People ex rel. Carpentier v. Goers

• Decision Date: 29 September 1960
• Docket Number: No. 35673,35673
• Citation: 20 Ill.2d 272,170 N.E.2d 159
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. Charles F. CARPENTIER, Secretary of State, Appellee, v. Werner GOERS, d/b/a Goers Motor Sales, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 159

170 N.E.2d 159

20 Ill.2d 272

PEOPLE ex rel. Charles F. CARPENTIER, Secretary of State, Appellee, v. Werner GOERS, d/b/a Goers Motor Sales, Appellant.

No. 35673.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 29, 1960.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Nov. 30, 1960.

Ryan & Heller, Mattoon (Orville F. Schoch, Mattoon, of counsel), for appellant.

Grenville Beardsley, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and Theodore G. Maheras, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for appellee.

SCHAEFER, Chief Justice.

The Secretary of State of Illinois brought this action in the circuit court of Effingham County to enjoin Werner Goers from engaging in the business of selling or dealing in motor vehicles without a license, in violation of the applicable statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, pars. 5-101, 5-102.) A decree granting the injunction was entered on the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and the defendant appeals directly to this court. We have jurisdiction because the validity of a statute is involved. Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 75.

In 1957, Werner Goers was a licensed automobile dealer doing business as Goers Motor Sales in Altamont, Illinois. On December 5 of that year, after a hearing, the Secretary of State revoked his license upon charges that he had committed a fraudulent act in connection with the sale of a motor vehicle, and had failed to produce records pertaining to his licensed business, as required by the statute. Goers brought an administrative review action in the circuit court of Effingham County to review the decision of the Secretary of State and obtained a stay order. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 110, par. 275.) This action was dismissed as moot in 1959, and the order dismissing the action is now pending on appeal in the Appellate Court for the Fourth District.

On December 31, 1957, the defendant applied for a license for 1958. The application was denied upon the grounds upon which the revocation was based, and upon additional charges of statutory violations. Goers instituted an action to review this determination in the circuit court of Sangamon County. That court affirmed the decision of the Secretary of State, and an appeal from this judgment is now pending in the Appellate Court for the Third District.

Subsequently, after another hearing, the Secretary denied the defendant's application for a license for 1959, and Goers's action to review this determination was pending in the circuit court of Sangamon County when the case now before us was decided in the trial court. On December 29, 1958, the Secretary instituted the present action to restrain Goers from engaging in business without a license with the result that has been stated.

We consider first the constitutional issue upon which our jurisdiction upon direct appeal is based. The defendant contends that sections 5-101(e) and 5-102(e) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, pars. 5-101, 5-102), which direct the Secretary of State to examine and grant or deny an application for a motor vehicle dealer's license 'within a reasonable time,' are invalid because they delegate legislative power to an executive officer, and because they authorize him to act on some applications immediately while arbitrarily delaying others indefinitely. Both objections are without merit. The Secretary is charged with the duty of determining whether an application for a license conforms to the statutory requirements and whether any reason, as prescribed in the statute, exists for denying the license. These duties may, upon occasion, require time-consuming investigation and difficult judgments. The statute gives the Secretary 'a reasonable time' to perform these functions before acting on a license; it does not authorize arbitrary delay. Whether a definite period in which the Secretary must act would be desirable or harmful is a decision for the legislature. Inclusion of such a period is not essential to the validity of the statute. Cf. Jaffe v. Cruttenden, 412 Ill. 606, 610, 107 N.E.2d 715.

Nor is there any basis for asserting, as the defendant does, that the statute has been administered in a discriminatory fashion, and so is invalid under the doctrine of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220. This assertion rests on the fact that the defendant's application for a 1959 license was filed on October 31, 1958, and was not denied until February 5, 1959, after the defendant had filed a mandamus action to compel the Secretary to act upon the application. That single circumstance, involving as it did an application that presented obvious legal problems, does not, of course, begin to approach the systematic scheme of discrimination that would be required to bring the Yick Wo doctrine into play.

The defendant's attack upon the sufficiency of the complaint is also without merit. Summarized, the complaint alleged that since on or about January 1, 1959, the defendant had been selling new and used automobiles, that no license had been issued to him, and that unless his conduct was restrained the rights of the People of the State of Illinois would be unduly prejudiced. The defendant's attack is upon the ground that the complaint fails to allege facts showing that irreparable injury is threatened in the absence of an injunction, and that the remedy at law is adequate. Both of these propositions are negatived by the statute which expressly authorizes issuance of an injunction 'to enforce the provisions of this Act, in addition to the penalties and other remedies in this Act provided.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1959, chap. 95 1/2, par. 2-116. See, e. g., Burden v. Hoover, 9 Ill.2d 114, 119, 137 N.E.2d 59; Security and Exchange Comm. v. Jones, 2 Cir., 1936, 85 F.2d 17; State ex rel. Weasmer v. Manpower of Omaha, 161 Neb. 387, 73 N.W. 692; Nevada Real Estate Comm. v. Ressel, 72 Nev. 79, 294 P.2d 1115.

The most serious problem in the case concerns the effect of the pendency of the various administrative review proceedings involving the revocation of the defendant's 1957 license and the denial of his applications for 1958 and 1959 licenses. The pendency of these proceedings was alleged in the defendant's answer and also in his affidavit in opposition to the Secretary's motion for summary judgment. With respect to this problem, the position of the Secretary is direct and simple: the statute requires a license, the defendant does not have one, and therefore the injunction properly issued.

In support of this position two decisions of this court are cited in which unlicensed operations were punished even though the court recognized that the license might have been wrongfully denied. City of East St. Louis v. Wider, 46 Ill. 351; Kadgihn v. City of Bloomington, 58 Ill. 229. In each of these...