People ex rel. Griffith v. Scott

• Decision Date: 19 December 1911
• Citation: 120 P. 126,52 Colo. 59
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. GRIFFITH, Atty. Gen., et al. v. SCOTT et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

120 P. 126

52 Colo. 59

PEOPLE ex rel. GRIFFITH, Atty. Gen., et al. v. SCOTT et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

December 19, 1911

Quo warranto by the People, on the relation of Benjamin Griffith Attorney General, and others against Tully Scott and others. Dismissed.

Benjamin Griffith, Atty. Gen., John T. Barnett Caldwell Yeaman, James W. McCreery, N.C. Miller, and Jesse G Northcutt, for relators Colorado Bar Association.

T. J. O'Donnell, Jas. J. Banks, Charles S. Thomas, Edwin Van Cise, Joseph C. Helm, N. Walter Dixon, and Henry McAllister, Jr., for respondents.

MUSSER J.

The Eighteenth General Assembly passed an act entitled 'An act in relation to courts of review.' The first section establishes a court to be known as the 'Court of Appeals,' which shall exist for a period of four years from the date upon which the act took effect, and provides for the number, qualifications, compensation, and appointment of the judges, the filling of vacancies and the terms of the court. The second section provides for clerks of the court, stenographers to the judges, and other things immaterial here. Section 3 fixes the jurisdiction of the new court, and says that it 'shall have jurisdiction to review and determine all judgments in civil causes now pending upon the docket of the Supreme Court, or wherein appeals were perfected prior to the taking effect of this act, or that may hereafter and during the life of the Court of Appeals be taken to the Supreme Court for review, save and except writs of error to county courts.' Section 4 provides that the statutes granting and regulating appeals from the district and county courts to the Supreme Court be repealed; that the jurisdiction of the latter court on appeal even as to causes already pending therein shall, save as in section 6 provided, terminate upon the taking effect of the act, except for the purpose of entering the order of transfer to the new court; that such repeal shall not operate as a dismissal of pending appeals or of appeals perfected and not yet docketed, but that all such appeals shall, immediately upon the organization of the new court or thereafter, and upon the docketing thereof, be transferred from the Supreme Court to the new court for hearing and determination, and that the decision of the Court of Appeals in all such cases shall be final and conclusive, except as to those specified in section 6 of the act, and substitutes error for appeal in certain causes. The other provisions of section 4 are not material here. Section 5 authorizes the Supreme Court to transfer such other civil causes now or hereafter and during the life of the new court, pending before the Supreme Court on error, as the latter court may deem advisable, omitting, however, writs of error to county courts.

Section 5 then provides as follows: 'And immediately upon such assignment and transfer of causes so pending on error, the clerk of the Court of Appeals, shall, by registered mail, notify the parties to each of said causes or their attorneys of record, of such transfer, and advise them that unless within thirty days from the date of said notice a petition be filed requesting that the same be remanded to the Supreme Court, a waiver by consent will be conclusively presumed of the right or privilege, if any such right or privilege exists, to a hearing and determination of the writ of error by the Supreme Court. And if either of the parties or his attorneys, to a cause thus removed, shall, within the time above specified, file such petition to remand, the same shall be at once returned to the Supreme Court docket for final consideration and decision. But in all cases pending on error thus transferred, wherein no such petition be filed within the 30 days mentioned in the notice, the decision of the Court of Appeals shall, with the exceptions specified in section 6 of the act, be final and conclusive.'

Section 6 is as follows: 'Provided, however, that in causes thus transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, whether pending on appeal or error, wherein the decision necessarily involves the construction of a provision of the federal or state constitution, or relates to a franchise or freehold, or a judgment for more than $5,000, exclusive of costs, such decision thereof by the Court of Appeals shall not be final. Such cases may be reheard in the Supreme Court by writ of error from the latter court, under rules to be adopted by it. Or if, before a hearing in any case, either party thereto shall advise the Court of Appeals that it belongs to one of the classes of cases in this section above specified, and the court shall upon investigation so find, it shall at once and without further proceedings remand the same to the Supreme Court for determination.'

Section 7, among other things, provides that the court shall have power to adopt rules regulating the procedure therein, that it shall be a court of record having a seal, and that it shall have power to issue all necessary and proper writs and processes in aid of its jurisdiction, 'in the same manner and with the same effect as the Supreme Court.' The balance of the act provides for detail matters, which need not be noticed. After the act went into effect the respondents, by appointment by the Governor, organized the new Court of Appeals and entered upon the discharge of the duties of judges thereof, and this original proceeding in quo warranto was brought to test the right of respondents to do so. Two questions are presented for determination. First, is the act constitutional? Second, were the appointments of respondents valid?

The court created by this act is a court of review, and its jurisdiction extends only to such civil causes as may be transferred to it from the Supreme Court. Section 1 of article 6 of the Constitution declares that, 'The judicial power of the state as to matters of law and equity, except as in the Constitution otherwise provided, shall be vested in a Supreme Court, district courts, county courts, justices of the peace, and such other courts as may be provided by law.' By this section, the General Assembly is authorized to create a court of review, and as there is no express constitutional limitation of the jurisdiction that may be conferred upon such a court thus created, if the act is unconstitutional, it must be because the jurisdiction sought to be conferred is by implication prohibited in some degree by other constitutional provisions. People v. Richmond, 16 Colo. 274, 26 P. 929.

Every question, save one, raised by relators, that is within the facts of this case, and which must be considered in order to determine it, was answered by this court in the case of People v. Richmond, supra, and there resolved against the contention of these relators. If any such question was not directly answered in that case, it is answered by the conclusions which must necessarily follow from the reasoning therein, and the answer is at once apparent upon the reading of the decision. The one such question raised now, that was not raised in the Richmond Case, relates to the sufficiency of the title of the act.

It is claimed that the title of the present act is obnoxious to section 21 of article 5 of the Constitution, which provides: 'No bill, except general appropriation bills, shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title; but if any subject shall be embraced in any act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be so expressed.' There is nothing in the present act but what relates to courts of review, so that the act contains but one subject clearly expressed in its title. This is settled in the case of Golden Canal Co. v. Bright, 8 Colo. 144, 6 P. 142, where the subject is thoroughly discussed. In speaking of this constitutional provision, relating to the title of a bill, this court said: 'This constitutional inhibition must receive a reasonable construction. It is enough if the bill treats of but one general subject, and that subject is expressed in the title; to require that each subdivision of the subject, each and every of the 'ends and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of the object,' must be specifically mentioned in the title, would greatly impede and embarrass legitimate legislation. Judge Cooley asserts that it would 'actually render legislation impossible." Any other questions than such as are above described are not pertinent to this case, and their discussion would be obiter.

Relators contend that the General Assembly cannot take away from the Supreme Court any of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Constitution. This abstract proposition cannot be denied. In discussing the question, however, as applicable to the present act, they constantly confuse the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court with the quantity of business that may be transacted by it. The jurisdiction of a court is one thing, the amount of business it may transact is another. A court may, in one year, dispose of a great number of cases, and in the next year dispose of but half as many yet its jurisdiction, during the second year, would be the same as during the first. A court may dispose of a certain number of cases during a certain time, and another court of like jurisdiction may dispose of one-half as many cases in the same time, yet it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the latter court was lessened any on that account. This act does not, in any way, impair the constitutional jurisdiction of this court. If it did, that question would be in this case. All the act does is to reasonably regulate the quantity of business before this court for a limited period. The Constitution confers...