People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Edgar

• Decision Date: 15 August 1963
• Citation: 219 Cal.App.2d 381,32 Cal.Rptr. 892
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John H. EDGAR et al., Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 236.

Page 892

32 Cal.Rptr. 892

219 Cal.App.2d 381

The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John H. EDGAR et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Civ. 236.

District Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Aug. 15, 1963.

Thomas H. Werdel, Baker, Palmer, Wall & Raymond, and Stephen E. Wall, Bakersfield, for appellant.

Holloway Jones, Jack M. Howard, Norval Fairman and David T. Hayden, San Francisco, for respondent.

CONLEY, Presiding Justice.

Disappointed in the amount of damages awarded them in eminent domain proceedings, particularly because the jury and the court found that the value of the special benefits far exceeded the severance damages, the defendants, John H. Edgar and his wife Ruby Dale Edgar appeal from a judgment for $4,236 and costs in their favor. The defendants were the owners of 19.78 acres with a frontage of 660.7 feet on the Taft Highway, a state highway, located some eight miles south of the Bakersfield courthouse near where the new routing of Highway 99 crosses it. Defendants' property is approximately 650 feet west of the intersection of Taft Highway and Kern Island Road, the next intersecting county road to the east, and about 1300 feet north of Curnow Road, a county road running parallel to Taft Highway to the south of both Taft Highway and the southern boundary of the subject property. The next intersecting county road to the west along Taft Highway is Wible Road. Immediate possession of the situs was obtained through proper court order, and at the time of the trial the new segment of Highway 99, the interchange with Taft Highway and the access road across the property of defendants had been constructed.

In its 'after' condition the property consists of two remainders, the easterly being 11.868 acres in extent, fronting on the Taft Highway but with no direct access from that frontage onto the Taft Highway, such direct access having been replaced with approximately 1263.60 feet of direct access on a new frontage road through the property of the defendants constructed by plaintiff as part of the improvement, of about 60 feet in width, with an entrance from such frontage road into Taft Highway. Similarly, the direct access to Taft Highway of the frontage of the western remainder has been taken, but it has been replaced by approximately 1253.23 feet of direct access on the new frontage road, which, as above stated, enters Taft Highway. Both of these remainders are now corner properties, the eastern remainder comprising the southeast corner of Taft Highway and the frontage road, and the western remainder comprising the southwest corner of Taft Highway and the frontage road. In the 'after' condition the next intersecting road to the north of the frontage road upon which both remainders have direct access by means of the frontage road is Taft Hignway; to the south the next intersecting road is Curnow Road.

As required by the applicable code section (Code Civ.Proc. § 1248), the jury's verdict gives the following answers: 1. The value of parcels 9a and 9b (the latter being the underlying ownership in the highway adjoining the land of the defendants in the 'before' condition) with improvements is the sum of $4,236; 2. damages by reason of severance $1,292; 3. special benefits which will accrue to the said remaining property by reason of the construction of the improvement by plaintiff is the sum of $39,136. As the value of the special benefits far exceeded the severance damages (Code Civ.Proc. § 1248, subd. 3), the judgment was limited to the value of the land taken, or $4,236, besides costs.

Appellants do not complain of the award for the value of the land taken; they raise only two points on the appeal, both of which relate to the finding as to special benefits: first, it is contended that the evidence did not warrant such a finding; secondly, it is claimed that the court committed fatal error in not giving one instruction in the exact wording proposed by the appellants.

With respect to the claim that the evidence does not justify the finding, two expert witnesses for the People, Olsen and Carpenter, each testified that the placing of the frontage roadway diagonally through defendants' property divided it into areas ideally suited for the installation of service stations; that the sites therefor were each of a reasonable market value of $40,000 or $50,000 and that the remaining land could also be used profitably for home sites or store properties, so that the defendants were greatly benefited by the construction of the improvement.

In 17 California Jurisprudence 2d, Eminent Domain, § 113, pp. 683-684, it is said:

'General benefits are such advantages of a conjectural nature, and therefore not suitable for estimation, as result in an increase in land values all over the community in which the condemned property is located. Special benefits, on the other hand, are such advantages, reasonably certain to result, as are peculiar to the property condemned.'

Benefits resulting from improved access and the better accommodation of transportation constitute special benefits for which an allowance by a jury in eminent domain proceedings is proper. (County of Los Angeles v. Marblehead Land Co., 95 Cal.App. 602, 614-615, 273 P. 131; City of Hayward v. Unger, 194 Cal.App.2d 516, 15 Cal.Rptr. 301; Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 352, 144 P.2d 818.) A similar situation is thus discussed in County of Los Angeles v. Marblehead Land Co., supra, 95 Cal.App. at page 614, 273 P. at page 137:

'Examination of the testimony shows that several witnesses, who were apparently competent and well informed, were of the opinion that the severance damage amounted to sums which were less than the amount subsequently established by the findings of the court. These witnesses were quite uniform in their opinion that the benefits to the portion of the ranch not taken, by reason of the construction of improvements, were many times as much as the amount stated in the findings of the court. We think that the evidence is sufficient to sustain these findings. It follows that on this branch of the case appellants have no ground of complaint, unless it be made to appear that said benefits were only a part of the general benefits and advantages accruing to the community, and were not benefits special and peculiar to the property of defendants not included in the condemnation. Numerous authorities on the subject were cited in the briefs and in the oral argument. The law in this state covering the question here presented is definitely stated in Beveridge v. Lewis, 137 Cal. 619, 67 P. 1040, 70 P. 1083, 59 L.R.A. 581, 92 Am.St.Rep. 188. It was there pointed out that general benefits consist in an increase in the value of land, common to the community generally, and resulting from advantages which will accrue to the community from the improvement. Special benefits, on the other hand, are such as result from the mere construction of the improvement, and are peculiar to the land in question. These special benefits must be such as are reasonably certain to result from the construction of the work. So far as we are advised, the rule or principle thus announced in Beveridge v. Lewis [supra] has not been modified by later decisions.

'The witnesses who testified in favor of the plaintiff on this question were of the opinion that, in addition to the general benefits, there were special benefits which would result from the construction of this highway, and that these benefits were peculiar to the property of defendants. The witness Butterworth, after stating that the market value of the land taken...