People ex rel. Attorney General v. Laska, 14097.

• Decision Date: 20 September 1937
• Docket Number: 14097.
• Citation: 72 P.2d 693,101 Colo. 221
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. LASKA.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

72 P.2d 693

101 Colo. 221

PEOPLE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. LASKA.

No. 14097.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 20, 1937

Original proceeding in disbarment by the People of the State of Colorado, on the relation of the Attorney General, against Ben B. Laska. On demurrer to respondent's answer.

Demurrer sustained, but with leave to respondent to amend answer.

Byron G. Rogers, Atty. Gen., and Walter F. Scherer, Asst. Atty Gen., for petitioner.

Philip Hornbein, Ralph L. Carr, and Jean S Breitenstein, all of Denver, for respondent.

HILLIARD Justice.

An original proceeding in disbarment.

The charge is, that in the Western Oklahoma District Court of the United States, respondent, a member of the Colorado bar, was indicted for and convicted of the 'crime of conspiracy to violate the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved June 22, 1932, sections 408a and 408c (18 U.S. C.A.). Conspiracy to violate the Lindberg Act relative to kidnaping,' and 'sentenced to confinement in a United States penitentiary for a term of ten years.' Respondent, answering, admitted the judgment of conviction and sentence as charged, but alleged, nevertheless, that he is 'innocent of the charges preferred against him in said indictment,' that he has 'always conducted himself in a proper and lawful manner and has been and is now guilty of no misconduct whatever.' Further, respondent averred that the 'crime for which he was convicted * * * is not a crime cognizable by the laws of the State of Colorado and that he is entitled to a hearing to determine whether or not he is guilty of the misconduct charged' against him. To respondent's answer a general demurrer challenging its legal sufficiency was interposed. This question stands submitted on briefs.

Neither petitioner nor respondent as our study convinces, has fully apprehended the doctrine of our decisions in disciplinary proceedings based on conviction of felony in courts other than of Colorado jurisdiction. When a member of the bar is convicted of a felony, a Colorado legislative enactment operates to disqualify him from 'practicing as an attorney in any of the courts of this state.' ' 35 C.S.A., c. 48, § 533 (C.L. § 7144). Clearly, if in such an instance there has been conviction in a Colorado court, the status of the convicted attorney is fixed by law, and upon formal exhibition of the record we are bound to note the fact and order accordingly, if, indeed, an order is necessary. But where the conviction has been in a court of another jurisdiction, as here, and the attorney whose discipline is sought formally invokes that right, we have deemed it consonant with justice to accord him the privilege of denying his guilt, notwithstanding his conviction in a 'foreign' court, and to plead facts and circumstances reasonably indicating that he did not have a fair trial, or which import innocence rather than guilt and have inquiry made under our supervision. People ex rel. v. Brayton, 100 Colo. 92, 65 P.2d 1438; People ex rel. v. Burton, 39 Colo. 164, 88 P. 1063, 121 Am.St.Rep. 165. Otherwise, as we perceive, the judgment of the convicting jurisdiction would operate extraterritorially and automatically, as if by lawful mandate, require the ministers of justice of another soverign jurisdiction to visit an added penalty on him, who, prone and helpless before them, denies his guilt and pleads that which indicates his innocence of the charge in the court of his trial. In an analogous situation, the New York court has said: 'The disqualification created by this statute is consequent only upon a conviction in this State.' Sims v. Sims, 75 N.Y. 466. See, also, Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, at pages 532-551, where the learned Chief...