People ex rel. Lewman v. Baird

Decision Date18 April 1923
Docket NumberNo. 14919.,14919.
Citation307 Ill. 503,139 N.E. 132
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. LEWMAN, State's Atty., v. BAIRD et al.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Information in the nature of quo warranto by the People, on the relation of John H. Lewman, State's Attorney, against W. I. Baird and others, to test the legality of the organization of Fairmount Community High School District No. 234. From a judgment sustaining the district, relator appeals.

Affirmed.

Dunn and Duncan, JJ., dissenting in part.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Vermilion County; John H. marshall, judge.

John H. Lewman, State's Atty., and Acton, Acton & Snyder, all of Danville, for appellant.

Gunn & Platt, of Danville, for appellees.

STONE, J.

The state's attorney of Vermilion county filed in the circuit court of that county, upon leave of court being had, an information in the nature of quo warranto against the appellees, as officers of Fairmount community high school district No. 234. The information consists of two counts. The first calls upon the officers to say by what authority they claim to exercise the office of members of the board of education of Fairmount community high school district No. 234, and the second alleges that the school district is not a legal district. Respondents filed four pleas, and petitioner demurred to the third and fourth pleas, which demurrer was sustained. Repondents filed an amended fourth plea and abandoned their third plea. The petitioner thereupon filed two replications, and a demurrer was sustained to the second replication.

The pleas of the respondents set forth the steps in the organization of the school district and the election of a board of education, and allege that the district is compact and contiguous. The pleas also contain allegations bringing the district within the validating act approved May 10, 1921. Laws 1921, p. 797. The first replication denied that the territory is compact and contiguous and averred that it comprises three distinct and separate communities. The second replication, to which the demurrer was sustained, alleged that the district is not valid, for the reason that the election was not conducted as required by law, that women were illegally allowed to vote, and that the curative act of May 10, 1921, is unconstitutional.

The objections to the organization of the district and the election held therein have been considered by this court and disposed of contrary to the contention of appellant in People v. Opie, 301 Ill. 11, 133 N. E. 689, where the constitutionality of the validating act of May 10, 1921, was sustained.

The district in this case is rectangular in form, 5 miles east and west and 8 miles north and south. Fairmount lies 2 1/2 miles from the north boundary of the district, 5 miles from the south boundary, 1 mile from the east boundary, and 3 1/2 miles from the west boundary. The Wabash Railroad crosses the district east and west through Fairmount. The only other village in the district is Jamaica, which is on the east boundary of the district, 1 1/2 miles from the south boundary, and has about 200 inhabitants. The district is traversed both east and west and north and south by rock, brick, or concrete hard roads, and is compact and contiguous. People v. Brown, 306 Ill. 245, 137 N. E. 854;People v. Patterson, 305 Ill. 541, 137 N. E. 514.

The principal argument of appellant is that by reason of a stream called Salt Fork river, which extends through the northwest corner of the district, leaving approximately four sections of land on the northwest side of it, and because of the existence of the village of Jamaica in the southeast corner of the district, the territory lying north of Salt Fork river and that surrounding the village of Jamaica is not a part of the community of Fairmount, and therefore cannot properly be included in a community high school. Evidence offered in the record on the hearing touches largely this objection, and consists of statements of withesses that the greater part of the people living northwest of Salt Fork river do most of their trading and church-going in the village of Fithian, lying north, while those in the territory surrounding the village of Jamaica do most of their trading and church-going either in Jamaica, or in Sidell, southwest of Jamaica, and outsideof the district. This district is bounded almost entirely by the boundary lines of other school districts. The Fithian school district bounds it on the north and has been organized for several years. The lands of this district lying north of Salt Fork river and adjacent to the Fithian district were not included therein at the time that district was organized. While the district in question was organized after those surrounding it, no attempt had ever been made, so far as the record shows, to include in the other districts any of the territory of this district.

There is nothing in the statute providing for the organization of a community high school district which requires that a certain community center shall exist for all of the territory to be included in the district. So far as the term ‘community’ is concerned, it is intended to apply only to school purposes, and not to other habits of the peopleliving in a proposed district. People v. Drennan (No. 14771) 139 N. E. 128. With the exception of a short distance on either side of the Salt Fork river the land included in this district is level. The roads are good. Bridges cross this river connecting the sections of land in the northwest corner of the district referred to, with roads leading to Fairmount. There is nothing to show that the students may not with reasonable convenience attend high school in Fairmount. The district is a valid district, and the circuit court was right in so holding.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

DUNN and DUNCAN, JJ. (specially concurring).

We concur in the judgment of affirmance, but not in the opinion, and, in view of the large number of cases involving the organization of community high school districts and the great importance of the litigation, we deem it advisable to state at length our views on the questions involved in this and other cases constantly arising in such litigation, and the reasons on which those views are based.

The objections urged against the validity of these districts in the various cases which have come before the court are that the territory of the districts is not compact and contiguous, that such territory comprises several separate and distinct community centers, and that the election upon the proposition to organize the school districts was not conducted according to law. The act of May 10, 1921, cited in the opinion of the court, and which was held valid in People v. Opie, 301 Ill. 11, 133 N. E. 689, purported to legalize the organization of high school districts in all cases where a majority of the inhabitants of any contiguous territory voting on the proposition have voted, at an election called for the purpose by the county superintendent of schools, in favor of the organization of such territory into a community high school district, and at a subsequent election similarly called and held a board of education has been chosen for such district. It will be observed that this statute contains no requirement that the territory of the district shall be compact, but requires only that it be contiguous. It contains no requirement that the district shall be formed about a community center, and neither does section 89a of the School Law, as amended in 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 908), under which the districts in question were orgainzed. The opinion in this case concedes this, though in other cases it has been held that the territory of community high school districts must be limited to a community of people with common interests and associations and a community center. In the opinion in this case the question whether the territory of the district is compact and contiguous, and in other cases the question whether the district was organized about a community center, are considered as if those questions were material to the decision of the case, while in our judgment they are wholly immaterial. The whole matter of the organization of school districts is a legislative and not a judicial question, and the courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into such organization, except to determine whether it is in conformity with the statute.

There is no constitutional requirement that a school district shall be compact or contiguous. That requirement is wholly statutory, and first appears in school legislation in this state in section 6 of the act of 1911 to authorize the organization of high school districts. Laws 1911, p. 505. This act, but not this requirement, was held unconstitutional in People v. Weis, 275 Ill. 581, 114 N. E. 331. This requirement was also included in the amendment of section 89 of the School Law adopted in 1917, which authorized the establishment of community high schools. Laws 1917, p. 738. This act was also held unconstitutional at the February term, 1919. Kenyon v. Moore, 287 Ill. 233, 122 N. E. 548. Thereupon the act of June 28, 1919, was passed, which amended the School Law by the addition of section 89a, which provided for the organization of community high school districts, omitting the provisions which caused the act of 1917 to be held unconstitutional. Laws 1919, p. 908. This act also contained the requirement that the territory should be compact and contiguous. At the same session the General Assembly amended the School Law by the addition to the revised act of 1909 of seven sections, which authorized the organization of community consolidated school districts. This amendment required the territory to be organized into a community consolidated school district to be compact and contiguous. Laws 1919, p. 904.

Information in the nature of quo warranto were filed in a number of cases, questioning the validity of the organization of various districts...

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8 cases
  • People v. Brown
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 9, 2012
    ...which the constitution imposes, cannot be considered in determining the question of legislative power.” People ex rel. Lewman v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 522, 139 N.E. 132 (1923). Pursuant to Graham, we have brought our independent judgment to bear on this matter, but only with respect to the c......
  • People v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • July 26, 1932
    ...has plenary power to enact such laws as it may see fit. Sutter v. People's Gas Light Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N. E. 562;People v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 139 N. E. 132. It must be presumed in favor of an act of the Legislature that the latter considered the constitutionality of its action and de......
  • People ex rel. Lutz v. France
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 28, 1924
    ...That decision has been repeatedly followed and reaffirmed by this court in a number of cases, including the cases of People v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 139 N. E. 132, and People v. Price, 310 Ill. 66, 141 N. E. 409. It is now the settled law of this state, and we again affirm the constitutional......
  • Watts v. Dep't of Pub. Works
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 24, 1928
    ...Cunningham v. Underwood (C. C. A.) 116 F. 803. Regarding community high schools, it was held by this court in People v. Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 139 N. E. 132, that the term is to be construed in the light of school purposes, and not as to other habits of the people living in a proposed distric......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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