People ex rel. Franklin Cnty. v. Williamson Cnty.

• Decision Date: 18 December 1918
• Docket Number: No. 12389.,12389.
• Citation: 121 N.E. 157,286 Ill. 44
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. FRANKLIN COUNTY v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

286 Ill. 44

121 N.E. 157

PEOPLE ex rel. FRANKLIN COUNTY

v.WILLIAMSON COUNTY.

No. 12389.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 18, 1918.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Williamson County; Benj. W. Pope, Judge.

Petition by the People, on the relation of the County of Franklin, for a writ of mandamus against the County of Williamson. From a judgment granting the writ, respondent's demurrer to the petition having been overruled, respondent appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer.

George R. Stone and William H. Warder, both of Marion, for appellant.

Roy C. Martin, State's Attorney, and W. F. Spiller, both of Benton, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The circuit court of Williamson county overruled the demurrer of said county to a petition filed by Franklin county for a writ of mandamus to compel the board of supervisors of Williamson county to appropriate its pro rata share of the cost of constructing a bridge across the Big Muddy river on the boundary line between the two counties, and, the defendant having elected to stand by its demurrer, a writ was ordered as prayed for.

The facts alleged in the petition were, that Franklin county, on September 24, 1912, desiring to build a bridge across the Big Muddy river, which was the boundary line between the counties of Franklin and Williamson, the cost of which bridge would exceed $5,000, the petitioner appropriated its share of the cost of constructing the same and caused plans and specifications therefor to be filed with the county clerk of Williamson county; that about the same date the petitioner passed a resolution appropriating $6,000 as its share of the cost of erecting the bridge, and caused to be served upon the county commissioners of Williamson county a request to make an appropriation to pay its share for erecting the bridge; that the petitioner caused a notice to be posted that on December 14, 1912, the committee of the board of supervisors of Franklin county would receive bids for the construction of the bridge, and on said date that committee and a committee from Williamson county met, and the committee from Williamson county refused to enter into the consideration of the proposition to build a bridge; that a contract was then entered into by the committee of Franklin county with the Vincennes Bridge Company to erect the bridge for $15,210; that in pursuance of the contract that company erected the bridge, which was received by the committee of Franklin county and was being used by the citizens of the two counties; and that Williamson county neglected and refused to make an appropriation for its share of the cost of building the bridge on the basis of the assessed value of property, real and personal.

The demurrer was general, setting up as special causes of demurrer that the statute contemplates that the petition shall be filed immediately after the county desiring a bridge shall have made its appropriation and before the letting of the contract or building the bridge, and if that construction of the statute is not correct it is unconstitutional and void.

[1] The rights of the parties were fixed by the Road and Bridge Act of 1883 (Laws of 1883, p. 136), as amended in 1909 (Laws of 1909, p. 326). That act fixed the liability of adjoining counties for the cost of a bridge equaling or exceeding $5,000 over a stream forming a boundary line between the counties, in proportion to the taxable property of the respective counties, according to its assessed value. It provided that when any county desired to build a bridge across any stream which was the boundary line, the cost of which bridge would equal or exceed $5,000, and the county desiring to construct such bridge had appropriated its share of the cost of constructing the same, it should be the duty of the other county to make an appropriation for its proportion of the cost of the bridge, and if the other county failed or refused to make such appropriation any court of competent jurisdiction should issue an order to compel such county to make such appropriation upon a proper petition for that purpose. It further provided that for the purpose of building such a bridge it should be lawful for county boards of such adjoining counties to enter into joint contracts, and the county boards might be proceeded against jointly by any parties interested in the bridge for any neglect of duty in reference to the bridge or for any damage growing out of such neglect, and if a county board, after reasonable notice in writing from another county board, should neglect or refuse to build any such bridge when any contract had been made in regard to the same, it should be lawful for the county board so giving notice to build the same, to recover by suit one-half of the expense or...