People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann

• Decision Date: 29 September 1966
• Citation: 220 N.E.2d 653,18 N.Y.2d 257,273 N.Y.S.2d 897
• Parties: , 220 N.E.2d 653 The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Earthan KEITT, Appellant, v. Daniel McMANN, as Warden of Clinton Prison, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 897

273 N.Y.S.2d 897

18 N.Y.2d 257, 220 N.E.2d 653

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Earthan KEITT, Appellant, v. Daniel McMANN, as Warden of Clinton Prison, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Sept. 29, 1966.

Nanette Dembitz, New York City, for appellant.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (Winifred C. Stanley and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

Frank S. Hogan, Dist. Atty. (H. Richard Uviller, Malvina H. Guggenheim and Milton M. Stein, New York City, of counsel), amicus curiae.

SCILEPPI, Judge.

Relator appeals to this court by our permission from an order of the Appellate Division, Third Department, which unanimously affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court, Clinton County, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that habeas corpus is not the proper remedy.

Having been indicted for robbery in the first degree and for carrying a dangerous weapon as a felony, relator was convicted, after a jury trial, only of robbery in the first degree and sentenced. On appeal to the Appellate Division, his sentence was modified. He was denied leave to appeal to this court (Code Crim.Proc., § 520), and his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Federal Supreme Court was also denied (376 U.S. 972, 84 S.Ct. 1140, 12 L.Ed.2d 86).

At the trial, the defendant stood mute on the question of his prior convictions. The prosecution, pursuant to section 275--b ^* of the Code of Criminal Procedure and over defense counsel's objection, then introduced evidence before the jury to the effect that Keitt had been previously convicted of attempted robbery in the third degree. Prior to the introduction of this proof, in an exchange with the court, the defendant unequivocally stated that he was going to take the stand in his defense. The defendant did, in fact, later testify and admitted that he had been previously convicted of attempted robbery, as well as some other crimes.

On August 28, 1964, by his attorneys, relator petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his imprisonment was illegal because the People's introduction before the trial jury of evidence of the attempted robbery destroyed the possibility of a fair verdict on the indictment and thus violated his constitutional guarantee of due process. In addition, it was urged that section 275--b itself is unconstitutional in that it violates due process and the privilege against self incrimination.

These alleged constitutional violations were not raised at the trial or on the appeal, rather, we are told, they first appeared in relator's petition for certiorari.

In determining the availability of habeas corpus under the now repealed Civil Practice Act, we settled upon the rule that it would not lie if the conviction was by a court which had jurisdiction over the person of the defendant and over the crime charged, as well as the power to impose the sentence which was meted out (Matter of Hogan v. New York Supreme Ct., Bronx County, 295 N.Y. 92, 97, 65 N.E.2d 181, 183). This narrow view of the grounds for habeas corpus relief represented by Hogan has over the years undergone a subtle albeit steady change never clearly articulated until today. People ex. rel. Colan v. La Vallee, 14 N.Y.2d 83, 86--87, 248 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854--855, 198 N.E.2d 240, 241, People ex rel. Lupo v. Fay, 13 N.Y.2d 253, 256, 246 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400, 196 N.E.2d 56, 58, People ex rel. Bartlam v. Murphy, 9 N.Y.2d 550, 554, 215 N.Y.S.2d 753, 756, 175 N.E.2d 336, 338, and People ex rel. Vischi v. Martin, 8 N.Y.2d 63, 66, 201 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755, 168 N.E.2d 94, 95, among others, may have been couched in terms of 'jurisdiction' and 'void judgments', but the use of these words was dictated more by respect for the history of habeas corpus than anything else.

Our holding today that habeas corpus is available to test a claim that the introduction of certain evidence violated both due process and the privilege against self incrimination requires us to acknowledge that habeas corpus is an appropriate proceeding to test a claim that the relator has been imprisoned after having been deprived of a fundamental constitutional or statutory right in a criminal prosecution, including, but not limited to, the right to be tried and sentenced by a court having jurisdiction over the charge and the person. For example, in Lupo (supra) the deprivation asserted by way of habeas corpus was the defendant's constitutional right to be present at all important stages of the trial; and in Vischi (supra), of the statutory rights found in sections 471--473, 480 and 481 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Lest anyone be misled, we add this caveat. We have intimated that to adhere to the rigidities of traditional practice and procedure would be contrary to the spirit and purposes of the writ (see Matter of Morhous v. New York Supreme Ct., 293 N.Y. 131, 139--140, 56 N.E.2d 79, 83--84). 84). While cases may arise where the right to invoke habeas corpus may take precedence over 'procedural orderliness and conformity' (People v. Schildhaus, 8 N.Y.2d 33, 36, 201 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98, 167 N.E.2d 640, 641), we are not holding that habeas corpus is either the only or the preferred means of vindicating fundamental constitutional or statutory rights (e.g., People v. Huntley, 18 N.Y.2d 72, 76--77, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841--843, 204 N.E.2d 179, 182--183). Departure from traditional orderly proceedings, such as appeal, should be permitted only when dictated, as here, by...