Prentice v. Crane

• Decision Date: 12 June 1909
• Citation: 88 N.E. 654,240 Ill. 250
• Parties: PRENTICE et al. v. CRANE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

240 Ill. 250

88 N.E. 654

PRENTICE et al.

v.CRANE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 23, 1909.

Rehearing Denied June 12, 1909.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Lockwood Honore, Judge.

Suit by Allen T. Prentice and others against Richard T. Crance. From a decree for complaints, defendant appeals. Affirmed.Ashcraft & Ashcraft (E. M. Ashcraft, of counsel), for appellant.

Kraus, Alschuler & Holden and James H. Barnard, for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, C. J.

Allen T. Prentice and Lizzie P. Crane, the appellees, brought this case to this court by appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Cook county dismissing their bill filed in that court to set aside a quitclaim deed of their father, Alonzo T. Prentice, to Richard T. Crane, appellant. Upon a consideration of the evidence and the legal effect of the same, it was found that the circuit court arrived at an incorrect conclusion as to the validity of the deed, and it was determined that the deed was void for fraud of the appellant in procuring it. The decree was accordingly reversed, and the cause was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in the opinion of the court then delivered and filed in the cause. Prentice v. Crane, 234 Ill. 302, 84 N. E. 916. Upon the reinstatement of the cause in the circuit court, the appellant entered his motion for another hearing of the cause and leave to introduce further evidence in his behalf. The court denied the motion, and entered a decree finding that the execution of the deed was procured through false and fraudulent representations of appellant and was therefore void, setting aside said deed as a cloud upon the title of the appellees, ordering an assignment of the homestead and dower of appellant and partition of the premises, and directing an accounting of rents and profits. From that decree this appeal was prosecuted, and the assignment of error is the refusal of the court to permit a second hearing and the introduction of further evidence by appellant.

The issues of fact in the case were whether Alonzo T. Prentice was mentally competent to execute the deed, and whether it was obtained by false and fraudulent representations of appellant that his deceased wife had left a last will and testament giving all her property to him, and that said will had been inadvertently destroyed. The case was considered by this court on its merits, and the conclusions reached were expressed in an opinion stating that the evidence showed such debility of body and feebleness of mind in Alonzo T. Prentice as to render him an easy victim of fraud and imposition, and also showed that the representation of appellant that his deceased wife had left a last will and testament giving all her property to him was false and fraudulent, and that the charge in the bill that the execution of the deed was procured through such false and fraudulent representation was sustained by the evidence. As that finding was conclusive, the question whether the grantor had sufficient mental capacity to execute the deed became immaterial and was not considered. The decree dismissing the bill was reversed, and the cause was remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views so expressed.

The motion for another hearing was supported by the affidavit of appellant's solicitor that if the cause was set for hearing he would offer additional evidence tending to show that Alonzo T. Prentice was capable of making the deed, and testimony tending to, show the disbursements of large sums of money among the heirs of the deceased wife of appellant, amounting to about $40,000, and that said Allen T. Prentice was a large beneficiary in the distribution of said sums. The affidavit further stated, that the solicitor would offer evidence tending to show that the deceased wife executed a will substantially as set forth in the letter of appellant, in which will appellant was the chief beneficiary; that appellant inadvertently destroyed said will; that the will provided for giving certain sums of money to certain heirs of the testatrix, and gave all the rest and remainder of the estate, including the property in question, to appellant, the letter being erroneous in stating that the testatrix willed everything to the appellant.

This court may in any case, either at law or in equity, render final judgment as provided by section 110 of the practice act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 110), or, in case of a reversal, may remand the cause to the inferior court. If the cause is one where the parties are entitled to a trial of the issues of fact by a jury, the inferior court must be governed by the legal principles laid down in the opinion in any further proceedings in the case; but the conclusion of this court as to matters of fact does not control upon another trial, where the facts are to be determined from the evidence then introduced. If the case is one where there is no right to a jury trial, this court, upon reversing the judgment or decree and remanding the cause, may direct the inferior court to enter a particular judgment or decree or give directions which will have that effect. In any case it is the duty of the inferior court to examine the opinion and conform its action to it, and, in case of a general order reversing a judgment or decree and remanding the cause without specific directions, it must be determined from the nature of the case what further proceedings would be proper and not inconsistent with the opinion. If the case has been considered on its merits and they have been determined, the only proceeding that could be had not inconsistent with the opinion would be to enter a decree in accordance with it. If the merits of the case have not been determined, an amendment of the pleadings and the introduction of additional evidence may be permitted, and, while the inferior court is concluded by the legal principles announced, other facts may be proved within those principles which obviate objections to granting the relief sought or to the allowance of the defense interposed. If necessary to accomplish the ends of justice, this court may give leave to make amendments to the pleadings, as was done in McConnel v. Holobush, 11 Ill. 61, and other cases, or to introduce additional evidence, as was permitted in Eppstein v. Kuhn, 225 Ill. 115, 80 N. E. 80,10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 117. If the grounds of reversal are of a character to be obviated by amendments of the pleadings or the introduction of additional evidence, such procedure may not be at all inconsistent with the opinion of this court and may be proper. Chickering v. Failes, 29 Ill. 294;Dinsmoor v. Rowse, 211 Ill. 317, 71 N. E. 1003;Washburn & Moen Manf. Co. v. Chicago Galvanized Wire Fence Co., 119 Ill. 30, 6 N. E. 191. If, however, the merits of the case have been determined and the rights of the parties fixed, any different determination of the same would be inconsistent with the views expressed by this court, and the only decree that could be entered would be one which accords with such views. In such a case a direction for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in the opinion does not permit another trial of the same issues and a different determination of them. Hollowbush v. McConnel, 12 Ill. 203;Wadhams v. Gay, 83 Ill. 250;Newberry v. Blatchford, 106 Ill. 584;Hook v. Richeson, 115 Ill. 431, 5 N. E. 98;Gage v. Bailey, 119 Ill. 539, 9 N. E. 199;Buck v. Buck, 119 Ill. 613, 8 N. E. 837;Sanders v. Peck, 131 Ill. 407, 25 N. E. 508;City of Chicago v. Gregsten, 157 Ill. 160, 45 N. E. 505;Lynn v. Lynn, 160 Ill. 307, 43 N. E. 482;Hardin v. Shedd, 177 Ill. 123, 52 N. E. 380;Blackaby v. Blackaby, 189 Ill. 342, 59 N. E. 602;In re Estate of Maher, 210 Ill. 160, 71 N. E. 438;Noble v. Tipton, 222 Ill. 639, 78 N. E. 927.

The case of West v. Douglas, 145 Ill. 164, 34 N. E. 141, was a second appeal in a suit in equity to restore a lost deed and to confirm title to the premises thereby conveyed. The defenses stated and insisted upon by the answer were: First, that the grantor did not execute the alleged deed; and, second, that at the time the deed was claimed to have been executed he was of unsound mind and incapable of making the same. When the case was first heard in the circuit court the controversy was confined to the first of these defenses, and the circuit court reached the conclusion that the deed was not delivered. The evidence was reviewed by this court, and the view that the deed was delivered was expressed in the opinion then filed. Douglas v. West, 140 Ill. 455, 31 N. E. 403. The decree...