People ex rel. Hesley v. Ragen

• Decision Date: 19 March 1947
• Docket Number: No. 29865.,29865.
• Citation: 72 N.E.2d 311,396 Ill. 554
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HESLEY v. RAGEN, Warden.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

396 Ill. 554

72 N.E.2d 311

PEOPLE ex rel. HESLEY

v.RAGEN, Warden.

No. 29865.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 19, 1947.

Habeas corpus proceedings by the People, on the relation of Daniel Hesley, against Joseph E. Ragen, Warden.

Writ quashed and prisoner remanded to custody of warden.Daniel Hesley, pro se.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (Edward Wolfe, of Springfield, of counsel), for respondent.

THOMPSON, Justice.

Daniel Hesley, an inmate of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, filed herein his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ was ordered issued and respondent filed his return and also a motion to quash. On November 12, 1946, the court entered an order taking the motion to quash with the case, ordering the issues closed and briefs to be filed in accordance with the rules of this court.

Hesley was convicted of robbery in the Federal court at Hammond, Indiana, and was sentenced to the Federal penitentiary for a term of twenty-five years. He was taken to the penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, on or about July 9, 1926, to commence the service of his sentence imposed in the Federal court. After the delivery of petitioner to the penitentiary, he was, on July 20, 1926, indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for the crime of murder. Thereafter, the cause was continued from time to time and was finally set for trial on April 26, 1927. Prior thereto, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and prosequendum was filed by the State's Attorney in the criminal court of Cook county, who sought to have the petitioner returned from the Federal penitentiary to the criminal court of Cook county for trial on his indictment for murder.

Pursuant to this writ, the warden of the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth produced the petitioner in open court, who, being represented by counsel, after arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty. He was tried by a jury, found guilty, and his punishment fixed at twenty-five years in the penitentiary. A motion for a new trial was filed but later withdrawn and he was sentenced by the court to the Illinois State Penitentiary for a term of twenty-five years. On the same day, April 23, 1927, the court entered an order dismissing the writ of habeas corpus and remanding the petitioner to the custody of the warden of the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.

Petitioner remained in the said Federal penitentiary until August 25, 1938, when he was transferred to the Federal penitentiary at Alcatraz, California, where he remained until about May 1, 1942, when he was again transferred from the Federal penitentiary at Alcatraz to the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas. His sentence was due to expire on or about August 15, 1942. On or about August 4, 1942, the Governor of Illinois presented to the Governor of Kansas a request for the extradition of the petitioner as a fugitive from justice. The requisition was honored and the petitioner was returned to Illinois and delivered to the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet, on or about August 27, 1942, where he is now incarcerated and serving his sentence for the crime of murder.

Petitioner contends that his imprisonment is illegal and that he is entitled to his discharge in accordance with the provisions of subsection 3 of section 22 of the Habeas Corpus Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 65, par. 22. He presents the following as grounds for discharge: (1) That the court did not suspend execution of the judgment imposed on April 23, 1927, and that no ministerial officer may disobey the mandate of the court by turning him over to another jurisdiction; (2) that the court was in error in demanding that petitioner be returned to the State of Illinois to commence service of a judgment that had expired two years prior to his commitment, and that he was not a fugitive from justice as charged by the State's Attorney of Cook county; (3) that the maximum term, twenty-five years, ‘less statutory good time allowed by law,’ expired before petitioner was returned and imprisoned in the Illinois State Penitentiary; and, (4) that the constitution of the State of Illinois supersedes any and all acts created by State Legislatures and argitrary acts of ministerial officers.

Petitioner first contends the court did not suspend execution of the judgment, and that the mandate was violated by turning him over to another jurisdiction. The effect of the judgment, as well as its force and validity, must be determined by the judgment itself when supported by the record. The question to be determined by the record here is whether or not the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the person of the defendant, and had the power and authority to enter the judgment which it entered. That such jurisdiction and power was present could hardly be questioned, and, under such circumstances, we hardly see how the court, in entering the judgment, in any way exceeded its power and jurisdiction. Having been sentenced by a court having jurisdiction, petitioner could only be discharged from serving said sentence in the manner provided by the laws of Illinois. This court has repeatedly held that a sentence of imprisonment can only be satisfied by actual imprisonment for the period of time fixed by the judgment of the court, unless such sentence be remitted in a manner provided by law. We held in the case of People ex rel. Kelly v. Ragen, 392 Ill. 423, 64 N.E.2d 872, that the judgment is conclusive, and the unserved part of the penalty imposed remained in full force, notwithstanding the defendant, having been released on bail and having failed to appear, was not reincarcerated for more than twelve years. Unless a prisoner has suffered the actual imprisonment in conformity with the terms and conditions of the judgment, he cannot be discharged unless his sentence has been remitted in some manner provided by law. People ex rel. Ross v. Ragen, 392 Ill. 465, 64 N.E.2d 862;People ex rel. Barrett v. Crowe, 387 Ill. 53, 55 N.E.2d 84;People ex rel. Ross v. Becker, 382 Ill. 404, 47 N.E.2d 475;Purdue v. Ragen, 375 Ill. 98, 30 N.E.2d 637;People ex rel. Barrett v. Dixon, 387 Ill. 420, 56 N.E.2d 816;Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359, 58 S.Ct. 872, 82 L.Ed. 1399, 116 A.L.R. 808;Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 44 S.Ct. 43, 68 L.Ed. 247.

Petitioner's contention that the court had no power to remand him to the custody of the Federal authorities is met with the record which discloses that he was produced in court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by the criminal court of Cook county and honored by the Federal authorities. He was at all times a Federal prisoner and was never out of the custody of the warden of the Federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas.

This court in the case of People ex rel. McCarthy v. Ragen, 389 Ill. 172, 58 N.E.2d 872, 873, had an occasion to pass on a case involving similar facts, and there said: ‘In June, 1934, petitioner stood charged with having violated the laws of two sovereignties. He had the right to a fair trial, according to the law of the sovereignty he was alleged to have violated, but he could not use the charge in one jurisdiction to prevent his trial on the charge in the other jurisdiction. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879. The law provides a means by which a sovereign, who has in its jurisdiction one who has been convicted of violating its laws, may deliver such convicted person to the court of a different jurisdiction for trial, without losing its right to have him returned to serve his sentence. Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879. The record in this case does not show who, if anyone, representing the United States, consented that petitioner might be taken to the criminal court for trial, but even though he was taken there without previous consent, it is not a matter which affects the jurisdiction of the criminal court to try him on the indictment pending there. People v. Speece, 367 Ill. 76, 10 N.E.2d 379;People v. Berardi, 332 Ill. 295, 163 N.E. 668, 62 A.L.R. 274.’

It has been held that no rights of a prisoner are violated who, while serving a Federal sentence, is delivered to a State court for trial for an offense against the State laws. People v. Berardi, 332 Ill. 295, 163 N.E. 668, 62 A.L.R. 274;Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879;Vanover v. Cox, 8 Cir., 136 F.2d 442;Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 A. 631,4 Ann.Cas. 719. It has also been held that the fact that the Federal authorities deliver a prisoner to a State court for trial does not violate any of the due-process provisions of the Federal or State constitutions. People ex rel. McCarthy v. Ragen, 389 Ill. 172, 58 N.E.2d 872;Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 42 S.Ct. 309, 66 L.Ed. 607, 22 A.L.R. 879;Wall v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir., 108 F.2d 865;Vanover v. Cox, 8 Cir., 136 F.2d 442;Rigor v. State, 101 Md. 465, 61 A. 631,4 Ann.Cas. 719;Kelley v. State of Oregon, 273 U.S. 589, 47 S.Ct. 504, 71 L.Ed. 790;Kirk v. Squier, 9 Cir., 150 F.2d 3;United States ex rel. Durkin v. McDonnell, 7 Cir., 153 F.2d 919;United States v. Farrell, 8 Cir., 87 F.2d 957;United States ex rel. Buchalter v. Warden, 2 Cir., 141 F.2d 259, certiorari denied Buchalter v. Warden, 321 U.S. 780, 64 Sup.Ct. 633, 88 L.Ed. 1072;Fowler v. State, 196 Ga. 748, 27 S.E.2d 557; State v. Conway, 351 Mo. 126, 171 S.W.2d 677;Jones v. Hiatt, D.C., 50 F.Supp. 68.

[7] It is the contention of petitioner that he was not a fugitive from justice and that he was unlawfully returned to the State of Illinois by extradition from the State of Kansas. Even if it could be said that he was unlawfully returned to the State of Illinois by extradition, this question cannot be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. The record discloses petitioner was present in open court and no question was raised concerning the authority or jurisdiction of that court to impose the judgment...