People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Ayon

• Decision Date: 20 May 1960
• Citation: 5 Cal.Rptr. 151,54 Cal.2d 217
• Parties: , 352 P.2d 519 PEOPLE of the State of California ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Respondent, v. Cornelius L. AYON, as Administrator, etc., et al., Defendants; Yor-Way Markets (a Corporation) et al., Appellants. L. A. 25754.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 151

5 Cal.Rptr. 151

54 Cal.2d 217, 352 P.2d 519

PEOPLE of the State of California ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Respondent, v. Cornelius L. AYON, as Administrator, etc., et al., Defendants;

Yor-Way Markets (a Corporation) et al., Appellants.

L. A. 25754.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 20, 1960.

Rehearing Denied June 14, 1960.

McLaughlin & Casey, James A. McLaughlin and Lawrence P. Casey, Los Angeles, for appellants.

George C. Hadley, San Diego, W. H. Peterson and Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Los Angeles, for respondent.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and A. R. Early, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

Yor-Way Markets and E. W. Kennedy appeal from a judgment fixing the damages suffered by them as a result of respondent's exercise of its power of eminent domain. The trial court awarded appellants the sum of $5,800, which is the amount that the parties stipulated was the market value of the property actually taken plus the damage to the remainder as a result of the severance. In the stipulation, the appellants reserved the right to introduce evidence of additional damage resulting from loss of business, customers and goodwill.

The trial court held that appellants had suffered no compensable damage not included in the stipulation. It rejected appellants' offer of proof relating to the claimed impairment of their right of access to the street upon which their property abutted. The court also rejected appellants' offer of proof of temporary damages which may be suffered by them during construction of the proposed street improvement.

The rulings of the trial court were correct and its judgment should be affirmed.

Appellants Kennedy and Yor-Way Markets are lessee and sublessee, respectively, of a parcel of land in the city of Azusa. This parcel, referred to as 'parcel 5', is situated on the northwest corner of Azusa Avenue, which runs north and south, and First Street, which runs east and west, and has 200 feet of frontage on Azusa Avenue and 140 feet on First Street. The following diagram shows the general location of the property and of the route and nature of the improvement.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINS TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

Appellants operate a supermarket and an adjoining customer parking lot on the property in question. The customers' entrance to the market is apparently from the parking lot, which is located along the northerly portion of parcel 5. Automobile entrances to the parking lot are located on Azusa Avenue and through an alley which runs along the west side of parcel 5 and intersects with First Street. A ten-foot wide strip along the entire eastern boundary of parcel 5 was condemned by respondent pursuant to a plan of street improvement and traffic relocation. The fair market value of the strip, as well as the diminution of the value of the remainder due to the severance of this strip, were agreed upon by the parties and are not involved in this dispute. But appellants contend that a new street has been interjected between parcel 5 and the street upon which it originally abutted, destroying their right of access to Azusa Avenue and the traffic which customarily travels thereon. Appellants claim that this alleged impairment of the right of access gives rise to a right to additional damages.

Before construction of the street improvement involved in this action traffic on Azusa Avenue traveled both north and south. There was no divider strip separating the traffic lanes, and customers traveling north on Azusa Avenue could make a left-hand turn into the supermarket parking lot. When the proposed change is completed this will no longer be possible. Azusa Avenue is to be widened from its original 47 feet curb-to-curb to 80 feet curb-to-curb from the corner of Azusa and First to a point north of parcel 5 (approximately midway between First Street and the next parallel street to the north, Second Street) where a new proposed connecting road will enter Azusa Avenue. This new road will connect Azusa with San Gabriel Avenue, which is parallel to Azusa and is the next intersecting street to the west.

San Gabriel Avenue is to become a southbound one-way street north of the new connecting street. South of the point of intersection of this new street and San Gabriel Avenue the latter will carry traffic in both directions. The connecting street between San Gabriel and Azusa will be a one-way street running in a southeasterly direction. A metal divider strip will be placed in the middle of Azusa from the corner to the point where this connecting street intersects with Azusa and will be linked to the northeasterly boundary of this connecting street so that automobiles entering Azusa from this street will be able to proceed in a southerly direction only. From this point south, traffic, although divided, will proceed in both directions.

From the point of intersection with the connecting street north, Azusa Avenue will only be widened to 56 feet curb-to-curb and will become a one-way street, carrying traffic north. Thus two-way traffic will not exist on Azusa north of this point of intersection.

Traffic can enter Azusa in either direction from First Street. But in order for automobiles to travel south on Azusa from a point north of parcel 5 (so that they can enter the parking lot from Azusa Avenue) they must use this new connecting street which they can enter either from San Gabriel Avenue or from the alley which parallels Azusa to the west. Customers coming from the north must either use this connecting street from San Gabriel or travel south to First Street, east on First and then turn left from First into the alley. Customers traveling from the south must either turn left on First (west) to the alley or drive north on Azusa to Second, west on Second to San Gabriel and then use the connecting street. Three-way traffic lights will be constructed on Azusa, permitting left turns into First from both directions.

There can be no doubt that appellants have an easement right of direct access to Azusa Avenue which cannot be impaired by a public agency without compensation. 'The courts of this state, from time immemorial and in cases too numerous to mention, have declared and enforced the abutting property owner's right to a free and convenient use of and access to the highway on which his property abuts. (Citing cases.)' People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 397, 144 P.2d 799, 803. But it is equally true that the right of a property owner to ingress and egress is not absolute. He cannot demand that the adjacent street be left in its original condition for all time to insure his ability to continue to enter and leave his property in the same manner as that to which he had become accustomed. Modern transportation requirements necessitate continual improvement of streets and relocation of traffic. The property owner has no constitutional right to compensation simply because the streets upon which his property abuts are improved so as to affect the traffic flow on such streets. If loss of business or of value of the property results, that is noncompensable. It is simply a risk the property owner assumes when he lives in modern society under modern traffic conditions.

The compensable right of an abutting property owner is to direct access to the adjacent street and to the through traffic which passes along that street. People v. Ricciardi, supra. If this basic right is not adversely affected, a public agency may enact and enforce reasonable and proper traffic regulations without the payment of compensation although such regulations may impede the convenience with which ingress and egress may thereafter be accomplished, and may necessitate circuity of travel to reach a given destination. 'In the proper exercise of its police power in the regulation of traffic, a state or county may do many things which are not compensable to an abutting property owner, such as constructing a traffic island, placing permanent dividing strips which deprive an abutter of direct access to the opposite side of the highway, painting double white lines on the highway, or designating the entire street as a one-way street. McDonald v. State, 130 Cal.App.2d 793, 799, 279 P.2d 777; People v. Sayig, 101 Cal.App.2d 890, 226 P.2d 702; Holman v. State, 97 Cal.App.2d 237, 217 P.2d 448; Beckham v. City of Stockton, 64 Cal.App.2d 487, 149 P.2d 296.' People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russell, 48 Cal.2d 189, 197, 309 P.2d 10, 15. The Russell case held that the use of a parkway as a traffic separation strip between a state highway and a county road was a noncompensable traffic regulation.

Under these well-settled rules the appellants are not entitled to compensation because of the divider strip placed in the middle of Azusa. They have direct access to that street and to traffic traveling in one direction on that street. See particularly People v. Sayig, supra; Holman v. State of California, supra. Nor can appellants complain because the relocation plan will divert some southbound traffic from Azusa in front of appellants' property. A property owner has no right to compensation because traffic is rerouted or diverted to another thoroughfare even though the value to his property is substantially diminished as a result. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Russell, supra; People v. Ricciardi, supra; People v. Sayig, supra; Holman v. State of California, supra.

In an attempt to avoid the application of these well-settled rules appellants cite People v. Ricciardi, supra, and Blumenstein v. City of Long Beach, 143 Cal.App.2d 264, 299 P.2d 347. Those cases are clearly distinguishable. In Ricciardi this court held that a street improvement which results in rerouting the highway itself in relation to the property which originally abutted upon it, rather than merely rerouting traffic from the highway, thus destroying any direct access...