People ex rel. Baumgardner v. Shultz
| Decision Date | 21 April 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 13636.,13636. |
| Citation | 298 Ill. 125,131 N.E. 279 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. BAUMGARDNER et al. v. SHULTZ et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit in quo warranto by the People, on the relation of Joseph Baumgardner and others, against Charles E. Shultz and others, as President and members of School Board of Education of Community Consolidated School District No. 401. There was a judgment of ouster, and defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Appeal from Circuit Court, McLean County; T. M. Harris, judge.
Livingston & Whitmore, of Bloomington, for appellants.
Miles K. Young, State's Atty., of Bloomington (John J. Morrissey, of Bloomington, of counsel), for appellees.
This is a suit in quo warranto brought against appellants, as president and members of the board of education of community consolidated school district No. 401, in McLean county. The information as originally filed consisted of two counts. The first was withdrawn, leaving the issues standing on the second count. The second count sets forth in detail the organization of the district under sections 84a to 84g of the School Law (Hurd's Rev. St. 1919, c. 122), as amended June 24, 1919 (Laws of 1919, p. 904). Appellants demurred to this count. Their demurrer was overruled. They elected to abide their demurrer, and judgment of ouster was rendered against them, and the cause was appealed to this court.
There appears to be no contention that the act of June 24, 1919, was not complied with, but it was, and is, contended by appellees that section 46 of the School Law provides the only means of consolidation of school districts lying in the same county, and that no attempt was made to consolidate the two school districts under that section. Both school districts lie entirely within the limits of Funks Grove township, and it is the contention of appellees that the act of June 24, 1919, if held to be constitutional, does not apply to the consolidation of districts other than those lying in different counties. Appellees also contend that sections 84a to 84g are unconstitutional. This latter question was before this court in People v. Exton, (No. 13516) 131 N. E. 275, where practically the same grounds were urged, and appellees' contention was there decided otherwise. It was there held that although the act was referred to as an act to amend the general School Law, it in fact does not change, reform, revise, correct, or modify any provisions of the general School Law, or purport by its language to do so; that it simply adds to the School Law the sections there enacted, and specifically gives to the districts organized thereunder the rights and powers of the whole act.
Concerning appellees' contention that this law, if held to be constitutional, nevertheless does not apply to the consolidation of the school districts lying within the same county, the argument is that it is manifest from the act itself that it was intended to apply only to territory or districts involving the rights or the jurisdiction of more than one county superintendent of schools; that to hold that it applies to districts lying within one county would be, in effect, to say that this act repealed section 46 of the School Law by implication, which is not favored, and that had the Legislature intended the repeal of said section it would have referred to such repeal in apt terms. We are unable to see the force of this argument. It was evident that the Legislature, in enacting sections 84a to 84g of the School Law, intended to add other means than those existing by which consolidation of school districts may be had, and the fact that it made provision for the consolidation of such districts as lie in different counties, which was not provided for in section 46, does not establish that the Legislature intended to repeal section 46, or that the application of the act is...
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City of Chicago v. Cotton
...exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent"); People ex rel. Baumgardner v. Shultz, 298 Ill. 125, 128, 131 N.E. 279, 280 (1921) ("The courts cannot say that the legislature did not mean what in plain language is expressed in the statu......
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...and does not include additional provisions not affectingexisting provisions. People v. Exton, 298 Ill. 119, 131 N. E. 275;People v. Shultz, 298 Ill. 125, 131 N. E. 279. In People v. Knopf, supra, it was said that the character of an act, whether amendatory or complete in itself, must be det......
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...with respect to the first three points have been considered and answered in People v. Exton, 298 Ill. 119, 131 N. E. 275,People v. Shultz, 298 Ill. 125, 131 N. E. 279, and People v. Moyer, 298 Ill. 143, 131 N. E. 280. We there held that the act of 1919 (Acts 1919, p. 904), authorizing the c......
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Ketcham v. Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 201
...under the laws as they now exist, the remedy is with the Legislature. People v. Graham, 301 Ill. 446, 134 N. E. 57;People v. Shultz, 298 Ill. 125, 131 N. E. 279. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment ...