People ex rel. Harris v. Sullivan

• Citation: 74 N.Y.2d 305,546 N.Y.S.2d 821,545 N.E.2d 1209
• Parties: , 545 N.E.2d 1209 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Wilbur HARRIS, Appellant, v. James SULLIVAN, as Superintendent of Sing Sing Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.
• Decision Date: 17 October 1989
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 821

546 N.Y.S.2d 821

74 N.Y.2d 305, 545 N.E.2d 1209

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Wilbur HARRIS, Appellant, v. James SULLIVAN, as Superintendent of Sing Sing Correctional

Facility, et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 17, 1989.

Carol Kahn, for appellant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. (Howard L. Zwickel, O. Peter Sherwood, Lawrence S. Kahn and Burton Herman, New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, Judge.

Relator, an interstate compact parolee, seeks by habeas corpus to redress the revocation of his New York State parole based on his conviction and sentence for a new felony in California. Executive Law § 259-i(3)(d)(iii) authorizes the New York State Division of Parole to revoke, without a final hearing, the parole of a releasee subsequently convicted of a new felony and sentenced to an "indeterminate" term. The question is whether the dispensation from providing a final revocation hearing is applicable against this parolee, subsequently convicted and sentenced for the California felony. We conclude that it is not and hold that relator remained entitled to a timely final revocation hearing upon return to New York.

In 1982, relator had been released to parole supervision while serving an indeterminate term of 5 to 15 years' imprisonment pursuant to a 1969 New York conviction of second degree burglary. He moved to California in 1983 and was placed under the supervision of California parole authorities pursuant to the Interstate Parole Compact (see, Executive Law § 259-m). Two years later, he was convicted of forcible rape in that State and was sentenced in Superior Court to three years' imprisonment. By April 1987, having earned credit for good conduct and for time spent in local custody, relator was released to California parole supervision (California Penal Code § 3000[a]; § 3001[a]. Prior to the release date, a preliminary parole revocation hearing was held with respect to relator's New York parole status (Executive Law § 259-o ). He was returned thereafter to New York to resume his incarceration under the 1969 New York conviction and sentence, because the New York State Parole Board, pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(3)(d)(iii), had revoked his parole without providing a final revocation hearing based on the California felony conviction and sentence.

Relator claims that he should be restored to parole status because the dispensation for the Parole Board from giving him a timely final parole revocation hearing does not apply to his situation. Supreme Court dismissed the writ, holding that Executive Law § 259-i(3)(d)(iii) authorized the revocation of relator's parole by operation of law without the necessity of a final parole revocation hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed, 144 A.D.2d 605, 534 N.Y.S.2d 442, and we granted leave to appeal to our court.

As a general rule, a parolee detained in New York for allegedly violating parole is entitled to a preliminary hearing within 15 days of the execution of the parole warrant (Executive Law § 259-i[3][c][i] and to a final revocation hearing within 90 days of the preliminary hearing (Executive Law § 259-i[3][f][i]. A parolee convicted of committing a new crime while on parole and sentenced to a new definite term, however, need only receive a final revocation hearing (Executive Law § 259-i[3][d]; and a parolee convicted of committing a new felony and sentenced to an indeterminate term is not even entitled to a final revocation hearing by reason of a 1984 statutory amendment. Felons in the latter category are subject to revocation of parole by operation of law without any hearing (see, L.1984, ch. 238, adding Executive Law § 259-i[3][d][iii]. The extension of the exemption from the final revocation hearing requirement to out-of-State convictions is the issue in this case. In pertinent part, the statute provides: "when a parolee * * * has been convicted of a new felony committed while under his present parole * * * supervision and a new indeterminate sentence has been imposed, the board's rules shall provide for a final declaration of delinquency. * * * The inmate's next appearance before the board shall be governed by the legal requirements of said new indeterminate sentence, or shall occur as soon after a final reversal of the conviction as is practicable" (emphasis added).

Concededly, relator was convicted of a new felony while in California, but he argues that the exemption from the final revocation hearing requirement is limited to parolees who commit felonies and are sentenced indeterminately in New York.

Respondents refute that narrow interpretation, urging instead that the statutory exemption from providing a final revocation hearing extends to relator's three-year California sentence for the crime of forcible rape. They ask us to treat that sentence as if it were an indeterminate sentence under New York law, thus qualifying for the dispensation enacted in subdivision (3)(d)(iii) of Executive Law § 259-i. The hypothesis proceeds from the premise that had relator committed a forcible rape in New York, he would have been found guilty of a class B violent felony (Penal Law § 130.35[1] and would have been given an indeterminate sentence (Penal Law § 70.00[1], [4].

The plain words of the statute, its stated purpose and relevant legislative history do not permit this expansive construction of the statute. A court is obliged to interpret a statute to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. When its language is clear and unambiguous, it should be construed so as to give effect to the plain meaning of its words (see, Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 71 N.Y.2d 669, 675, 529 N.Y.S.2d 732, 525 N.E.2d 454). Here, the words excusing the usual requirement of a final revocation hearing are plain--a parolee must have been sentenced to an "indeterminate" term for the exemption to apply. The prior sentence this relator received in California is not "indeterminate", facially, definitionally or functionally, as that term of art is used in New York (see, Penal Law § 70.00[2], [3]; Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 39, Penal Law art. 70, at 232).

The dispensation from hearing is the exception from the general requirement and cannot, under its enacted wording, be applicable against parolees subsequently convicted and...