Penunuri v. Sundance Partners Ltd.

• Decision Date: 21 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. 20140854–CA,20140854–CA
• Citation: 380 P.3d 3,2016 UT App 154
• Parties: Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, Appellants, v. Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holdings LLC, Sundance Development Corporation, Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain Outfitters LC, Appellees.
• Court: Utah Court of Appeals

380 P.3d 3

2016 UT App 154

Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart, Appellants,

v.Sundance Partners Ltd., Sundance Holdings LLC, Sundance Development Corporation, Robert Redford, Redford 1970 Trust, and Rocky Mountain Outfitters LC, Appellees.

No. 20140854–CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed July 21, 2016

Robert D. Strieper, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellants.

H. Burt Ringwood, Sandy and A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellees.

Judge J. Frederic Voros Jr. authored this Opinion, in which Judge Michele M. Christiansen and Senior Judge Russell W. Bench concurred.¹

Opinion

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Plaintiffs Lisa Penunuri and Barry Siegwart appeal the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Rocky Mountain Outfitters LC and the other defendants (collectively, Rocky Mountain). Penunuri suffered injuries when she fell from her horse on a guided trail ride. On that ride, potentially dangerous gaps formed between horses. Rather than addressing these gaps immediately, the trail guide decided to deal with them after the company had passed some hikers and reached a clearing. But before they did, Penunuri fell off her horse. Plaintiffs sued Rocky Mountain and related parties for ordinary negligence and gross negligence.

¶2 The district court ruled that a release signed by Penunuri barred the ordinary negligence claim. This court and the Utah Supreme Court upheld that ruling in a prior appeal. On remand, the district court rejected the gross negligence claim on summary judgment. We agree with the district court that this set of facts cannot as a matter of law support a claim of gross negligence. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND²

¶3 On August 1, 2007, Penunuri joined a guided horseback trail ride operated by Rocky Mountain at Sundance Resort. Her group consisted of a guide and four other riders: Penunuri's two friends, an eight-year-old child (Child), and Child's mother (Mother). Before beginning the ride, Penunuri and the other riders received instruction from the guide and signed liability releases. The guide worked as a horseback trail guide for Rocky Mountain from summer 2004 to fall 2008. She was trained by Rocky Mountain at the beginning of each season to guide horseback trail rides. Rocky Mountain instructed guides to close up large gaps between horses as they walked and to warn riders about hazards on the trail.

¶4 The riders left the stables riding single file. Throughout the ride, the guide rode at the head of the group. For the first 45 minutes, Mother, Child, and Penunuri were the first three riders, followed by Penunuri's friends. After stopping at a meadow, the order of the riders changed. Penunuri's friends rode behind the guide, while Mother, Child, and Penunuri brought up the rear. Both Child and Penunuri struggled to keep their horses from grazing. The grazing caused Child's and Penunuri's horses to lag behind, creating gaps between the horses.

¶5 The guide tried to keep the group together by slowing down. One of Penunuri's friends asked the guide to stop and wait for Child and Penunuri to catch up. The guide responded that they would be stopping at a clearing about 100 feet away so that she could take the reins of Child's horse. To reach the clearing, the horses had to climb a steep section of the trail around a bend where hikers were present. Child's horse again stopped to graze, creating a gap of several feet between Penunuri and the rest of the group. When Child's and Penunuri's horses began moving again, Penunuri testified that “it was a rougher ride than [she] remember[ed] having had before.” She testified that “with other grazing episodes my horse would, you know, kind of giddyup a little faster than it had been going, because [Child's] horse would start up and then mine would start up, too, and then would slow down. And this particular incident, it seemed even rougher than, you know, the giddyup that I had gotten in other stops.” Her horse suddenly accelerated and Penunuri fell off, suffering injuries.

¶6 Plaintiffs sued Rocky Mountain alleging ordinary negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability. Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment and declaratory relief. They argued that a release Penunuri had signed was unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act. The district court concluded that the Act did not prevent a party from contracting away its liability for ordinary negligence. The court accordingly ruled the release enforceable and dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims based on ordinary negligence. This court and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. See Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. , 2013 UT 22, 301 P.3d 984 ; Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, Ltd. , 2011 UT App 183, 257 P.3d 1049.

¶7 On remand, Plaintiffs pursued their gross negligence claim. Rocky Mountain filed two motions for summary judgment, the first to dismiss Plaintiffs' gross negligence claim and the second, in the alternative, to exclude Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness. The court granted both motions, dismissing the gross negligence claim and ruling that Plaintiffs' proposed expert was “not qualified to render expert opinion testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to commercial horseback trail guiding.” The court also awarded Rocky Mountain costs pursuant to rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs appeal.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

¶8 First, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Rocky Mountain in a gross negligence case where the standard of care was not fixed by law.

¶9 Second, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it determined that no facts supported their claims of gross negligence.

¶10 Third, Plaintiffs contend that the district court “erred when it determined the outcome of the entire case based upon one alleged, disputable fact.”

¶11 Fourth, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it “granted [Rocky Mountain's] motion for summary judgment on causation based upon mischaracterization of deposition testimony.”

¶12 Fifth, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it granted Rocky Mountain's alternative motion for summary judgment and excluded testimony from Plaintiffs' proposed expert witness. Because our resolution of Plaintiffs' first four claims on appeal renders this claim moot, we do not consider its merits.

¶13 Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its discretion when it awarded Rocky Mountain costs.

ANALYSIS

I. The District Court Properly Granted Rocky Mountain's Summary Judgment Motion Relating to Gross Negligence.

¶14 Plaintiffs' first four contentions each challenge the district court's granting of Rocky Mountain's first motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion on the ground that Plaintiffs “presented no evidence upon which reasonable minds could conclude that [Rocky Mountain's] guide ... exercised no care.”

¶15 Summary judgment is appropriate “if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(a). “An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Orvis v. Johnson , 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[B]ecause negligence cases often require the drawing of inferences from the facts, which is properly done by juries rather than judges, summary judgment is appropriate in negligence cases only in the clearest instances.” Castellanos v. Tommy John, LLC , 2014 UT App 48, ¶ 7, 321 P.3d 218 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶16 “Gross negligence is ‘the failure to observe even slight care; it is carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that may result.’ ” Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found. , 2008 UT 13, ¶ 24, 179 P.3d 760 (quoting Berry v. Greater Park City Co. , 2007 UT 87, ¶ 26, 171 P.3d 442 ). Further, “gross negligence, which is associated with willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, applies to conduct that is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if harm was intended and usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to consequences.” Blaisdell v. Dentrix Dental Sys., Inc. , 2012 UT 37, ¶ 16, 284 P.3d 616 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶17 First, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to Rocky Mountain in a gross negligence case where the standard of care was not fixed by law. They argue that the “standard of care regarding how a guide manages gaps in the train of horses is not fixed by law” and that it was therefore “inappropriate for the [district] court to grant the summary judgment motion.”

¶18 Plaintiffs rely on the Utah Supreme Court's opinions in Berry v. Greater Park City Co. , 2007 UT 87, 171 P.3d 442, and Pearce v. Utah Athletic Foundation , 2008 UT 13, 179 P.3d 760. The Berry court stated a two-part guideline for summary judgment in negligence cases:

[S]ummary judgment is “ ‘inappropriate unless the applicable standard of care is fixed by law, and reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the defendant's negligence under the circumstances.’ ”

Berry , 2007 UT 87, ¶ 27, 171 P.3d 442 (quoting White v. Deseelhorst , 879 P.2d 1371, 1374 (Utah 1994) (quoting Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah , 780 P.2d 821, 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) )). Plaintiffs read this passage to mean that summary judgment may never be granted in negligence cases unless both the standard of care is “fixed by law” and reasonable minds could not differ as to the defendant's negligence. And to be sure, the passage does describe the two elements in the conjunctive.

¶19 But that...