People ex rel. Farley v. Winkler

• Decision Date: 05 December 1911
• Citation: 96 N.E. 928,203 N.Y. 445
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. FARLEY v. WINKLER et al., Board of Water Com'rs.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

203 N.Y. 445

96 N.E. 928

PEOPLE ex rel. FARLEY

v.WINKLER et al., Board of Water Com'rs.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 5, 1911.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

Application by the People, on the relation of John M. Farley, for mandamus against Max Winkler and others, constituting the Board of Water Commissioners of District No. 1 in the Town of Harrison, in Westchester County, to audit the claim of the relator for services. Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division (130 N. Y. Supp. 691),reversing an order granting a writ of mandamus. Order of the Appellate Division reversed, and order of the Special Term affirmed.William L. Rumsey, for appellant.

Henry C. Henderson, for respondents.

WERNER, J.

[1] The relator, a supervising civil engineer, was retained in that capacity by the respondents, as water commissioners of district No. 1, in the town of Harrison, in the county of Westchester, to superintend and inspect the construction of a water system in the district mentioned. The relator served for a time as such engineer, and had been paid the larger part of his stipulated compensation, when a dispute arose between him and the commissioners, as the result of which he resigned, and they refused, or at least neglected, to pay him the balance which he claimed to be due him for such services. Thereupon the relator instituted this proceeding to procure an order for a writ of mandamus, directing the respondents either to audit or reject the claim. Such an order was made by Mr. Justice Keogh at Special Term. From that order an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division of the Second department, which resulted in a reversal of the order of the Special Term. As this reversal was upon the law, and not as a matter of discretion, the appeal to this court presents a question which we must review.

At Special Term the learned justice granted the writ on the authority of Holroyd v. Town of Indian Lake, 180 N. Y. 318, 73 N . E. 36. In that case the contractor sought to recover unliquidated damages for an alleged breach of a contract, under which he had constructed a water system in a water district established in the town of Indian Lake, in the county of Hamilton. A demurrer was there interposed to the complaint, on the ground that the latter pleading did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was overruled at Special Term, but the Appellate Division reached a different conclusion, sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint. Upon appeal to this court, the decision of the Appellate Division was affirmed, upon the explicit ground that the plaintiff in that case had no cause of action against the town, and, in the opinion written for the court by Vann, J., it was suggested that Holroyd's appropriate remedy was by writ of mandamus against the district water commissioners, to be followed by proceedings in certiorari, if a review was necessary . It was this latter suggestion of Judge Vann, in Holroyd's Case, that was followed by the Special Term in the case at bar, and disregarded by the Appellate Division, upon the theory that, in Holroyd's Case, this court had actually decided nothing more than that an action could not be maintained against the town. Proceeding upon that assumption, the Appellate Division has held that an action at law may be brought against the water commissioners as a quasi corporation, which may sue and be sued upon all contracts and obligations arising out of the purposes of its creation.

Admitting for the purposes of this discussion that the Appellate Division has correctly assumed that the only question actually decided in Holroyd's Case was that the plaintiff there was not entitled to maintain an action against the town, we are now called upon to determine whether we shall adopt the suggestions of Judge Vann in that case, to the effect that mandamus and certiorari against district water commissioners are the proper remedies in such a case as this, or whether we shall sustain the Appellate Division in holding that an action at law may be maintained against them.

The question thus presented is very narrow and not free from difficulty. If we should accept the premise that the respondent water commissioners constitute a quasi corporation, the conclusion would seem to follow that they can sue and be sued in their corporate capacity. But it is common knowedge that in recent times in this country there has been a constantly growing tendency to create a variety of commissions, so called, for the purpose of administering special governmental functions, whose powers and duties are sometimes very specifically enumerated in the statutes creating them, and in many other instances, as in the case before us, are left largely to implication from the character of the general purpose for which they were created. All of these products of modern legislation bear some analogies to the offices and institutions which, under the common law, were known as quasi corporations, but most of them are purely administrative departments of some local form of government, and have such widely variant relations to the state, or to some of its governmental subdivisions, that they cannot be classified with anything like scientific accuracy. There is, therefore, no uniformity of decision upon the subject, and ancient definitions and classifications of so-called quasi corporations are of little value in construing these modern statutes.

The statutes, relating to the matter of procuring a water supply for the various communities in the state, disclose the wide range of legislation upon this subject. In some cities the waterworks systems are operated as a part of the general municipal government; in others, the powers and liabilities pertaining thereto are imposed upon special officers or boards, either with or without distinct corporate powers. This is also true of villages, some of which obtain their water supplies under the general village law, while others are supplied by private water corporations, or under special statutes. In a recent case arising under such a special law, it was held that the water commissioners were the agents of the village, and that their contract for a pumping engine rendered it liable for the purchase price. Davidson v. Village of White Plains, 197 N. Y. 266, 269,90 N. E. 825.

The town law provides for several distinct and separate schemes, by means of which a supply of...