preceding the collission was as follows:

'I was on my regular route, coming from the Naval Air Station to town, and left the Naval Air Station at eleven-ten on that morning and I was coming up, or down, Barrancas Avenue, heading in town or heading toward the city from the Naval Air Station, and I got to the intersection of Barrancas Avenue and Jackson, and approaching the intersection, which is in a school zone and we are not allowed but fifteen miles per hour in the school zone, so I was well within the speed limit, and I was about seventy-five feet behind this car when they stopped for the traffic light and I applied my brakes normally and they didn't hold. For some reason they didn't take. I let up on my brake clutch again and applied my brakes again and it still didn't hold, and I began to look for a place to go, and there was a line of traffic on my left and the utility pole just before I get to the Britt Service Station on my right. I couldn't turn right or left and this man's car was directly in front of me and I hit him from the rear.'

The bus driver further testified that his air brake 'simply did not function,' that he estimated that he was travelling about 15 to 20 miles per hour when he ran into the back of the plaintiff's car, and that he tested his brakes on the scene after the accident and they worked.

As the Florida Supreme Court held in the recent case of Bellere v. Madsen, Fla.1959, 114 So.2d 619, 621, 'where a defendant runs into the rear of plaintiff's automobile while plaintiff is stopped for a traffic light or at an intersection, there is a presumption of negligence of the defendant on which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of an explanation by the defendant.' See also Shedden v. Yellow Cab Company, Fla.App., 1958, 105 So.2d 388, and McNulty v. Cusack, Fla.App., 1958, 104 So.2d 785.

Under this just-quoted rule, properly considered, the question then is whether the explanation of the defendant's driver is sufficient to permit the jury lawfully to conclude theefrom that the presumption of negligence, which arose when the bus creashed into the rear of the plaintiff's car stopped at the intersection, had been overcome by that explanation. We do not think a judge, with his limited powers in the field of the determination of facts, can determine this question without 'climbing into the jury box,' so to speak, and encroaching upon the exclusive domain of the jury. We hold, therefore, that the trial judge erred in granting...