People ex rel. Geneseo Tp. v. Vickroy

• Decision Date: 04 February 1915
• Docket Number: Nos. 9713,9714.,s. 9713
• Citation: 266 Ill. 384,107 N.E. 638
• Parties: PEOPLE, for Use of GENESEO TP., v. VICKROY et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

266 Ill. 384

107 N.E. 638

PEOPLE, for Use of GENESEO TP.,

v.VICKROY et al.

Nos. 9713, 9714.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1914

Rehearing Denied Feb. 4, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; Robert W. Olmsted, Judge.

Proceeding in behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, for the use of Geneseo Township, against N. C. Vickroy and others. Decree for defendants, and the People appeal. Affirmed.Henry Waterman, of Geneseo, for the People.

Harry E. Brown, of Geneseo (Bartlett S. Gray, of Geneseo, of counsel), for appellees.

CARTER, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Henry county sustaining a demurrer to the declaration filed in behalf of the people of the state of Illinois, for the use of Geneseo township, in said county, against N. C. Vickroy and his bondsmen, for alleged failure to account for the full amount of money coming into said Vickroy's hands as town collector. The question involved in this case is identical with that in another case of the same title, the two cases being consolidated in this court; the only difference being that the suits were on different bonds, of different dates, for different amounts, and one of the bonds being signed by two more bondsmen than the other. One suit is for taxes collected in 1912 and the other for 1913.

The only question involved is the constitutionality of a proviso of a paragraph added in 1911 by amendment to section 36 of the Fees and Salaries Act. The paragraph in question reads as follows:

‘Each town or district collector shall be allowed a commission of two per cent., on all moneys collected by him, to be paid out of the respective funds collected: Provided, that in any case where the compensation so allowed shall be insufficient, the town or county board may allow an additional compensation or per diem in lieu of other or greater commissions, in which case said additional compensation shall be paid out of the town or county treasury, as the case may require: And provided, further, that all excess of commissions and fees over $1,500 in counties of the first and second class and over $3,000 in counties of the third class shall be paid into the town or district treasury: Provided, however, that the town board of auditors of any town may, prior to election of a town collector, fix the maximum amount at a lesser sum than provided herein.’ Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 1269.

The last proviso is the one whose constitutionality is questioned. The trial court held this amendment unconstitutional, on the ground that it was in conflict with sections[266 Ill. 386]11 and 12 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1870. These sections read:

‘Sec. 11. The fees of township officers, and of each class of county officers, shall be uniform in the class of counties to which they respectively belong. The compensation herein provided for shall apply only to officers hereafter elected, but all fees established by special laws shall cease at the adoption of this Constitution, and such officers shall receive only such fees as are provided by general law.

‘Sec. 12. All laws fixing the fees of state, county and township officers, shall terminate with the terms, respectively, of those who may be in office at the meeting of the first General Assembly after the adoption of this Constitution; and the General Assembly shall, by general law, uniform in its operation, provide for and regulate the fees of said officers and their successors, so as to reduce the same to a reasonable compensation for services actually rendered. But the General Assembly may, by general law, classify the counties by population into not more than three classes, and regulate the fees according to class. This article shall not be construed as depriving the General Assembly ob the power to reduce the fees of existing officers.’

For the purpose of fixing the fees and compensation of county and township officers the Legislature has divided the counties of the state into three classes (Hurd's Stat. 1913, p. 1256): First, those not exceeding 25,000 inhabitants; second, those containing a population of over 25,000 and not exceeding 100,000; and, third, those over 100,000. The county of Henry is in the second class, and therefore, under section 36 as it stood before the amendment of 1911, the town collectors in that county were entitled to 2 per cent. commission on moneys collected, provided that all excess of commissions and fees over $1,500 was required to be paid into the town treasury. Appellee Vickroy, in each of the years in question, collected over $1,500 in fees and commissions and duly turned over the excess. On September[266 Ill. 387]5, 1911, the town board of auditors in said township, in conformity with the amendment of 1911, fixed the salary of the town collector for the ensuing year at $400. These two suits were for the purpose of compelling Vickroy or his bondsmen to turn over the difference between $400 a year and $1,500 a year.

Is the proviso added by the amendment of 1911 to section 36 of the Salaries Act a general law providing that the fees of the township officers ‘shall be uniform in the class of counties to which they respectively belong,’ as required in said section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution? And, further, is said proviso a general law, uniform in its operation, so regulating the fees of the township officers as to give them ‘a reasonable compensation for services actually rendered,’ as required in said section 12 of said article 10?

The standard authorities define ‘uniform’ as conforming to one rule, mode, or unvarying standard; agreeing with each other; substantially one and the same; not different at different times or places; applicable to all places or divisions of a country. Anderson's Law Dict.; Century Dict.; New Standard Dict.; 39 Cyc. 685, and cases cited. See, also, 8 Words and Phrases, 7175, and cases cited. A law is uniform when all persons brought within the relation and circumstances provided for are affected alike; when it has uniform operation upon all within the class upon which it purports to operate. Anderson's Law Dict. 1068; Senior v. Ratterman, 44 Ohio St. 661, 11 N. E. 321;Commonwealth v. Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 59 Atl. 961. The word ‘general’ is defined as pertaining to the whole of a body, society, organization, or the like; not local, as, a general election; pertaining to, affecting, or applicable to each and all the members of a class, kind, or order; not particular; relating to a genus or kind; common to the many or to the greatest number; extensive, though not universal. Webster's New Int. Dict.; 20 Cyc. 1182, and cases cited. A general law is one framed in general terms and restricted to no locality, operating equally upon all of a group of objects, which, having regard to the purpose of the legislation, are distinguished by characteristics sufficiently marked and important to make them a class by themselves. State (Trenton Iron Co.) v. Yard, 42 N. J. Law, 357; 4 Words and Phrases, 3066, and cases cited. The word ‘local’ is used as a counterterm to ‘general.’ People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill. 421, 86 N. E. 672. Laws are general and uniform when they operate alike upon all who are in the same situation. A law is general, not because it embraces all the governed, but that it may, from its terms, when many are embraced in its provisions, embrace all others when they occupy a like position to those who are embraced. Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am. Rep. 610;People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319, 6 N. E. 480;City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 101 N. E. 192. it is not necessary that a law, to be general, should apply to every person in the state. Very few laws do so apply. An act is general in its nature and uniform in its operation if it acts upon all persons coming within its scope. People v. Kewanee Light Co., 262 Ill. 255, 104 N. E. 680.

[2][3] Judged by these general rules, is the proviso here in question a general law, uniform in its operation? It is insisted by counsel for appellant that as it affects every township in the state it is...