People ex rel. Dawson v. Smith

• Decision Date: 19 December 1986
• Citation: 512 N.Y.S.2d 19,504 N.E.2d 386,69 N.Y.2d 689
• Parties: , 504 N.E.2d 386 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Earvin DAWSON, Appellant, v. Harold J. SMITH, as Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 19

512 N.Y.S.2d 19

69 N.Y.2d 689, 504 N.E.2d 386

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Earvin DAWSON, Appellant, v. Harold J. SMITH, as Superintendent of Attica Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 19, 1986.

Leigh E. Anderson and Norman P. Effman, Attica, for appellant

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Martin A. Hotvet, O. Peter Sherwood and Peter H. Schiff, Albany, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT MEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division, 116 A.D.2d 1018, 498 N.Y.S.2d 1017, should be affirmed, without costs.

Petitioner, an inmate at Attica Correctional Facility, commenced a habeas corpus proceeding, contending that respondent had illegally ordered his confinement for a period of 24 months in the special housing unit following a Tier III disciplinary hearing in which petitioner had been found guilty of violating various institutional rules prohibiting murder, assault and violent conduct. In his petition he asserted that the determination was invalid because the regulations had not been filed as required by New York State Constitution and the Executive Law (N.Y.Const. art. IV, § 8; Executive Law § 102) (see, Matter of Jones v. Smith, 64 N.Y.2d 1003, 489 N.Y.S.2d 50, 478 N.E.2d 191). We agree with the Appellate Division that a writ of habeas corpus is not the correct vehicle for reviewing the legality of a prisoner's confinement following a superintendent's proceeding. ^* Accordingly, the Appellate Division properly reversed Special Term, converted the habeas corpus to an article 78 proceeding (see, People ex rel. Corcoran v. Smith, 105 A.D.2d 1142, 1143, 482 N.Y.S.2d 618, mod. on other grounds 66 N.Y.2d 130, 495 N.Y.S.2d 332, 485 N.E.2d 997) and dismissed the proceeding as time-barred (CPLR 217; see, People ex rel. Jelich v. Smith, 105 A.D.2d 1125, 1126, 482 N.Y.S.2d 391, lv. denied 64 N.Y.2d 606, 487 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 476 N.E.2d 653).

People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 174 N.E.2d 725, relied on by petitioner, is not to the contrary. There, we held that the writ of habeas corpus was properly employed by petitioner, an Attica inmate, in seeking his release from an allegedly illegal confinement in Dannemora State Hospital, an institution for custody of prisoners who are declared insane. The confinement in People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston (supra) was in an institution separate and different in nature from the correctional facility to which petitioner had been committed pursuant to the sentence of the court, and was not within the specific authorization conferred on the Department of Correctional Services by that sentence. Here, by contrast, petitioner does not seek his release from custody in the facility, but only from confinement in the special housing unit, a particular type of confinement within the facility which the Department of Correctional Services is expressly authorized to impose on lawfully sentenced prisoners committed to its custody (Correction Law § 137 7 NYCRR 251-1.7; 254.7 304.1 304.2 see, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675; People ex rel. France v. Coughlin, 99 A.D.2d 599, 471 N.Y.S.2d 695). Such disciplinary confinement and the proceedings leading to it must comply with applicable statutes and regulations which, of course, must meet due process standards (see, Matter of Jones v. Smith, supra, 64 N.Y.2d at p. 1005, 489 N.Y.S.2d 50, 478 N.E.2d 191), and the proper procedure for review is under CPLR article 78.

MEYER, Judge, dissenting.

Respectfully I dissent. I cannot accept the majority's distinction between this case and People ex rel. Brown v. Johnston, 9 N.Y.2d 482, 215 N.Y.S.2d 44, 174 N.E.2d 725. Defendant was committed to a correctional institution for incarceration in the normal prison setting, except as his conduct, proscribed by valid regulations, permits his confinement in more restricted detention (Correction Law § 137 see, 7 NYCRR 254.7). To permit solitary confinement ^*...