People ex rel. Callahan v. Bd. of Educ. of New York

• Decision Date: 17 March 1903
• Citation: 174 N.Y. 169,66 N.E. 674
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. CALLAHAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

174 N.Y. 169

66 N.E. 674

PEOPLE ex rel. CALLAHAN

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 17, 1903.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Application by the people, on the relation of Katharine R. Callahan, for a writ of mandamus to the board of education of the city of New York, to compel the reinstatement of relator as teacher in the Fourth grammar grade in the public schools. From an order of the Appellate Division (79 N. Y. Supp. 624) affirming an order granting the writ, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

In her petition for the writ, the relator alleged, among other things, that on the 1st of February, 1898, she ‘was appointed as a teacher of the Sixth grammar grade, mixed, in public school No. 89 of the city of Brooklyn, under a permanent appointment,’ and that at the time she held a certificate entitling her ‘to a permanent appointment as teacher of any grammar grade in the said city’; that on the 30th of June, 1900, she was transferred to public school No. 90, and appointed teacher of the Fourth grammar grade therein; that her name appeared on the pay roll of the school last named for the month of September, 1900, as a teacher of the Fourth grammar grade, and the principal of said school certified to the correctness of the pay roll; that the October pay roll contained her name as a teacher of the Sixth grammar grade, but she declined to sign it; that she was transferred from the Fourth grammar grade and appointed in the Sixth grammar grade, and that by reason thereof her salary was lowered by at least $156 a year; that no charges were ever preferred against her, no trial had, and none of the requirements of the charter or of the by-laws of the school board of Brooklyn in relation to the removal of teachers were complied with.

These allegations were substantially admitted by the defendant, although it denied any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to certain other allegations of the petition which have not been mentioned. It also alleged, in substance, that teachers in the borough of Brooklyn hold their positions during the pleasure of the school board, and that the relator, after assignment to the higher grade, was reassigned to the lower.

The hearing before the Special Term resulted in an order for a peremptory writ of mandamus, requiring the defendant to reinstate the relator in her former position as a teacher of the Fourth grammar grade. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, said order was unanimously affirmed, and the defendant appealed to this court.George L. Rives, Corp. Counsel (James McKeen, of counsel), for appellant.

Conrad Saxe Keyes, for respondent.

VANN, J.

The rights of the parties to this proceeding depend upon the meaning of certain sections of the charter of the present city of New York, as enacted May 1, 1897, to take effect January 1, 1898 (Laws 1897, c. 378). In construing a statute, light is generally thrown upon its meaning by considering any other statute upon the same subject which either preceded or followed it. Therefore, as an aid to the interpretation of the statute directly involved in this litigation, we will briefly refer to the law as it was before that statute was passed, and to changes since made in the statute itself.

According to the charters of the cities of New York and Brooklyn, as they stood just before the act of consolidation went into effect, the board of education in each could remove teachers arbitrarily and without a trial. While in the city of New York there was a right to appeal from the board of school superintendents to the board of education, the school authorities, as a whole, had absolute control of the subject. Laws 1896, c. 387, § 26. This was also true as to the school authorities of the city of Brooklyn, except that no provision existed for an appeal from one branch of the department of public instruction to another. Laws 1888, c. 583, tit. 17, p. 1071. As the law was, therefore, when the present city of New York was created, the teachers of the public schools in New York and Brooklyn, with certain exceptions, not now material, were not protected, in the absence of a contract, in holding their positions, even if they had earned them by many years of faithful and efficient service. They could, one or all, be removed with or without cause, investigation, or trial, at the will of the power that appointed them. This is expressly admitted by the appellant.

By the charter of the greater city, however, as originally passed, a change was made in this regard. For the first time the statute authorized charges to be preferred against a teacher, a formal trial had, and, in case of conviction, punishment inflicted by a fine, suspension for a fixed time without pay, or dismissal. Laws 1897, p. 403, c. 378, § 1114. Thus, instead of the old method of arbitrary removal, there was substituted a method of removal after notice and an opportunity to be heard. This prepares us to search for some express limitation upon the discretionary power which formerly existed, as otherwise a trial upon charges before removal would be useless, for, if the board could remove at will, why should they have recourse to a trial? The relator contends that section 1117 has this effect, while the defendant contends that it was enacted for a different purpose. As the decision of this controversy depends upon the construction of that section, we quote it in full, although the discussion is substantially confined to the first and last sentences thereof: ‘Sec. 1117. All superintendents, assistant or associate superintendents, and all principals, teachers and other members of the educational staff in the public school system of any part of the city of New York as constituted by this act, shall continue to hold their respective positions and to be entitled to such compensation as is now provided or may hereafter be provided by the various school boards, subject to the limitations of this act, and to reassignment or to removal for cause, as may be provided by law. On the first day of February, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, the city superintendent of schools in the city of New York as constituted prior to the passage of this act, shall be and become the superintendent of schools of the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx; and the assistant superintendents of the city of New York as then constituted,shall be and become associate superintendents of the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx; the superintendent of public instruction of the city of Brooklyn as constituted prior to the passage of this act shall be and become the superintendent of schools of the borough of Brooklyn; and the associate superintendents of the city of Brooklyn as then constituted, shall become associate superintendents of the borough of Brooklyn. The duties of all of these officers on and after February first, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, shall be entirely defined and limited by the provisions of this act. All persons transferred by this section to the service of the consolidated city who hold office for definite terms, shall be transferred for the remainder of their respective terms only.’

This section was in force when the relator was removed from the one grade to the other, and its purpose, according to the contention of the appellants, ‘was to allay the apprehension that the consolidation, involving the dissolution of former local boards of education, might drop out of employment teachers and other subordinates in the municipal service.’ While this may have been a part of the purpose, there may have been the further object of permanently protecting teachers in the tenure of their positions unless they were removed for cause after a trial, which, as we have seen, was then authorized for the first time. On the other hand, the relator claims that it was the inauguration of a new policy in this regard, and we find some support of her theory in subsequent legislation, which, although not directly affecting this case, may indicate a settled purpose on the part of the Legislature.

The greater charter was thoroughly revised by chapter 466, p. 1, of the Laws of 1901, which took effect on the 1st of January, 1902. By the revision, section 1114 was reenacted, with unimportant changes, as section 1093 (Laws...