People ex rel. Lesnowski v. Von Holden

Decision Date12 November 1980
Citation435 N.Y.S.2d 620,107 Misc.2d 581
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Daniel J. LESNOWSKI, Petitioner, v. Martin VON HOLDEN, Director of Central New York Psychiatric Center; Thomas A. Coughlin III, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services; and Edward R. Hammock, Chairman of the New York State Division of Parole, Respondents.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, for petitioner; Albert B. Lawrence, Student Atty., Lanny E. Walter, Supervising Atty., Albany, of counsel.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, for respondents; by Thomas J. Maroney, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel.

JOHN P. BALIO, Justice.

This proceeding was instituted by a writ of habeas corpus. Since no evidence was submitted on the legality of the petitioner's present detention, the Court has treated this petition as an Article 78 proceeding in the nature of certiorari to review a determination of the Board of Parole. People ex rel. Davis v. Arnette, 57 A.D.2d 562, 393 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Second Dept., 1977).

The essential facts are not in dispute. The petitioner was convicted in New York of burglary and sentenced to imprisonment. While on conditional release, he absconded and was determined to be delinquent on November 20, 1979. He was arrested in Florida on a charge of burglary on December 8, 1979 and committed to the county jail. On January 11, 1980, petitioner pleaded guilty. A pre-sentence investigation thereafter revealed that he was wanted by New York officials. On March 24, 1980, the petitioner appeared for sentencing, and the Florida Court, pursuant to Section 948.01(3) of the Florida Statutes (F.S.A.), withheld any adjudication of guilt, placed the petitioner on probation on condition that he serve one year in the county jail, and then released him from probation as of the date he was taken into custody by New York authorities.

Upon return to New York and in June 1980, the Board of Parole found petitioner in violation of the terms of his conditional release, revoked his release and apparently made a determination that petitioner was entitled to jail time credit on his interrupted sentence of 26 days (April 4 to April 30, 1980) while in the custody of New York authorities. That determination was affirmed by the Appeals Unit of the Board of Parole on September 18, 1980, and it is this latter determination that is subject to review here.

The Appeals Unit determined that petitioner was only entitled to jail time credit for custodial time in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment for a conviction under Penal Law, § 70.40(3)(c)(iii).

The petitioner contends that he was never convicted under Florida law; that the New York courts must accord Florida law full faith and credit; that the Florida determination was tantamount to a dismissal or acquittal; and that the practical effect of the conduct of Florida officials was to hold the petitioner in custody until he was picked up by New York authorities.

The pertinent portion of the Penal Law, § 70.40(3)(c), provides for the allowance of a credit to an interrupted sentence for time spent in custody between the time of delinquency and the resumption of the sentence, provided,

"(ii) that such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal; or

(iii) that such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a conviction, but in such case, if a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the credit allowed shall be limited to the portion of time spent in custody that exceeds the period, term or maximum term of imprisonment imposed for such conviction."

Where a Judge, pursuant to F.S.A. § 948.01(3), withholds an adjudication of guilt, technically there has been no conviction. Thus, applying full faith and credit to Florida law, the prior withholding of an adjudication of guilt upon a plea of guilty cannot be considered a prior conviction for the purpose of finding a defendant to be a second felony offender. People v. Bell, 82 Misc.2d 1021, 372 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1975); see also Shead v. State of Florida, 367 So.2d 264 (Fla.App., 1979).

However, it is equally clear that the withholding of an adjudication of guilt does not constitute an acquittal or dismissal. If the Court withholds an adjudication of guilt, it must either sentence the defendant or place him under probation. F.S.A. § 948.01(3). If the defendant violates probation, the court, upon a finding of violation of probation, must continue or modify the probation or revoke the probation, adjudge the defendant guilty and impose sentence. F.S.A. § 948.06(1); United States v. Hartsfield, 387 F.Supp. 16 (M.D.Fla., 1975). It should be further noted that the withholding of an adjudication of guilt only applies when the defendant has pleaded guilty or nolo contendere or been found guilty by jury verdict or court decision after a non-jury trial. F.S.A. § 948.01. The "withholding" is not tantamount to a dismissal or acquittal. Rather, the purpose is to avoid the stigma of a criminal record where prospects are good for rehabilitation. Holland v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 352 So.2d 914 (Fla.App., 1977).

Therefore, applying full faith and credit to Florida law, the determination of the Florida court was technically neither a conviction nor a dismissal or acquittal. Also a strict application of statutory construction and full faith and credit would deny this petitioner any consideration of jail time credit under the Penal Law. However, the Court is of the view that the New York jail time credit provisions must be interpreted in light of the unique...

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