People ex rel. Johnson v. George

Citation57 N.E. 804,186 Ill. 122
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. JOHNSON et al. v. GEORGE.
Decision Date21 June 1900
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Information filed against Charles E. George for disbarment, and rule obtained against respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys. Rule made absolute.Charles S. Deneen, State's Atty. (Frank Asbury Johnson and Frank J. Smith, of counsel), for relators.

Charles E. George (Wm. E. Hughes and R. A. Wade, of counsel), for respondent.

This is an information filed by the state's attorney of Cook county, on the relation of five members of the Chicago Bar Association, constituting a committee on grievances of the said association, against Charles E. George, the respondent, an attorney at law practicing in the city of Chicago, asking for his disbarment. The information shows that the respondent was admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law October 22, 1894, according to the rules and customs of this court and the laws of the state of Illinois, for and during good behavior, and has ever since been engaged in the practice of law in the county of Cook and state of Illinois. The information charges that on or about the 2d day of April, 1896, an indictment was duly returned to the criminal court of Cook county, charging the said Charles E. George with embezzling and converting to his own use the sum of $200, which had come into the possession of the said George by virtue of his employment as an attorney for one Tillie Cutta; that on or about the 24th day of December, 1896, the said George was duly tried under said indictment, and a verdict was rendered by the jury therein, finding the said George guilty of larceny in manner and form as charged in said indictment, and finding the amount so stolen to be $150; that thereafter, on or about the 15th day of January, 1897, the said George was duly sentenced by the criminal court of Cook county on the said verdict, and ordered to be taken to the penitentiary of this state located at Joliet, and there delivered to the warden of said penitentiary; that all of said acts of the said George were fraudulent, dishonest, scandalous, and unprofessional, and were and are calculated to bring the courts of justice into disrepute and contempt, and to tarnish the good name of the legal profession; that such acts were contrary to the duty of the said George as an attorney and counselor at law, and contrary to the rules of this honorable court, and against the peace and dignity of the people of the state of Illinois. The information prayed for a rule on the respondent to show cause why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys of this court. The respondent filed his sworn answer, admitting that at the December term, 1896, of the criminal court of Cook county, he was convicted of a felony,-of the crime of embezzlement; that a motion for a new trial was entered before his honor, Judge Sears, which motion was overruled, and judgment thereupon entered upon the verdict and sentence pronounced accordingly, to reverse which judgment a writ of error was sued out, which was made a supersedeas, but upon the hearing the judgment of the criminal court was affirmed, and a motion for a rehearing afterwards overruled. Respondent also sets up that two affidavits were afterwards presented to the board of pardons for the state of Illinois, purporting to be newly-discovered evidence on the part of respondent, both being of such effect, as respondent claimed, as to establish his innocence, and that upon the showing made and evidence furnished the board of pardons made a recommendation to the governor of the state of Illinois, and that, acting upon such recommendation, the said governor, upon the 19th day of December, 1897, issued to respondent a full and unconditional pardon, thereby restoring to him all of the rights which he had at any time before been entitled to or enjoyed as a good and reputable citizen of the state of Illinois; asks that the rule entered April 6, 1899, upon the information, may be discharged, and that the court may find that respondent has made a proper showing, and that he be not disbarred as prayed for on the part of the people. A supplemental information was filed by the state's attorney of Cook county, charging that respondent unlawfully and falsely, on or about the 10th day of March, 1899, pretended to one William Lister that one Chris Riedel was then dead, and that Lena Riedel, his wife, needed and desired the sum of $10 in money with which to purchase a bonnet and some crape for her use at the funeral of said Chris Riedel, and that said Lena Riedel then needed and desired the further sum of $15 with which to pay a certain bill then due to Dr. Barrow for medical attendance upon said Chris Riedel during his lifetime, which false pretenses were made by respondent to Lister to induce Lister to sign a check for $25, which Lister did sign and deliver to respondent, and respondent procured $25 in money thereon, and appropriated the same to his own use; that said Chris Riedel was not dead, but was living, as was well known to respondent, and that Lena Riedel was not a widow, and was not in need of money for the purposes above set forth; that for this crime an indictment was returned to the criminal court of Cook county, and is now pending. Respondent filed an amended sworn answer to the original information, denying every charge of unprofessional conduct as a lawyer, or with doing any act about his business as an attorney at law or solicitor in chancery, as untrue and false, and also answered the supplemental information, denying the charges of obtaining money of William Lister by false pretenses. Testimony was taken by the state's attorney in support of the supplemental information, the same as will be presented on the trial of the indictment for false pretenses.

CRAIG, J. (after stating the facts).

The offense charged in the original information against the respondent was embezzlement and larceny. The record of the criminal court of Cook county, duly certified, was attached to, and made a part of, the information. This record shows that on the 2d day of April, 1896, an indictment was duly returned to the criminal court of Cook county, Ill., charging the respondent, Charles E. George, with embezzling and converting to his own use $200 which had come into his possession by virtue of his employment as an attorney for one Tillie Cutta; that on or about the 24th day of December, 1896, the respondent was duly tried under the indictment, and a verdict was rendered by the jury finding respondent guilty of larceny, and finding the value of the property stolen to be $150; and on the 15th day of January, 1897, he was sentenced to the state penitentiary at Joliet. The case was brought to this court by writ of error to the criminal court of Cook county, and the judgment affirmed. 47 N. E. 741. The record established the guilt of the respondent of the crime with which he was charged, and it is admitted by the respondent's answer. The respondent sets up in his answer that the board of pardons made a recommendation to the governor of the state of Illinois, and that, acting upon such recommendation, the governor issued a full and unconditional pardon, restoring to him all of the rights to which he had before been entitled. The question is whether under these undisputed facts, the respondent, Charles E. George, is a proper person to retain his license as an attorney of this court. A good moral character is required by the statute of this state and the rules of this court before a person is entitled to receive a license to practice as an attorney and counselor at law. If a good moral character is a condition precedent to his receiving a license as an attorney, is it not implied that he shall continue to possess a good moral character if he would retain his license? This court has discretion to strike the name of any attorney or counselor at law from the roll of attorneys for malconduct in his office. What constitutes malconduct must depend upon the facts in the particular case. What effect did the conviction of the respondent of the crime of larceny and his sentence to the penitentiary have upon his moral character?

Paragraph 227 of the Criminal Code (Rev. St. 1874, p. 394) defines a ‘felony’ as follows: ‘A felony is an offense punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary.’ Paragraph 74 defines ‘embezzlement’: ‘Whoever embezzles or fraudulently coverts to his own use, or secretes, with intent to embezzle or fraudulently covert to his own use, money, goods or property delivered to him, which may be the subject of larceny, or any part thereof, shall be deemed guilty of larceny.’ Id. p. 362. Paragraph 168 provides: ‘Every person convicted of larceny, if the property stolen exceeds the value of $15, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than ten years,’ etc. Id. p. 377. Paragraph 279 provides: ‘Every person convicted of the crime of murder, rape, kidnapping, willful and corrupt perjury, * * * incest, larceny, forgery, counterfeiting or bigamy, shall be deemed infamous, and shall forever thereafter be rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust or profit, of voting at any election, or serving as a juror, unless he is again restored to such rights by the terms of a pardon for the offense, or otherwise according to law.’ Id. p. 394. Section 13 of article 5 of the constitution provides: ‘The governor shall have power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law relative to the manner of applying therefore.’ Id. p. 67. Paragraph 49 of chapter 108, entitled ‘Penitentiary,’ provides: ‘The governor shall have the right to grant any convict that has been, now is, or may be...

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24 cases
  • Braverman, In re
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 1 Marzo 1974
    ...to the contrary hold no more than this, that reinstatement will not follow automatically from pardon without more. People ex rel. Johnson v. George, 186 Ill. 122, 57 N.E. 804. There must be convincing proof of innocence before pardon will restore to the followship of the bar. Even innocence......
  • State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming v. Brown
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • 22 Marzo 1938
    ...v. Meyervitz, supra (278 Ill. 356, 116 N.E. 189); People v. Gilmore, supra (214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737, 60 L.R.A. 701); People v. George, supra (186 Ill. 122, 57 N.E. 804). It disclosed sufficient cause for the disbarment. The recommendation of the commission is adopted, and the respondent i......
  • Eaton, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 18 Septiembre 1958
    ...This wellestablished rule is based upon conviction of an attorney rather than any admission implied in his plea. People ex rel. Johnson v. George, 186 Ill. 122, 57 N.E. 804; People ex rel. Deneen v. John, 212 Ill. 615, 72 N.E. 789; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Meyerovitz, 278 Ill. 35......
  • Browning, In re, 36419
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 30 Noviembre 1961
    ...278 Ill. 356, 116 N.E. 189; People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 214 Ill. 569, 73 N.E. 737, 69 L.R.A. 701; People ex rel. Johnson v. George, 186 Ill. 122, 57 N.E. 804) does not militate against this result. Such a judgment is entered only after guilt has been acknowledged by a plea of guilty, ......
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