People ex rel. Eisman v. Ronner

• Decision Date: 25 May 1906
• Citation: 77 N.E. 1061,185 N.Y. 285
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. EISMAN v. RONNER.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

185 N.Y. 285

77 N.E. 1061

PEOPLE ex rel. EISMAN

v.RONNER.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 25, 1906.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Mandamus, on relation of Michael H. Eisman, against John H. J. Ronner, register of the county of New York. The order of the Special Term of the Supreme Court denying the writ (95 N. Y. Supp. 518) was affrmed by the Appellate Division (97 N. Y. Supp. 550,110 App. Div. 816), and relator appeals. Affirmed.Louis Marshall and Edward Lazansky, for appellant.

Julius M. Mayer, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

GRAY, J.

The validity of the act, passed by the Legislature of this state in 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 2059, c. 729), entitled: ‘An act to amend the tax law in relation to the taxation of debts secured by mortgages,’ is assailed by the relator upon several grounds. In the first place, it is insisted that the act is unconstitutional, because it was passed in violation of the provisions of section 20 of article 3 of the state Constitution; which reads that ‘the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the Legislature shall be requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes.’ This act amended the general tax law of 1896, by imposing a tax upon all debts and obligations for the payment of money, which should thereafter be secured in whole, or in part, by mortgage of real property situated within this state. Section 307 provides that ‘upon the first day of each month the recording officer * * * shall pay over to the county treasurer of said county, and in the counties of New York, Kings, Queens and Richmond to the chamberlain of the city of New York all moneys received during the preceding month upon account of taxes paid to him, * * * after deducting the necessary expenses of his office. * * * The county treasurer of each county and * * * the city chamberlain of the city of New York shall * * * quarterly thereafter, after having deducted the necessary expenses of his office, * * * transmit one-half of this net amount collected under the provisions of this article to the State Treasurer. * * * The remaining portion thereof in the counties of New York, Kings, Queens and Richmond shall be paid into the general fund of the city of New York and be applied to the reduction of taxation, and in the other counties of the state the remaining portion shall be held by the respective county treasurers subject to the order of the board of supervisors as hereinafter provided.’

In a general sense, this bill did provide for an appropriation of public moneys, inasmuch as the moneys, of which disposition was thereby made, were to be collected by taxation and the purpose, to which a portion of the moneys so collected was appropriated, was local, because relating to a political division of the state and not affecting the people of the state in general. But the appropriation was not such as came within the inhibition of the clause of the Constitution in question. That had reference to the public moneys of the state, as distinguished from public revenues from taxes levied for local purposes. The scheme of this enactment was, clearly, to provide further revenue for the state treasury, and also for the relief of the particular political divisions of the state. An annual tax was imposed upon mortgages, and the net amount eventually coming into the hands of the county treasurer, or of the chamberlain of the city of New York, was to belong, one-half to the state, and one-half to the particular locality. The Legislature is the source of the taxing power. It imposes and collects taxes for the state treasury for general governmental purposes and it authorizes taxation for local administrative purposes throughout the state. Possessing the power to tax, the right, necessarily, inheres to exercise it in any way, not objectionable upon constitutional grounds, that may be devised as suitable for the purpose in view. I cannot perceive any valid reason why the Legislature could not devise a scheme for raising revenues for the general government and for the various local governments by the apportionment of the proceeds of a tax laid upon a certain species, or class, of possessions. The principle of the decision in the case of People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N. Y. 367, 44 N. E. 146,32 L. R. A. 344, is, distinctly, applicable to the present case. In that case, an act passed in 1896, ‘in relation to the traffic in liquor,’ etc. (Laws 1896, p. 45, c. 112), was assailed upon the same ground that we are now considering. It declared that two-thirds of the excise moneys collected under the tax should ‘belong to the town, or city, in which the traffic was carried on, from which the revenues were received,’ and it was held to have been sufficiently enacted by a majority vote of the Legislature. It was pointed out, in the opinion of this court, that this appropriation of the excise taxes ‘operated on the fund at the very moment of its collection. The two-thirds so appropriated never reaches the treasury of the state and never bears the impress of state money.’

The act is assailed upon the ground that it violates the provisions of section 1 of article 14 of the Constitution of the United States, in that it denies to the relator and to other holders of mortgages, recorded after July 1, 1905, the equal protection of the law. Section 294 of the act imposes ‘a regular annual tax * * * on every debt and obligation, and upon the mortgage securing the same, described in section 291, except upon mortgages recorded prior to July 1, 1905, * * * equal to five mills on each dollar of the amount of the principal debt or obligation as the same shall be at nine o'clock ante meridian on the first day of July, 1906, and in each year thereafter,’ etc. The act became a law on June 3, 1905, and a date was appointed in the future upon which the law would be operative upon property held in the form of mortgages. The argument as to the inequality of the law rests upon the proposition that ‘a different rule of taxation applies to mortgages recorded after July 1, 1905, from that which applies to those recorded before that date.’ In the one case, it is said, the holder has not the right to make deductions for indebtedness and in the other he has, and, hence, ‘some mortgages * * * are not taxable, while others, under exactly the same conditions, are required to contribute to the expenses of government.’ The reference is to the provisions of the general tax law, under which a person assessed upon his personal property may deduct his just debts from the amount of the assessment.

It is true that the effect of the act, to the extent that a person's investments, after a certain date, should be made in mortgage securities, was to segregate them from his other personal property for specific taxation; but such investments were voluntary, and while, conceivably, the law might act repressively, in instances, nevertheless, government has the power. It may change the methods, or rate, of taxation, and it may classify new subjects for taxation. The power of the state in its sovereign capacity to impose taxes is unlimited in extent, so far as no constitutional guaranty is infringed upon, and is controlled only by the considerations of...