People ex rel. Chadwick v. County Officers of St. Clair

• Decision Date: 10 November 1866
• Citation: 15 Mich. 85
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People ex rel. Anson E. Chadwick v. County Officers of St. Clair

15 Mich. 85

The People ex rel. Anson E. Chadwick v. County Officers of St. Clair

Supreme Court of Michigan

November 10, 1866

Heard November 9, 1866 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Appeal in chancery fro St. Clair circuit.

The bill in this cause was filed to test the legality of certain proceedings for the removal of the county seat from St. Clair to Port Huron, and praying for an injunction.

The board of supervisors of St. Clair county, on the 13th day of October, 1865, passed a resolution providing for the removal of the county seat from St. Clair to Port Huron, subject to the following proviso, to wit: That "suitable guarantees should be given for the erection of the necessary buildings for county purposes, free of cost to the county, and that said guarantees should be given within ninety days from the date of this resolution."

That on the following day, said board, by resolution, directed that the question of said removal be submitted to the qualified electors of said county, in the manner provided by law, and which was done.

That said board then appointed five of their number as a committee to examine, and, if found satisfactory, to approve the bond required to be given on account of the removal of said county seat.

That no further or other action was had or taken by said board of supervisors on the subject of said removal, and no provision was made with respect to the guarantees required by the powers of the first named resolution, relative to the nature or sufficiency of such guarantee, or the receipt or approval of the same, if any should be offered, except the resolution last above set forth; but that subsequently a bond was deposited in the clerk's office of said county, with an indorsement of approval by said persons named in said committee.

That the question of said removal, but not the proviso, having been voted upon by the electors of said county, the board met, and, by resolution, declared that the county seat be removed from St. Clair to Port Huron, with the records, property, etc.

The bill was demurred to, the demurrer sustained, and the bill dismissed.

Decree of the court, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill, reversed.

A. E. Chadwick, for complainant.

(No brief was furnished the reporter.)

Mitchell & Farrand, for defendants:

1. The board of supervisors have power to designate a place to which a county seat shall be removed, whenever such removal is proposed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elect, and, after a majority of the electors of such county shall have voted in favor of the proposed location, they also have the power to make and establish such county seat at such place: Comp. L., § 352; Sess. Laws of 1863, p. 30.

In this case a removal was proposed, and a two-thirds majority of the members elect designated Port Huron as the place, but with a proviso that suitable guarantees should be given for the erection of the necessary buildings, free of cost to the county, and that such guarantees should be given within ninety days.

The only question raised by the bill of any importance or seriousness is, whether the board of supervisors had the authority to pass such a resolution; whether the proviso makes it something that they were not authorized to pass.

The board had expended all their authority when they, by resolution, designated the place. The next thing to be done is to obtain a vote by the electors, and the resolution of designation is necessarily a conditional one, that needs confirmation by a vote of the people.

The proviso must be regarded as applicable to the removal, or designed so to be after the submission to the electors; and there is no way in which it could become operative until that time, and whether they could make a proviso that would hinder its being removed, after such designation and vote, is an objection that can scarcely be made, especially as the proviso has been complied with. To remove the county seat needs a proposal, a resolution of removal passed by two-thirds, and a vote of a majority of the electors, and then the removal.

These things have taken place in the only order they could, and all is accomplished except the removal, a large majority having voted for the removal.

If the proviso would render nugatory the resolution, then the proviso should be disregarded. The legislature gave the board of supervisors power to designate the place to which the removal shall be made. They do that. They designate, but by their provisos provide for the expenses of constructing. They have power over the whole matter. Do they exceed their authority? If it is thought that such a proviso ought not to be attached to a designation, is there a necessity for regarding it as attached or intended to be, to the designation? Why not consider it as intended to be a condition of removal?

But an unlawful proviso does not necessarily imply an unlawful resolution, any more than an unlawful proviso in an act of the legislature renders the act void. Such provisos do not render acts void. Laws may be unconstitutional in some of their provisions, and valid as to the remainder. See 1 Mich. 485; 6 Id. 266; 11 Id. 139; 13 Id. 481.

2. The only other objection of the least importance is, that the resolution of designation was not passed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the board elect.

The meaning of this must be two-thirds of the members then constituting the board. If otherwise, one section of a county (being more than one-third) could, by resignation before any meeting of the board, prevent a vote being taken upon the question of removal.

The resolution was actually passed by a two-thirds vote of all the members elected originally by the change of vote of Julius Granger from no to aye.

The resolution had been declared as passed by a two-thirds vote the previous day, and on the second day, at the opening of the session, Julius Granger asks and obtains leave to change his vote from no to aye, which is granted, and this makes up with the nineteen votes that had before been given, twenty out of twenty-nine members. There was no need of reconsideration of the previous vote passing the resolution; it is enough that a body having power over the matter allow a change of vote, so that the record shall stand twenty instead of nineteen in favor of the passage of the resolution. A board of supervisors is not a body bound by any particular formula or set rules by which they were bound to reconsider their vote of the previous day and vote on it again--nineteen had voted for it, and on the second day, before any further action was had upon the matter,...