People ex rel. Hardy, on Behalf of Miller v. Sielaff

Decision Date04 June 1992
Citation584 N.Y.S.2d 742,79 N.Y.2d 618
Parties, 595 N.E.2d 817 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Michael A. HARDY, on Behalf of Gerald MILLER, Appellant, v. Allyn R. SIELAFF, as Commissioner of the Department of Correction of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Chief Judge.

At issue in this habeas corpus proceeding is the validity of the distinction drawn in CPL 500.10(17) between personal property and real property for the purpose of securing a bail bond. CPL 500.10(17)(a) provides that nonexempt personal property may be used as security if its net value is equal to or greater than the total amount of the undertaking. CPL 500.10(17)(b), on the other hand, requires that, for real property to be used as security, its net value must be at least twice the total amount of the undertaking.

In the underlying criminal proceeding, the defendant sought to post a bail bond secured by several parcels of real property the aggregate value of which, he acknowledged, was insufficient to satisfy the double equity requirement of CPL 500.10(17)(b). He contended, however, that the requirement was unconstitutional. After Supreme Court rejected his arguments, he commenced this habeas corpus proceeding in the Appellate Division, Second Department, renewing his constitutional arguments and seeking a reduction in bail. The Appellate Division dismissed the proceeding, without opinion.

Relator relies primarily upon People v. Burton, 150 Misc.2d 214, 569 N.Y.S.2d 861, which held that the double equity requirement of CPL 500.10(17)(b) was irrational and therefore unconstitutional. In Burton, the court first rejected the defendant's contention that, for purposes of equal protection analysis, the distinction between personal property and real property should be subjected to strict scrutiny, concluding that the distinction implicated neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right (150 Misc.2d, at 221-222, 569 N.Y.S.2d 861). After tracing the history of the double equity requirement, however, the court concluded that the evils which prompted its enactment--the use of undesirable properties as security and abusive bondsmen who used the same property as security for bail several times--are no longer significant problems and that the retention of the requirement in the face of these changed circumstances was irrational (id., at 225-226, 569 N.Y.S.2d 861).

We conclude, however, that the double equity requirement is rationally based. The legislative history recounted by the court in People v. Burton reveals that the requirement, as might be expected, was designed to ensure that the real property would provide adequate security for the obligation (id., at 219, 569 N.Y.S.2d 861). While the concern may have been prompted by the abuses of certain commercial bondsmen, it does not follow that the Legislature's success in curtailing such abusive practices has negated the State's legitimate interest in ensuring that the collateral posted for a secured bond is adequate. For these purposes, treating personal property and real property differently is rational.

To a greater extent than personal property, real property is subject to title problems and other hidden defects that can affect value, but which cannot readily be ascertained without expensive and time-consuming procedures. A court, in the context of entertaining a bail application, cannot be expected to employ the careful appraisal and underwriting techniques of a commercial lender. The double equity requirement provides the court with the ability to accept real property as security without...

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