State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming v. Brown
| Decision Date | 22 March 1938 |
| Docket Number | 2063 |
| Citation | 77 P.2d 626,53 Wyo. 42 |
| Parties | STATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF WYOMING v. BROWN |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Rehearing denied May 25, 1938.
ORIGINAL proceeding by the State Board of Law Examiners of Wyoming for the disbarment of Edwin L. Brown, wherein the Attorney General filed a motion for judgment.
For the complainant, there was a memorandum of authorities submitted by Ray E. Lee, Attorney General; Thos. F. Shea, Deputy Attorney General; and Wm. C. Snow, Assistant Attorney General, all of Cheyenne, and oral argument by Mr. Lee.
Prior proceedings have been prosecuted in this court and in the Supreme Court of South Dakota entitled, State Board of Law Examiners v. Brown, 290 P. 1013, 42 Wyo. 108; in re Brown, 245 N.W. 824; in re Brown, 264 N.W 521. Inherent powers of court to suspend or disbar attorneys. 7 C. J. S. 728, Sec. 18 a; 7 C. J. S. 730-32, Sec. 18 b; Board of Law Examiners v. Phelan, 43 Wyo. 481; 5 Amer. Jurisprudence 410, Sections 249, 411, Section 251. Recognition of judgment of courts in other states. Matter of Mosness, 39 Wis. 509; 20 Am. R. 55; in re Lowenthal, 61 Cal. 122; Selling, et al. v Rarford, 243 U.S. 46; 61 Law Ed. 585; Ann. Cas. 1917 (d) 569 (in the report of this case there is a note discussing the effect of disbarment by one court upon the right of a person disbarred to practice in other courts); U. S. v Gschran, et al., 53 F.2d 128.
For the respondent, there was a memorandum of authorties submitted and oral argument by Edwin L. Brown pro se.
As to the jurisdiction and subject matter, the following authorities are cited. Art. V, Sec. 3, Const. of Wyoming; Sec. 9-116 Wyoming Statutes; Higgins v. Burton, (Utah) 232 P. 914; In re Robinson, (Wash.) 92 P. 929; The Fair v. Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22; Fehr v. Petroleum Corporation, (Okla.) 229 P. 1048. The motion for judgment on pleadings admits the allegations of paragraphs 1-4-6 to 28 inclusive. Coe v. Bennett, (Ida.) 226 P. 736; Qualls v. National Bank, (Okla.) 212 P. 308; Leahy v. Trust Co., (Mo.) 247 S.W. 396; Long v. Pub. Co., (Cal.) 228 P. 873; Madregano v. Electric Co., 195 N.W. 861. As to the jurisdiction to grant relief in a particular action, the following authorities are cited. Long v. Long, (Kans.) 214 P. 1116; Reddin v. Frock, (S. D.) 223 N.W. 50; Church v. Quiner, (Wyo.) 224 P. 1073; Abraham v. Homer, (Okla.) 226 P. 45; Reed v. Hillister, (Ore.) 212 P. 367; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Schendel, 292 F. 326; Taylor v. Taylor, (Cal.) 218 P. 756. A proceeding for disbarment requires a special judgment. It is not a plenary action recognized under the full faith and credit rule. In re Eaton, (N. D.) 62 N.W. 597; in re Morganstern, (Cal.) 215 P. 721. Proof is necessary. In re Diesen, (Minn.) 215 N.W. 427; In re Eberhardt, (Minn.) 205 N.W. 266; State v. Ebbs, (N. C.) 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 892; People ex rel Deneen v. Coleman, (Ill.) 71 N.E. 693; Hamlin v. Payson, (Ill.) 74 N.E. 383. As to the judgment on foreign records, see 23 Cyc. 1575; Ross v. Miller, (Colo.) 224 P. 224.
This is an original proceeding instituted by the State Board of Law Examiners as complainant through the Attorney General of the State of Wyoming in this court, for the purpose of procuring the disbarment of respondent, Edwin L. Brown, and the revocation of his license to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Summarized the petition filed herein by the complainant charges that Edwin L. Brown is now and for some time past has been engaged in the practice of law at Lusk, Wyoming; that on or about September 9, 1930, by the judgment of this court, he was suspended from engaging in practice as an attorney before the courts of this state for a period of three years, on account of unprofessional conduct; that thereafter, and while said order of suspension was still operative, he returned to South Dakota, a state where he had originally been admitted to the practice of law and upon whose certificate he had relied to secure admittance to the practice of the profession in this state, and again engaged in the work of an attorney at law in that state; that by an order of the Supreme Court of South Dakota, effective December 13, 1932, he was suspended from such practice for the remainder of the period of suspension imposed by the judgment of this court.
It is also charged that the respondent subsequently commenced the practice of law in South Dakota after the expiration of the suspension period ordered as aforesaid had expired; that thereafter an original proceeding was brought in the Supreme Court of South Dakota for respondent's disbarment as an attorney at law in that state, which culminated in a judgment rendered by that court January 11, 1936, that respondent's license to practice law in the State of South Dakota be revoked, that his name be stricken from the roll of licensed attorneys therein, and that he be absolutely disbarred from further practicing as an attorney at law in any of the courts of that commonwealth,. An exemplified copy of the proceedings, including this judgment of disbarment, was duly filed herein with complainant's petition.
The plaintiff further charged in its petition that in an action in the District Court of the United States for the District of Wyoming, entitled No. 1842, Walter F. Sprengel, Trustee, Plaintiff, v. Edwin L. Brown, Defendant, decided January 15, 1930, it was found that respondent had collected a large sum of money due a client for which respondent was trustee, and had failed to pay or account for the same, for which he was indebted to said plaintiff in the sum of $ 1,307.75, and a decree for the recovery of that amount, as well as a return of the accounts and notes which he held for said client, together with costs, against the said Edwin L. Brown, was duly entered, and that this decree remains unsatisfied.
Complainant requested this court, in view of these facts thus presented, to assume original jurisdiction and dispose of the matter. It was prayed that the order of this court be made requiring the said Edwin L. Brown to show cause, if he could, why his license to practice law in this state should not be revoked.
The order sought as aforesaid was issued, duly served upon the respondent, and he has filed a verified answer and return admitting that he is now engaged in the practice of law in this state, challenging the jurisdiction of this court, admitting that the several orders of suspension and the judgment of disbarment mentioned in the petition for same were entered, and incorporating allegations undertaking to relitigate the fact issues involved in the disbarment proceedings had against him in the State of South Dakota. With reference to the case disposed of in the Federal Court and referred to in complainant's petition, as stated above, he admits a decree of the character alleged was entered. He states that it involves the facts upon which the order of suspension heretofore made by this court was made, and, also, that by reason of the said decree the relation of debtor and creditor arose. He does not deny specifically that the decree remains unsatisfied.
The Attorney General of Wyoming has filed a "Motion for Judgment," wherein he alleges "that the return of the defendant to the order to show cause filed herein, does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense or cause for denying the prayer of complainant's petition," and also asserts that the admissions contained in respondent's answer, together with the exemplified copy of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of South Dakota and on file herein, as stated, above, constitute sufficient cause for his disbarment in this state.
As the purpose of the motion filed by complainant is manifestly that of a demurrer to the answer and return made by respondent, with prayer for judgment thereon, we shall so regard it.
Disbarment proceedings are not exactly either criminal or civil in nature, but partake of the character of special proceedings, disciplinary and summary in form, necessarily incident to the inherent power of courts to control properly their own affairs. They are not litigation between adverse parties, but simply the exercise of jurisdiction over an official whose authority to serve the public and the courts issues out of the courts themselves. Such proceedings cause an inquiry into his conduct not for the purpose of applying a remedy for a wrong done, but only for the maintenance of the purity and dignity of the courts, by removing an officer whose fitness to function has been questioned and whose unfitness shall be established. When they result in disbarment, the official affected is, of course, punished thereby, but the intrinsic nature of the whole matter involves a determination in the public interest whether the person whose conduct is the subject of the inquiry should be permitted to practice the profession of law. Bar Association of Boston v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 97 N.E. 751, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 116, Ann. Cas., 1913A, 1226; In Re Stern, 12 N.E.2d 100; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 441, 13 L. R. A. 767; State ex rel. Spillman v. Priest, 123 Neb. 241, 242 N.W. 433; 7 C. J. S. 770-771, Sec. 28, and authorities cited.
All members of the legal profession know that when they are admitted to practice law they assume certain obligations and duties which properly met must conform to certain standards in honesty and fair dealing as concerns their clients, the courts, the profession, and the public at large. State ex rel. Spillman v. Priest, supra. It goes...
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