People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm. of Kings Cnty.

Decision Date09 October 1900
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. COFFEY v. DEMOCRATIC GENERAL COMMITTEE OF KINGS COUNTY.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Second department.

Action by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of Michael J. Coffey, against the Democratic general committee of Kings county. From a judgment of the appellate term in favor of the defendant (65 N. Y. Supp. 1143), the plaintiff appealed. Reversed.

O'Brien, Cullen, and Bartlett, JJ., dissenting.

Isaac M. Kapper, for appellant.

Charles J. Patterson, for respondent.

PARKER, C. J.

The fundamental question in this case is whether a member of the general committee of a county may be removed from office as a member of the committee. The answer to it depends upon the construction now to be given to the primary election law (chapter 473, Laws 1899), section 1 of which, in declaring the application of the act, says: ‘It shall be controlling (1) on the methods of enrolling the voters; * * * (2) on primary elections; * * * (3) on party conventions; * * * (4) on the choice * * * of political committees and on the conduct of political committees in and for any political subdivision of the state. * * *’

It will help us intelligently to consider the statute if we call to mind preceding legislation intended to protect the rights of minorities; the statute law looking to the purity of the ballot, and the organic law having for its purpose the encouragement of independent action in matters relating to municipal government. The help will come from our possession of the situation in which the legislators were when, in 1899, they passed the statute in question, which was in part composed of the general drift of public opinion, and the fault which that public opinion had found with the machinery for the election of public officials. The settled conviction that the safeguarding of our institutions requires the untrammeled exercise of the franchise by the citizens, and that the result be protected from fraud, has led to no inconsiderable amount of legislation during the present generation,-legislation aimed largely, although not entirely, at the frauds of majorities, who, at times, have manifested a disposition to retain their power, let the cost be what it might. The frauds that have perhaps occasioned the greatest amount of discussion resulted from colonization and repeating, for the correction of which several registry acts were passed. At the outset the legislation on that subject proceeded on the view that only in great cities were such frauds practiced, but such view proved to be partial, and in 1890 a general registry law was passed applicable to all of the state except the cities of New York and Brooklyn. Chapter 321, Laws 1890. In those cities registration had long been required. Chapter 142, Laws 1880. An enlightened public sentiment was at the same time making war against the evils of bribery, and the outcome was a new departure in our method of voting, under the provisions of an act entitled ‘An act to promote the independence of voters at public elections, enforce the secrecy of the ballot, and provide for the printing and distribution of the ballot at public expense.’ Chapter 262, Laws 1890. This act inaugurated the voting booth; prohibited electioneering within 150 feet of the polling place; took the burden of printing and distributing ballots from the party organizations, and placed it upon the public generally; and throughout teemed with provisions guarding against the frauds upon the ballot that experience had shown to be possible. Complaints had also been made that the practical effect of the power exercised by the organization was to render ineffective independent voting in purely municipal affairs, to the detriment of the best interests of the cities; and the recent constitutional convention (the work of which was subsequently ratified and adopted by the people) undertook to ameliorate the situation, to some extent, by providing that city officers should be elected at a different time than state officers, the election of the latter to take place in even, and the former in odd, numbered years; the reason assigned being that, unrestrained by national and state contests, the citizen would naturally be more independent, not only in voting, but in bringing about independent nominations, whenever the party to which he belonged should attempt to make nominations intended to subserve the selfish purposes of the leaders rather than to promote the public interests. Prior to 1882 there was no attempt to regulate by law the conduct of primaries, but chapter 154 of the Laws of that year, known as the Chapin Act,’ declared certain acts committed at primaries crimes, such as the false personation of a voter, intentionally voting without right, prevention of others from voting, and fraudulent concealment or destruction of ballots. It also required that the presiding officers and inspectors at such an election should take the usual oath of inspectors at general elections, and provided for the challenge of voters, and the administration of an oath to a person so challenged. The act applied only to the city of Brooklyn, but in 1883 its operation was so extended as to include the entire state (chapter 380, Laws 1883); while four years later it was restricted to cities of 10,000 inhabitants or less (chapter 265, Laws 1887). The latter act, however, contained new provisions regulating the primary elections in all the cities of the state containing over 10,000 inhabitants.Among other things, it required the appointment of watchers, the examination of the ballot box before use, and that it should be so placed as to enable the voter and each watcher to see the ballot deposited, the keeping of a poll list of the voters, and the making and filing of returns in the county clerk's office. The qualifications a voter was required to possess under the Chapin act (section 2) and under the act of 1887 (section 14), in addition to his being an elector, were those ‘prescribed by the regulations of the association holding the primary or convention.’

While these provisions reduced to a considerable extent the wrongs which had been committed against the voter who desired to participate in the selection of the candidates of his party, and made snap caucuses impossible, and the selection of delegates by brute force extremely difficult, still the right of the general committee to prescribe tests or qualifications for a voter was in some instances so employed as to exclude from participation in the primary many who were not in sympathy with the majority of the committee in all respects, and who might be termed members of a minority faction in the party. The not unnatural desire of the several general committees to perpetuate their power and control led, in some instances, to the making of ‘regulations' under which members who were not congenial to the majority were disciplined upon charges of disloyalty, inefficiency, or mismanagement, and the places made vacant by their removal were oftentimes filled with men who, from choice or prudence, worked in harmony with the ‘majority’ or the organization; for the latter term practically means the particular members of a party within a given territory who are, for the time being, in full control of its affairs. In McKane v. Adams, 123 N. Y. 609, 25 N. E. 1057, it appeared that the plaintiff was formerly a member of the Democratic association of his town, and a delegate upon the general committee of the county. Charges were preferred against the town association, and the trial resulted in its being disbanded. A reorganization of the town association was undertaken, and a primary election thereupon ordered by the general committee of the county organization, at which the defendant was elected a delegate to the county committee. The general committee refused to accept the returns of the primary election and to recognize him as a delegate. It was held that membership in such an association is a privilege which may be accorded or withheld. And, such being the status of a delegate to the general committee, that body could refuse to recognize the choice of a given constituency until such time as they should conclude to elect a delegate agreeable to the wishes of the majority, thus rendering futile all attempts at independent, otherwise termed ‘hostile,’ action.

These and other abuses, as they were called by the minority members of party associations, became so common that a demand was made for a primary election law sufficiently comprehensive in scope to assure to all citizens equal rights in the primary elections, conventions, and political committees of the party with which they were allied. This demand the legislature undertook to meet by chapter 179 of the Laws of 1898, which was amended (but not in respects affecting this question) by chapter 473 of the Laws of 1899. These acts recognize the equal importance of primary and general elections, and model the conduct of the former upon the general lines of conduct of the latter. They provide for the enrollment of the voter, and the only exaction permitted precedent to his right to enroll is that he shall express an intention to support generally at the next general state or national election the nominees of such party for state or national offices. Section 3, subd. 1. No inquiry as to the past political conduct is permitted, or promise as to future support of local candidates required. They provide for booths at public expense, in which the primary voter must in secret prepare his ballot; for ballots, and their printing and subsequent folding, so that the inspectors shall not be able to know for whom the ballot is cast; for the administration of an oath to a voter in case of a challenge; for challengers and watchers; for an annual primary day; and that the polls shall be held open for a fixed period of time. The dominant idea...

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