People ex rel. Callahan v. De Young
| Decision Date | 22 June 1921 |
| Docket Number | No. 13783.,13783. |
| Citation | 298 Ill. 380,131 N.E. 801 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. CALLAHAN et al. v. DE YOUNG, Judge. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Application of Mary Callahan and others for leave to file a petition for mandamus against John J. Healy. From a judgment dismissing the bill complainants appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed and remanded, defendant securing leave to amend his answer, whereupon complainants applied to the Supreme Court for leave to file petition for mandamus requiring the trial court to enter final decree, which leave was granted and respondent judge answered; the cause being busmitted for decision on demurrers to the answer.
Writ awarded.
Samuel W. Norton and William C. Dunn, both of Chicago, for relators.
Litsinger, Healy & Reid, of Chicago (James J. Finn, of Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.
Mary Callahan and her three minor children recovered a judgment for $5,000 on March 14, 1913, against Frank Hallinan, in a suit brought under section 9 of the Dramshop Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1919, c. 43), for injury to their means of support. They subsequently filed a bill in chancery against John J. Healy, under section 10 of the Dramshop Act, to charge the judgment as a lien upon the premises in which Hallinan conducted his saloon. At the hearing of the chancery cause the defendant offered no evidence, but both parties rested at the conclusion of the evidence introduced by the complainants.The court sustained motions made by defendant to strike out the complainants' evidence and dismissed their bill for want of equity. The complainants appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, which reversed the decree and remanded the cause to the circuit court ‘for such other and further proceedings as to law and justice appertain, in conformity with the views expressed in the opinion of this court this day filed herein.’ The opinion stated:
‘We are of the opinion that the original declaration stated a good cause of action under section 9 of the Dramshop Act; that on the evidence submitted complainants were entitled to a lien; and that the court erred in striking out complainants' evidence.’
After the cause was reinstated in the circuit court the complainants made a motion for a final decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The defendant asked leave to amend his answer, and Judge McGoorty, to whom the cause had been assigned, denied the complainants' motion and granted leave to the defendant to amend his answer. Thereupon the complainants applied to this court for leave to file a petition for a mandamus requiring Judge McGoorty to enter a final decree declaring the judgment to be a lien on the premises as prayed for in the bill. The leave was granted, the respondent answered the petition, and the cause has been submitted for decision on demurrer to the answer.
Where a cause is remanded by an Appellate Court with directions to the circuit court to enter a decree, the court has no discretion, but its duty is to enter the decree in accordance with the direction. The contention of the respondent's counsel is that the remandment, with directions for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion of the court, was not a remandment with specific directions, but left to the discretion of the judge to determine what proceedings would be in conformity with the opinion of the court. The rule is well established that when the mandate of an Appellate Court directs the entry of a decree in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion, the court must look to the opinion to ascertain the views expressed, but it must conform its action to directions given in the mandate and must enter a decree in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. Fisher v. Burks, 285 Ill. 290, 120 N. E. 768;Prentice v. Crane, 240 Ill. 250, 88 N. E. 654. The duty to do so may be enforced by mandamus. People v. Scanlan, 294 Ill. 64, 128 N. E. 328. In the case now under consideration the court did not, in so many words, direct the entry of a decree, but remanded the cause for further proceedings in conformity with the opinion filed. In such a case the trial court is bound to examine the opinion and determine from the nature of the case what further proceedings may conform to the opinion. If the merits of the case have not been determined on the appeal, an amendment of the pleading and the introduction of additional evidence may be permitted, but if the case has been considered on its merits and they have been determined, the only proceeding in conformity with the opinion is the entry of a decree in accordance with it. Prentice v. Crane, supra. The case in the Appellate Court presented the question of the sufficiency of the declaration in the case against Hallinan under section 9 of the Dramshop Act as a basis for the lien, and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the lien of the judgment upon the property of the defendant under section 10 of the Dramshop Act. Both these questions were decided in favor of the complainants; the court stating in its opinion that the declaration stated a good cause of action under section 9, and that on the evidence submitted the complainants were entitled to a lien. The decision of those questions determined the merits of the case. The views expressed in the opinion were that the law was with the complainants and that the facts established by the evidence entitled them to the lien for which they prayed. The cause having been submitted for decision and the Appellate Court having found the issues of law and fact for the complainants, no other proceeding in conformity with the views expressed in the opinion was possible than a decree for complainants establishing the lien.
No evidence was introduced by the defendant on the hearing, and it is insisted that the action of the court in sustaining the motion to strike the complainants' evidence eliminated such evidence from consideration, and that no decree could be entered in the absence of any evidence. The parties had both rested, the...
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