People ex rel. Dunbar v. District Court of Seventh Judicial Dist., 25454
Decision Date | 13 March 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 25454,25454 |
Citation | 494 P.2d 841,177 Colo. 429 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado ex rel. Duke W. DUNBAR, Attorney General, and Ralph E. Miller, District Attorney In and For the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF the SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and the Honorable George V. Kempf, a Judge Thereof, Respondents. |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Jerry W. Raisch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ralph E. Miller, Dist. Atty., for petitioners.
Petrie, Woodrow & Roushar, Victor T. Roushar, Montrose, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding. A direct information was filed charging one McReynolds with unlawfully dispensing a narcotic drug. Pursuant to the provisions of Crim.P. 7, a preliminary hearing was held in District Court. The People's witness at the hearing was an agent of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation. He identified himself, gave his business address, and testified upon direct examination that McReynolds provided marijuana which was thereafter furnished to him in the form of a handrolled cigarette.
Cross-examination was conducted relating to the witness's direct testimony, and then as a final question, he was asked to state his residence address. The agent refused, and the district attorney objected to the question on the ground of relevancy. The trial court ruled that the agent's address must be given, but the witness again refused, explaining that the court knew that the trailer furnished him by the Bureau, in which he lived while on the road, was blown up (By fortuitous circumstances he was sleeping in a motel on the particular night and not living in the trailer.); that C.B.I. intelligence indicated that there was a 'contract' out on him; that he was concerned about his family's safety; and that for these reasons, he refused to give his residence address. The trial court, however, indicated that, regardless of any safety considerations, the address had to be given. Defense counsel did not participate in this discussion.
The lower court then ordered his testimony stricken and asked the district attorney if he had any other evidence to present. The district attorney replied that he did not, and after a discussion involving the court, the witness, and the district attorney, the trial court found no probable cause to hold McReynolds and dismissed the information.
A petition was filed in this court requesting issuance of an order to show cause why the district court should not reinstate the information. We have done so, respondents have answered, and the matter is at issue.
The primary question presented for our determination is: Did the lower court exceed its authority in summarily striking the agent's testimony and dismissing the information for want of probable cause? We answer this question in the affirmative.
Generally, it is the rule that the right by cross-examination to require a witness to give his residence address is in aid of a defendant's right of confrontation. Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). This right, however, is not without exceptions. The Court in Smith v. Illinois, Supra, quoted with approval language from Alford v. United States, Supra:
"* * * There is a duty to protect (the witness) from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him. * * *"
Additionally, Mr. Justice White, in his concurrence in Smith v. Illinois, Supra, noted:
* * *'(Emphasis added.)
These principles were applied in United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969). Therein, the government's principal witness, Warren, refused to disclose the name and address of his current employer, and his refusal was upheld by the lower court. On appeal, the court stated:
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