People ex rel. Baez v. Superintendent, Queensboro Corr. Facility
| Decision Date | 04 March 2015 |
| Citation | 5 N.Y.S.3d 216,127 A.D.3d 110 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. Eduardo BAEZ, respondent, v. SUPERINTENDENT, QUEENSBORO CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., appellants. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Richard Dearing and Bethany Davis Noll of counsel), for appellants.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Robert Newman of counsel), for respondent.
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., SANDRA L. SGROI, JEFFREY A. COHEN, and BETSY BARROS, JJ.
RIVERA, J.P.
In 1993, the petitioner was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree and two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. The indeterminate sentence imposed on the conspiracy in the second degree conviction was directed to run concurrently to the indeterminate sentences imposed on the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree convictions. In 2009, the Division of Parole terminated the petitioner's drug-related sentences pursuant to Executive Law former § 259–j(3–a), which was enacted as part of the 2004 Drug Law Reform Act (hereinafter the 2004 DLRA). That provision allowed for early termination of indeterminate sentences imposed on certain drug-related offenses for those persons who had completed three years of unrevoked parole. The issue presented on the instant appeal is whether the petitioner was entitled to the early termination of the sentence imposed on the conspiracy in the second degree conviction on the ground that it merged with the sentences imposed on the drug-related convictions. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the petitioner was not entitled to the early termination of the sentence imposed on the conspiracy in the second degree conviction.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, who was "a manager in a drug ring," sold three ounces of cocaine and conspired to "murder a rival drug leader" (Matter of Baez v. Dennison, 25 A.D.3d 1052, 1052, 807 N.Y.S.2d 485 ). By two separate judgments, both rendered April 7, 1993, the petitioner was convicted of conspiracy in the second degree and two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. With regard to the conspiracy in the second degree conviction, the petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment consisting of 8 ? to 25 years. As to the criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree convictions, he was sentenced to consecutive indeterminate terms of imprisonment consisting of 8 years to life and 4 ½ years to life, respectively. The sentence imposed on the conspiracy conviction was directed to run concurrently with the sentences imposed on the drug-related convictions.
On July 25, 2006, the petitioner was released to parole supervision. After the petitioner successfully completed three years of parole supervision without violation, the Division of Parole terminated the sentences imposed on the petitioner's two drug-related convictions, effective July 28, 2009. The termination of those sentences was pursuant to Executive Law former § 259–j(3–a), recodified as Correction Law § 205(4) (). Executive Law former § 259–j(3–a) directed the Division of Parole to "grant termination of sentence after three years of unrevoked presumptive release or parole to a person serving an indeterminate sentence for a class A felony offense defined in" Penal Law § 220 ( People ex rel. Speights v. McKoy, 88 A.D.3d 1039, 1040, 930 N.Y.S.2d 498 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Executive Law former § 259–j(3–a) was enacted as part of the 2004 DLRA (L. 2004, ch. 738). "Essentially, the 2004 DLRA established a new sentencing structure for laws that had been enacted in 1973 and were commonly referred to as the Rockefeller Drug Laws" ( People v. Overton, 86 A.D.3d 4, 11, 923 N.Y.S.2d 619 ). As relevant to this appeal, the Division of Parole did not terminate the sentence imposed on the petitioner's conspiracy in the second degree conviction. Instead, the petitioner continued under parole supervision with regard to that conviction. The Division of Parole recalculated the petitioner's sentence to modify the "Maximum Expiration" date, which had originally been life imprisonment based upon his drug sale convictions, to February 9, 2017, based on the 25–year maximum term of the conspiracy in the second degree sentence.
On September 16, 2009, the petitioner was arrested by federal agents in New Jersey and charged in federal court with conspiring to possess and distribute cocaine (see 21 U.S.C. § 846 ). He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 48 months in prison (later reduced to 46 months), to be followed by 4 years of postrelease supervision. During his imprisonment, New York authorities lodged a parole violation detainer against him. On December 19, 2012, upon his release from federal custody, the petitioner was taken into New York's custody pursuant to the detainer. On January 16, 2013, he pleaded guilty to violating parole, based upon his federal conviction. The Division of Parole imposed a delinquent time assessment of time served plus 90 days. He was expected to be released from incarceration on April 16, 2013. The maximum expiration date on the sentence relating to the 1993 conspiracy in the second degree conviction was recalculated to May 3, 2020.
The Instant Proceeding
On or about March 4, 2013, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Superintendent of the Queensboro Correctional Facility and the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter DOCCS and together the appellants). In the verified petition, the petitioner asserted that the sentence relating to the 1993 conspiracy in the second degree conviction should have been terminated in 2009 when the sentences imposed on the drug-related convictions were terminated. Specifically, the petitioner argued that, pursuant to Penal Law § 70.30(1)(a), the conspiracy in the second degree sentence merged with the longer drug-related sentences, each of which carried a maximum term of life. Accordingly, he contended that the sentence imposed on his conspiracy in the second degree conviction should be terminated and the time assessment imposed on the parole violation should be vacated. Finally, in the event that the petitioner was released to parole supervision before a decision was made in this matter, the petitioner requested that the writ of habeas corpus be converted into a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78.
In opposition, the appellants asserted that terminating the sentence imposed on the petitioner's conspiracy in the second degree conviction would give him a windfall not intended by the Legislature and not required by any statutory language. They argued that Executive Law former § 259–j(3–a) and the 2004 DLRA did not give the court the authority to terminate any sentence other than the sentences relating to the defendant's drug convictions. Thus, they contended that the early sentence termination provision did not apply to the sentence relating to the petitioner's conviction of conspiracy in the second degree. Further, the appellants disputed the petitioner's contention that termination of the conspiracy sentence was required by Penal Law § 70.30(1)(a).
The Amended Judgment Appealed From
In the amended judgment appealed from, upon granting the petitioner's request to convert this proceeding into one pursuant to CPLR article 78 in the nature of mandamus, the Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that the sentence relating to the petitioner's conviction of conspiracy in the second degree had merged with the drug-related sentences and, thus, should have been satisfied by discharge on July 28, 2009. Specifically, the court determined that the drug-related sentences "had the longest unexpired time to run" and the conspiracy sentence merged with the drug-related sentences pursuant to Penal Law § 70.30(1). Accordingly, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to DOCCS to (1) administratively terminate the sentence relating to the petitioner's conspiracy conviction as of July 28, 2009, (2) vacate, with prejudice, the parole violation warrant lodged against the petitioner, and (3) vacate, with prejudice, the delinquent time assessment imposed thereon.
Statutory Framework
We begin our analysis by providing a brief overview of the relevant statutes and their interplay.
)" ( People v. Brown, 115 A.D.3d 155, 156, 979 N.Y.S.2d 367, lv. granted 23 N.Y.3d 961, 988 N.Y.S.2d 568, 11 N.E.3d 718 ). The Legislature enacted the 2004 DLRA "to grant relief from what [it] perceived as the ‘inordinately harsh punishment for low level non-violent drug offenders' that the Rockefeller Drug Law required" ( People v. Paulin, 17 N.Y.3d 238, 244, 929 N.Y.S.2d 36, 952 N.E.2d 1028, quoting Assembly Sponsor's Mem., Bill Jacket, L. 2004, ch. 738 at 6; see People v. Norris, 20 N.Y.3d 1068, 1072, 964 N.Y.S.2d 67, 986 N.E.2d 901 ; People v. Acevedo, 14 N.Y.3d 828, 831, 901 N.Y.S.2d 578, 927 N.E.2d 1062 ; People v. Brown, 115 A.D.3d at 156, 979 N.Y.S.2d 367 ). With respect to offenses committed on or after January 13, 2005, the 2004 DLRA, inter alia, replaced lengthy indeterminate sentences with determinate sentences and reduced mandatory minimum prison sentences for nonviolent felony drug offenders (see L. 2004, ch. 738, § 36 [adding Penal Law §§ 70.70, 70.71 ]; see People v. Overton, 86 A.D.3d at 11, 923 N.Y.S.2d 619 ). Although the reduced sentencing provisions were made prospective only, the law included other provisions applicable to defendants who had committed their crimes prior to its effective date designed to afford them similar sentencing relief, such as the ability to obtain early termination of parole (see People v. Utsey, 7...
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