People ex rel. Batman v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.
| Citation | 366 Ill. 408,9 N.E.2d 310 |
| Decision Date | 11 June 1937 |
| Docket Number | No. 23524.,23524. |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. BATMAN, County Collector, v. ILLINOIS CENTRAL R. CO. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Proceeding by the People, on the relation of George S. Batman, County Collector, for a judgment against, and order forsale of property of, the Illinois Central Railroad Company for delinquent taxes. From a judgment and order of sale, the Railroad Company appeals.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, with directions.Appeal from Jasper County Court; Albert E. Isley, judge.
Charles A. Helsell and R. C. Beckett, both of Chicago, and Craig & Craig and Robert M. Werden, both of Mattoon (Edward C. Craig and Vernon W. Foster, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.
Homer Kasserman, State's Atty., of Newton, for appellee.
Lester Geers, of Edwardsville, edwin V. Champion, of Peoria, George W. Howard, Jr., of Mt. Vernon, and Ward P. Holt, State's Attys., of Salem, amici curiae.
The Illinois Central Railroad Company filed objections in the county court of Jasper county to the application of the county collector for judgment and an order of sale of the company's property for delinquent 1934 taxes. Its objections were overruled, judgment and order for sale were rendered, and the company has appealed.
The board of supervisors of Jasper county levied $16,200 for general county purposes for the year 1934. Appellant objected to the following items in that levy: ‘Fuel, water and lights for courthouse, $1000; fuel, water and lights for jail, $300, and for bridges, $400.’ The company contends that the items, ‘fuel, water and lights' for the courthouse and for the jail, were improper, in that several purposes are covered by one amount, or, in other words, the levies for these purposes should have been made specific by further itemization, and that the item for ‘bridges' is uncertain and does not sufficiently designate the purpose for which the levy made is to be used. In People ex rel. v. Jackson, 272 Ill. 494, 112 N.E. 344, 345, we held valid a levy for ‘public buildings, light, heat, and repairs, $12,000,’ and in People ex rel. v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., 336 Ill. 506, 168 N.E. 294, we held that a levy for ‘light and water’ need not be further itemized. See, also, People ex rel. v. Chicago, burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 306 Ill. 529, 138 N.E. 135. Taxpayers were sufficiently advised by these items in the levy that the purpose was to supply fuel, water, and lights for the courthouse and for the jail for the current year, and it was not necessary to state the separate cost of the fuel, the water or the lights. As to the item of $400 for ‘bridges,’ we held in People ex rel. v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 249 Ill. 170, 94 N.E. 57, and People ex rel. v. Bowman, 253 Ill. 243, 97 N.E. 304, that the item ‘bridges' fairly includes the building of new bridges, the repairing of old ones, and the construction of approaches. These objections were, therefore, properly overruled.
The appellee confesses error was committed by the overruling of the appellant's objection to the item of, ‘$100 for fire department’ contained in the levy ordinance of the city of Newton.
Objections were made to, ‘street and alley fund, $200,’ ‘for streets and alleys, $200,’ and ‘for street and alleys, $2,000,’ contained in the respective 1934 levy ordinances of the villages of Rose Hill and Willow Hill, and the city of Newton. In view of our holdings that levies for streets and alleys are for a single purpose, these objections were properly overruled. People ex rel. v. Eastern Illinois & Missouri Railroad Co., 335 Ill. 245, 167 N.E. 24;People ex rel. v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556, 139 N.E. 113.
Three other items were objected to in the village of Rose Hill tax levy ordinance, viz., ‘election fund $40,’ ‘light fund, $630,’ and ‘sidewalk and bridge fund, $100.’ The first two items are such as would ordinarily be found in an annual village tax levy ordinance. The expense items connected with holding an election in a village are few in number and small in amount. No statutory provision is violated by a failure to further itemize the election item of $40. The same is true of the item of $630 for light for the village. The fact that the word ‘fund’ was included does not necessarily make the items vague and indefinite. While we have held that it is possible for a fund or an account to be for different purposes and subject to the objection that it is indefinite (People ex rel. Frick v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Co., 361 Ill. 470, 198 N.E. 212;People ex rel. v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 243 Ill. 217, 90 N.E. 730), such is not the case here. We upheld a levy for ‘coal and gas fund,’ and said that it was equivalent to a levy for heat and light, in People v. Chicago, burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., supra. These items, objected to as indefinite because of the use of the word ‘fund,’ were readily understood and are not indefinite. For that reason the objections to them were properly overruled.
The objection to the levy of $100 for ‘sidewalks and bridges' should have been sustained, because these were two separate purposes. We held in People ex rel. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 332 Ill. 53, 163 N.E. 348, that an item for roads and bridges should be stated separately. It was error to overrule this objection.
Appellant objected to the 1934 levies in fifteen school districts in Jasper county on the ground that, in each district, the levies were so unreasonable and unnecessary as to show an abuse of discretion by the taxing authorities; that the directors, in making the 1934 levy, did not take into consideration the cash on hand, the uncollected 1933 taxes still in process of collection, and the amounts which would be received from the motor fuel tax, and the occupational tax through the state distributive school fund; that they made no attempt to estimate the funds which would be needed to operate the schools during the tax year; and that the result of permitting the levy for the year 1934 to stand would be an unnecessary accumulation of funds in the school treasuries. The financial status of each district on the day of the levy was stipulated, but the appellee objected to the materiality of the facts and figures contained in the various exhibits. District 35 illustrates the data furnished with reference to each of the districts. In it the net funds available for a two-year period included cash on hand $684.49 and a balance of $262.35 of the 1933 taxes, which the testimony shows was collected in the fall of 1934. It was stipulated that this district received $136.72 during the eight-month period in which the motor fuel tax was diverted, in part, to school purposes. From the occupational tax, based on eleven months' actual receipts, it was estimated that the district would receive $971.46 over a two-year period, or $485.73 for one year. There were no outstanding orders or debts at the time the 1934 tax levy was made. The average cost of operating the school district for one year was $684.25, based on the cost for the three preceding years, and the tax levied for 1934, at the rate of $1, would produce the sum of $564.17. It is contended that the district would have $2055.02 net funds available for a two-year period, and that no levy should have been made for the year 1934. Substantially the same objections are made to the tax in the other school districts. The only difference is in the amounts of the tax levy, cost of operation, and net funds available. Only school districts 40 and 41 had any outstanding school orders, and it is stipulated that these were deducted from the total funds available in those two districts.
It was stipulated that appellee had made a prima facie case, and no question is made as to the legality of the levy in any district by reason of the same exceeding the statutory rate. The exhibits introduced by appellant, and objected to as immaterial by appellee, purport to cover a two-year period. All the levies were made on August 7, 1934, and the fiscal year of the school districts ended on June 30, 1935. The appellant objects to the relevancy and materiality of the county collector's testimony showing that only a part of the 1934 levy was received by each district in May, 1935, and that the balance collected thereof would be paid in December, 1935. We have taken from the exhibits, which are admitted to be correct as to amounts, the figures for the year 1934-35, in the fifteen districts, which are shown in the following table:
+----------------------------------------------+
¦ ¦Average ¦ ¦ ¦Uncol- ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦ ¦annual ¦Levy ¦Cash on ¦lected ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦Dist.¦cost of ¦for ¦hand June¦taxes for¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦No. ¦operation.¦1934 ¦30, 1934 ¦1933. ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦35 ¦$ 684.25 ¦$ 564.17 ¦$ 684.49 ¦$ 262.35 ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦39 ¦552.22 ¦625.58 ¦901.48 ¦299.52 ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦40 ¦757.46 ¦531.17 ¦495.45 ¦243.07 ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦41 ¦12,306.88 ¦10,755.75¦9,541.86 ¦5,117.79 ¦
+-----+----------+---------+---------+---------¦
¦42 ¦469.12 ¦520.35 ¦505.67 ¦203.85 ¦...To continue reading
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