People ex rel. Kane v. Weis

• Decision Date: 15 December 1916
• Docket Number: No. 10847.,10847.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. KANE et al. v. WEIS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

275 Ill. 581

114 N.E. 331

PEOPLE ex rel. KANE et al.

v.WEIS et al.

No. 10847.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1916.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Livingston County; G. W. Patton, Judge.

Information in the nature of quo warranto, on the relation of John M. Kane and others, against O. L. Weis and others. From a judgment of ouster, after demurrer to the plea was sustained, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Farmer, J., dissenting.C. M. Clay Buntain, of Kankakee, and H. E. Torrance, of Pontiac, for appellants.

F. A. Ortman, State's Atty., and Bert W. Adsit, both of Pontiac, for appellees.

COOKE, J.

Upon leave granted, the people, upon the relation of John M. Kane and others, filed an information in the nature of quo warranto in the circuit court of Livingston county against appellants, O. L. Weis and others, requiring them to show by what warrant they claimed to hold and execute the offices of president and members of the board of education of a certain alleged high school district situated in the counties of Livingston, Kankakee, and Grundy. Appellants filed a plea in which they set up each step taken in the organization of the alleged high school district and their election as president and members of the board of education of such district. To this plea appellees interposed a demurrer, which was sustained. A judgment of ouster was entered, and appellants were each fined the sum of $1 and costs. This appeal followed.

It was attempted to organize this district under section 6 of the act of June 5, 1911, which authorizes the organization of high school districts. Hurd's Stat. 1916, p. 2361. One of the contentions made by appellees is that the plea fails to show a legal organization of the high school district, and that the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed, for the reason that the High School Act of June 5, 1911, is unconstitutional. Section 1 of that act is as follows:

‘That any school township that contains a school district having a population of 1,000 or more and not exceeding 100,000 inhabitants, whether operating under the general school law or governed by virtue of a special act, may be organized into a high school district by submitting the proposition to a vote of the people at a general or special election.’

Section 2 to 4, inclusive, provide the manner in which such high school district may be organized and established. Section 5 confers upon the board of education the same powers and authorizes them to discharge the same duties as boards of education elected under the general school law. Section 6 of the act is as follows:

‘The inhabitants of any contiguous and compact territory, whether in the same or different townships, upon a petition signed by at least fifty legal voters and an affirmative vote in such territory, may establish, in the manner provided by this act, a township high school for the benefit of the inhabitants of the territory described in the petition.’

The seventh and last section provides that a school district, or any part thereof, adjoining a high school district organized under the act, may be annexed to such high school district by following the procedure in that section prescribed.

It is contended that the act violates section 22 of article 4 of the Constitution. That part of the section relied upon is as follows:

‘The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws * * * granting to any corporation, association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever.’

Three cases have been taken under advisement and are now receiving our consideration involving the legality of the organization of high school districts under the act of 1911 and in which the question of the constitutionality of the act is raised. The contentions made in each of these cases and the authorities cited on this question will be considered in this opinion. In each of these cases the organization was attempted under section 6, and it is contended that section 6 is in no way dependent upon or connected with section 1; that section 1 may be eliminated, leaving an act complete in itself, and that with section 1 excluded all question of the constitutionality of the act disappears. Section 1 is clearly a limitation on section 6, and these sections are therefore so interdependent that it cannot be said that the Legislature would have passed the act without section 1. By its terms section 1 provides only for the organization of a school township containing a school district having a population of 1,000 and not more than 100,000 into a high school district. With section 1 excluded from the act, section 6 is broad enough to include the organization of such a school township into a high school district; but with section 1 in the act both sections must be construed together, with the result that the scope of section 6 is necessarily limited. In People v. Painter, 267 Ill. 473, 108 N. E. 683, we had occasion to construe this statute, and we there held that where it is proposed to organize a township into a high school district section 1 of the act applies, and it is essential that the township shall contain a school district having a population of 1,000 and not exceeding 100,000, and that section 6 of the act does not apply to territory which includes a whole township, but only to compact and contiguous territory in part of a township or townships. This holding was approved in People v. Swift, 270 Ill. 532, 110 N. E. 904. It will thus be seen that section 1 constitutes such a limitation upon section 6, and the two sections are so interdependent, that it cannot fairly be said that the Legislature would have passed the act with section 1 excluded, and therefore if section 1 is invalid the whole act must fall. As the whole act must be declared unconstitutional if section 1 is invalid, appellees are entitled to urge this objection, although the organization of this district is attempted to be made under section 6. People v. Huff, 249 Ill. 164, 94 N. E. 61.

Under the provisions of section 1 a school township may be organized into a high school district provided it contains a school district having a population of over 1,000 and less than 100,000. Under the holding in People v. Painter, supra, and People v. Swift, supra, a single township cannot be organized into a high school district unless it complies with the requirements of section 1. The only territory, aside from the school township described in section 1, which can be organized under the act into a township high school district, is a part of a township or townships. Thus two adjoining townships may have identically the same population, may be possessed of the same wealth, may have the same number of cities or villages similarly located, and yet, because of the difference in the division of the two towns into school districts, one would be entitled to organize into a township high school district under this act and the other would not. A part of such town not able to organize under section 1 of the act could, however, be organized into a township high school district under section 6. No provision is made in the act for a whole township not possessing the requirements prescribed in section 1 to organize, in conjunction with a part or parts of adjoining townships, into a high school district, as under the construction placed upon the act in People v. Painter, supra, there can be organized into a township high school district, under section 6, only a part of a township or parts of townships. While the Legislature may make classification as a basis for legislation in proper instances, the general rule is that a classification will suffice as a basis for legislation only where such classification is based upon a rational difference of situation or condition found to exist in the persons or objects upon which the classification rests. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155;L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, 72 N. E. 399,103 Am. St. Rep. 234;Douglas v. People, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N. E. 341,8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1116, 116 Am. St. Rep. 162;Dawson Soap Co. v. City of Chicago, 234 Ill. 314, 84 N. E. 920,14 Ann. Cas. 1131;People v. Nellis, 249 Ill. 12, 94 N. E. 165;Greene v. Fish Furniture Co., 272 Ill. 148, 111 N. E. 725. The classification made in section 1 of the act is not based upon any rational difference of situation or condition. We can perceive of no reason why a township which contains a school district of more than 1,000 and less than 100,000 inhabitants can be said to differ from an adjoining township having the same population, the same wealth, the same need of a high school, the same number of cities and villages similarly located, but which has a different division of its territory into school districts. Under the provisions of this act it is impossible for a whole township, as a single unit, to organize into a township high school district, unless it contains a school district of the population described in section 1; but, however meager the population, and without regard to the wealth or necessities of the community, a part of any township may organize into a township high school district. By this act the inhabitants of a township containing such a school district as is described in section 1 are given special privileges which are denied to the inhabitants of other districts of like population and similarly situated.

The situation here presented is identical with that presented in People v. Rinaker, 252 Ill. 266, 96 N. E. 897, where it was held that the Forest Preserve Act of 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 245), violated that part of section 22 of article 4 of the Constitution here relied upon, for the reason that the benefits of the law were not made available to all citizens similarly situated. That act authorized the incorporation as a forest preserve district of any area of contiguous territory lying wholly within one county containing within its boundaries one or...