People ex rel. Abt v. Vogt

• Decision Date: 21 February 1914
• Citation: 104 N.E. 226,262 Ill. 170
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ABT, County Collector, v. VOGT.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

262 Ill. 170

104 N.E. 226

PEOPLE ex rel. ABT, County Collector,

v.VOGT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1914.

Appeal from St. Clair County Court; Frank Perrin, Judge.

Proceeding in the name of the People, on relation of Paul W. Abt, County Collector, against Theodore Vogt. From an order sustaining an objection to one item in a tax levy, the State appeals, and defendant files cross errors. Affirmed.

Charles Webb, State's Atty., and A. B. Davis, both of Belleville, and Kramer, Kramer & Campbell and W. H. Hebenstreit, all of East St. Louis, for appellant.

James G. McHale, Jesse M. Freels, and A. B. Garrett, all of East St. Louis, and John Hay, of Belleville, for appellee.

CARTER, J.

This was an application by Paul W. Abt, county treasurer and ex officio county collector of St. Clair county, Ill., for judgment for taxes claimed to be delinquent for the year 1912, against appellee, Theodore Vogt. Appellee filed objections to the taxes levied against his property by the East, st. Louis Park District for the fiscal year 1912. Said park district is a municipal corporation organized under the act of 1895, to provide for the organization of park districts and the transfer of submerged lands. Hurd's Stat. 1911, p. 1678, c. 105, §§ 162-164. Among the various items objected to by appellee was one for $16,000 for ‘officers' and employés' fees and salaries.’ This objection was sustained by the trial court; all other objections of the appellee being overruled. From that order this appeal was prayed by the state and allowed. Appellee has filed cross errors questioning the correctness of the trial court's holdings in overruling certain of his objections.

[1][2] Section 22 of the Park Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 105, § 183) provides that ‘all taxes authorized to be levied by the corporate authorities of any park district created under this act on the taxable property in said district, shall be levied at the same time and in the same manner, as nearly as practicable, as taxes are now levied for city and village purposes under the laws of this state.’ Section 2 of article 7 of the Cities and Villages Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 24, § 89) provides that the annual appropriation ordinance ‘shall specify the objects and purposes for which such appropriations are made, and the amount appropriated for each object or purpose.’ Section 1 of article 8 of said Cities and Villages Act provides that such municipal authorities shall each year ‘ascertain the total amount of appropriations for all corporate purposes legally made and to be collected from the tax levy of that fiscal year; and, by an ordinance specifying in detail the purposes for which such appropriations are made and the sum or amount appropriated for each purpose respectively, levy the amount so ascertained upon all the property subject to taxation within the city or village,’ etc. This court has held that these provisions of the Cities and Villages Act as to specifying in detail the purposesfor which the taxes are levied must be strictly followed (People v. Florville, 207 Ill. 79, 69 N. E. 623), but that the provisions of the tax levy ordinance may be read in connection with the provisions of the appropriation ordinance if the latter is referred to in the former (Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. People, 218 Ill. 463, 75 N. E. 1021). It has been further held that, if a tax levy ordinance, so construed, fails to specify the purposes for which taxes are to be levied, such tax levy ordinance is to that extent invalid. Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Co. v. People, 207 Ill. 566, 69 N. E. 938;People v. Fenton & Thomson Railroad Co., 252 Ill. 372, 96 N. E. 864. There is a somewhat similar provision in section 121 of the general Revenue Law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 120) with reference to the county board setting out the several purposes for which taxes are to be levied, stating the amount for each purpose separately. We have repeatedly ruled that this statute must be strictly complied with in this regard. People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 237 Ill. 312, 86 N. E. 721, and cases there cited; People v. Bowman, 253 Ill. 234, 97 N. E. 304. The object of stating in the levy the amount for each purpose separately, as stated in the cases just cited, is to give the taxpayer an opportunity, if he desires, to prevent illegal and unjust levies and assessments. Such statutes should receive a fair and reasonable construction in order to be effective and accomplish the end desired. No absolute rule can be laid down as to just how many separate subdivisions or heads a given tax levy should be divided into. Each case, in some measure, must be decided in accordance with its special facts. The trial court held the tax levy of $16,000 for officers' and employés' fees and salaries illegal and void, ‘for the reason that said item is not sufficiently specific, and for the further reason that no salaries and fees are provided by law for said...