People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka

• Decision Date: 18 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. 102962.,102962.
• Citation: 877 N.E.2d 416,226 Ill.2d 445
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. DEVINE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Paul STRALKA, Respondent.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

877 N.E.2d 416

226 Ill.2d 445

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. DEVINE, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Paul STRALKA, Respondent.

No. 102962.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

October 18, 2007.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for petitioner.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield (Roger L. Longtin, Catherine J. Casey, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of DLA Piper US LLP, Chicago, of counsel), for respondent Honorable Paul Stralka.

Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, Chicago (James S. Jacobs, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for minor respondent.

OPINION

Chief Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

The question presented in this case is whether the circuit court exceeded its lawful authority when it vacated a juvenile delinquency finding over 11 months after the date the minor pled guilty and was sentenced for the offense. We must also consider whether mandamus relief would now be appropriate to compel the court to reinstate the delinquency finding.

The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship pursuant to section 5-520 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-520 (West 2004)), alleging that D.D., a minor, was delinquent because he committed the offense of unauthorized possession or storage of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/21-6 (West 2004)). The circuit court accepted the minor's guilty plea and sentenced him to 12 months of probation and other conditions. Nearly one year later, Cook County Circuit Court Judge Paul Stralka granted the minor's motion to vacate the delinquency finding. The State filed a motion with this court for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, arguing that the judge's order granting the motion to vacate exceeded his lawful authority. We allowed the State's motion. See 188 Ill.2d R. 381.

BACKGROUND

D.D. was a 16-year-old with no prior criminal record at the time he was arrested by the Berwyn police on May 16, 2005, for possessing a folding knife with a three-inch blade at his school, Morton West High School. The police report of the incident indicates that a student matching D.D.'s description was observed carrying a knife. A police detective was called to the scene, and he asked D.D. if he had anything on him that he was not supposed to have. D.D. responded, "Yes, look in my right pants pocket." The detective then recovered a knife from D.D. D.D. told police that he had not brought the item to school for any particular reason other than that he simply liked to carry it.

On May 17, 2005, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in connection with the crime, charging D.D. with unauthorized possession or storage of a weapon — a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/21-6 (West 2004)). The State and the minor entered into plea negotiations, and D.D. agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State's recommendation that he be sentenced to one year of probation and 30 hours of community service.

At the guilty plea hearing on June 23, 2005, defense counsel filed a motion requesting that the guilty plea be vacated upon successful completion of probation. The State told the court that it opposed the motion to vacate, but that it would "stand by" the offer it made to defense counsel. Defense counsel responded that he too would "stand by the agreement," but that the minor wanted to have the opportunity to have the adjudication erased from his record. The court then stated that it would accept the plea agreement and sentence the minor to one year of probation, 30 days of community service and order him to participate in the victim-impact and violence-prevention programs. Finally, the court stated that it would "enter and continue" the motion to vacate the delinquency adjudication over the State's objection. The court set a one-year status date for June 2, 2006.

On June 6, 2006, a hearing on the motion to vacate was held before Judge Stralka. D.D.'s probation officer informed the court that the minor had successfully completed community service and the victim-impact and violence-prevention programs. The probation officer further reported that the minor had taken his G.E.D. test, was working full time and had not caused any problems.

The State objected to vacating the delinquency finding, emphasizing the seriousness of the charge and also noting that a full year had not passed since the probation order was entered. Judge Stralka granted the motion to vacate the delinquency finding. He also ordered that D.D.'s probation be terminated and the case closed.

The Cook County State's Attorney filed a motion in this court for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition (see 188 Ill.2d R. 381(a)), arguing that the order granting the motion to vacate was unlawful. This court granted the motion, and the parties filed briefs before this court. A special assistant Attorney General was appointed to represent Judge Stralka, who is a nominal party to the proceeding under Supreme Court Rule 381(c) (188 Ill.2d R. 381(c)).

ANALYSIS

A writ of mandamus may be awarded if the petitioner establishes a clear legal right to relief, a clear duty of the public official to act, and a clear authority in the public official to comply with the writ, as well as the lack of other adequate remedies. People ex rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill.2d 457, 465, 281 Ill.Dec. 581, 804 N.E.2d 546 (2004). Although mandamus generally provides affirmative rather than prohibitory relief (People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill.2d 393, 398, 254 Ill.Dec. 729, 748 N.E.2d 175 (2001)), it can be used to compel the undoing of an act (Noyola v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 179 Ill.2d 121, 133, 227 Ill.Dec. 744, 688 N.E.2d 81 (1997)).

Similarly, a writ of prohibition may be used to "`prevent a judge from acting where he has no jurisdiction to act or to prevent a judicial act which is beyond the scope of a judge's legitimate jurisdictional authority.'" People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, 118 Ill.2d 90, 97, 112 Ill.Dec. 714, 514 N.E.2d 180 (1987), quoting Daley v. Hett, 113 Ill.2d 75, 80, 99 Ill.Dec. 132, 495 N.E.2d 513 (1986). There are four requirements that must be met before a writ of prohibition may be issued: (1) the action to be prohibited must be judicial or quasi-judicial in nature; (2) the jurisdiction of the tribunal against which the writ issues must be inferior to that of the issuing court; (3) the action prohibited must be outside the tribunal's jurisdiction or, if within its jurisdiction, beyond its legitimate authority; and (4) the petitioner must be without any other adequate remedy. Zaabel v. Konetski, 209 Ill.2d 127, 131-32, 282 Ill.Dec. 748, 807 N.E.2d 372 (2004). We have also held that mandamus-type relief may be awarded when the issues involved are of great importance to the administration of justice even if all the normal criteria for its issuance are not satisfied. People ex rel. Carey v. White, 65 Ill.2d 193, 197, 2 Ill.Dec. 345, 357 N.E.2d 512 (1976).

We believe that the points raised by the parties correspond most closely with the question of whether a writ of prohibition is appropriate under the circumstances. The key inquiry here, then, is whether the action taken by Judge Stralka in vacating the lawfully entered delinquency finding almost one year after it was entered based on the minor's subsequent good behavior was either (1) outside of the court's jurisdiction, or (2) beyond the judge's legitimate authority. The State contends that the judge's action exceeded his lawful authority because it runs contrary to a number of well-established legal principles, including this court's rules on how guilty pleas may be vacated, the important statutory distinctions between court supervision and probation, the exclusive authority of the governor to grant clemency, and the comprehensive legislative scheme for the expungement and sealing of delinquency findings.

D.D. and Judge Stralka respond by arguing that the action taken was within the judge's authority because the Juvenile Court Act confers broad discretion and equitable powers upon juvenile court judges to provide an individualized assessment of juvenile offenders and to fashion orders that promote rehabilitation.

We begin our analysis with an overview of the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 5-325 of the Act provides that law enforcement is to forward information to the State's Attorney whenever law enforcement has knowledge that a crime has been committed by a minor. 705 ILCS 405/5-325 (West 2004). The Act further provides that the State's Attorney may file a delinquency prosecution against a minor, alleging that the minor is delinquent and praying that he be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/5-501 (West 2004). The State's Attorney is then given full discretion to prosecute if he or she has probable cause to believe that the minor has committed a crime. 705 ILCS 405/5-330 (West 2004).

Delinquency proceedings based on a petition filed by the State's Attorney are separated into three judicial determinations or phases — a findings phase, an adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase. The first phase involves a trial and a determination of guilt. See 705 ILCS 405/5-601 through 5-625 (West 2004). The two later phases occur at a sentencing hearing and involve a determination of wardship and a sentencing disposition. See 705 ILCS 405/5-701 through 5-705 (West 2004).

Once a petition is filed alleging that a minor is delinquent, a trial must be held within 120 days of a written demand made by any party. 705 ILCS 405/5-601(1) (West 2004). "[B]efore proceeding to adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the trial," the court may enter an order for supervision for certain offenses if the minor admits or stipulates to the facts supporting the petition and if the State's Attorney does not object to supervision. 705 ILCS 405/5-615(1) (West ...