People Ex Rel. Francis P. Gleeson v. Meech
| Decision Date | 31 January 1882 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE ex rel. Francis P. Gleesonv.GEORGE A. MEECH. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
This is a petition for a mandamus, filed in this court by Francis P. Gleeson, against George A. Meech.
The relator, a resident of the town of South Chicago, in Cook county, demanded of the respondent, a justice of the peace in the same town, that he issue a summons, directed to any constable of Cook county, pursuant to the act of 1872, and tendered respondent his legal fees for such act, in order that the relator might have the writ served in the town of Hyde Park, in Cook county. This the respondent refused to issue, and refused to issue any writ except to a constable of “Chicago District,” pursuant to the amendatory act of 1881. Hyde Park is in that part of Cook county denominated “Cook District” by the amendatory act.
The respondent filed a demurrer to the petition, which this court in its judgment overruled.
Mr. C. STUART BEATTY, for the relator.
Messrs. LAWRENCE, CAMPBELL & LAWRENCE, for the respondent.
The petition in this case was filed to test the constitutionality of the first section of “An act to amend certain sections of an act to provide for the election and qualification of justices of the peace,” etc. (Laws 1881, p. 103.) That section provides that each county in the State shall constitute a justice's district, except Cook county, which is divided into two,--the city of Chicago one, and the territory outside of the city and within the county, another,--and to the limits of such districts the jurisdiction of all justices of the peace is expressly limited. It is claimed that this provision of the act contravenes several provisions of the constitution.
Section 21 of article 6 provides, “that justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables shall be elected in and for such districts as are or may be provided by law, and the jurisdiction of such justices of the peace and police magistrates shall be uniform.” The 28th section of the same article, however, makes an exception as to the city of Chicago, and requires that justices of the peace for the city shall be appointed in the manner therein prescribed. The 22d section of article 4 provides, that the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special laws in reference to a large number of subjects, amongst which is this, “regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables.” Other provisions of the constitution are referred to, but we deem it unimportant in this case to refer to them.
Of what does the jurisdiction of justices of the peace and police magistrates consist? Manifestly of the persons of the parties litigant, of the subject or thing in dispute, and the territory into which the process of the officer may run and be enforced. We apprehend this is so elementary that it will not be questioned. The justice must have power or jurisdiction to send process into some territory, by the service of which process he may acquire jurisdiction of the defendant, or the other elements of his jurisdiction would be barren, unless the defendant should voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction for trial. And so of final process, which is absolutely necessary to execute the judgment. His territorial jurisdiction is as essential to the complete administration of justice as either of the others, and the General Assembly fully recognizes the power to send process into a district, and to have it enforced therein, as constituting jurisdiction. After prescribing the districts the act provides, that “to the limits of which the jurisdiction of all justices of the peace is hereby limited.” It, then, incontestably follows, that the territory in which a justice of the peace may act is essential, and constitutes jurisdiction, and is referred to and embraced in both provisions of the constitution cited above.
This, then, being the sense of these provisions, the territorial districts must be uniform. Then what constitutes uniformity, in the constitutional sense? Not literally of one and the same shape or size. That could not have been the purpose. And this is made manifest from the constitution itself. It refers to districts as then existing, or that might thereafter be provided by law. The districts then existing were not of the same form or size, and yet they were adopted by those who framed the constitution. We must, therefore, conclude that such was not the purpose, and for the further reason that if not impracticable, it would have served no useful purpose. Uniformity of territory,...
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